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Structuring successful public-private partnership (P3) concession contracts is a problem 
for both the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) of Nigeria and private 
concessionaires that partner with the government to finance the delivery of public goods 
in the territory. Researchers have estimated the percentage of P3 concession failures in 
Nigeria to be between 50% and 60%. The purpose of this study is to explore 
concessionaires’ lived experiences involving P3 concession uncertainties, opportunities, 
and barriers while they partner with the FCTA of Nigeria to deliver public goods. The 
key research question examined the meaning of P3 concession uncertainty to 
concessionaires with the FCTA of Nigeria, and to what extent these choices, options, and 
experiences affected project values.  This phenomenological study was conducted 
through online interviews with 18 senior management staff of companies that have or 
have had P3 concessions with the FCTA since 2011. Interview data were transcribed and 
coded manually for efficiency before importing codes into NVivo for analysis. All 
concessionaires recounted experiencing both barriers and opportunities during their 
concessions with the FCTA. Each participant reported being unable to freely negotiate 
concession contract terms and structures. Useful recommendations and study results may 
inform and improve P3 collaborations for more efficient and effective infrastructural 
development. Recommendations will aid policy makers in crafting better P3 contracts 
and public policies that might escalate successful projects, which may boost development 
from Public Infrastructure delivery and improve living standards of the society leading to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Adequate public infrastructure is a driving force for national growth and equity 
because it increases economic growth through access to labor and markets, both internal 
and global (Oluba, 2008; Varnavskii & Tsvirkun, 2017). Public infrastructure consists of 
fundamental facilities, systems, and services of a country, city, or other area that is 
designed to support the efficient functioning of its economy (Oluba, 2008). Basic public 
infrastructure may include roads, waterways, airways, airports, schools, hospitals, 
markets, power generation and distribution systems, communication systems, shopping 
facilities, recreational facilities, parks and games reserves, stadia, seaports, railways, 
waste disposal facilities, and sewages and flood control docks. Policy makers in Nigeria 
seek enhanced economic growth and thus are focusing on building the infrastructure of 
the nation-state. Specifically, the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) of 
Nigeria is tasked with providing adequate public infrastructure for residents of Abuja as 
well as the entire FCT.  
The FCTA began using public-private partnership (P3) concessions in 2007 as a 
way of providing public infrastructure that its fiscal budget did not cover (Babatunde et 
al., 2015; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016). During a P3 concession, the public sector defines 
or indicates the needed facility or services, and the private sector executes the delivery of 
the project but then returns control of the facility or service back to the public sector at 
the end of the collaboration (Babatunde et al., 2014; Sanni & Hashim, 2014). While this 
concession process has resulted in the growth of some infrastructure in the FCT, not all 
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project outcomes have been successful. This is because P3 concessions are large sunk 
unverifiable contracts that are hampered by high risks, ambiguities, and unverifiability 
due to multiple actors, may experience political manipulations, require high profile 
technical requirements, and result in long concession periods (Hurk & Verhoest, 2016). 
 Concession contract structuring is a primary factor that affects project outcomes 
(Babatunde et al., 2015; Kadiri et al., 2015; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016). The structure of 
a concession contract shapes project outcomes: a flexible contract structure permits 
renegotiations as needed, while fixed or rigid contracts save transaction costs but 
preclude renegotiations (Hurk & Verhoest, 2016; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2016; Umar & 
Okafor, 2015). Because P3 concession contracts are generally large in scope and involve 
long-lasting relationship-specific investments, P3 concession contracts cannot be written 
completely to specify all contingencies (Xiong & Zhang, 2016). To better understand the 
complexities of the P3 concession process, I seek to understand what P3 concession 
uncertainty means to concessionaires who have promoted P3 concessions at FCTA and 
how the experience of P3 concession uncertainties affects goals and objectives of FCTA 
of Nigeria, and in turn, project outcomes. 
 This study is needed to explore and understand what P3 concession uncertainty 
means to concessionaires who partner with government to finance and promote P3 
concession projects. I researched P3 concession uncertainty and how contract structuring 
specifically has shaped project outcomes. I seek to make contributions to the literature in 
the P3 field because the study will identify lived experiences of concessionaires who 
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engage in P3 concessions, and use their experiences as a lens through which I analyze the 
role that complexities play in structuring and implementing P3 projects.  
Background of the Study 
Nigeria is the most populous nation in sub-Saharan Africa. With an estimated 
population of 181 million people, it is the seventh most populous country in the world 
(United States Census Bureau, 2015; Worldometers, 2015). Due to its large population 
and scarcity of funds with which to finance adequate public infrastructure delivery, 
Nigeria suffers from a large infrastructural deficit. This has triggered the government’s 
decision to deliver public services through P3s (Babatunde et al., 2014). This decision led 
to the  Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act (ICRCA) of 2005 and 
signing of its first P3 concession contract in September 2005. Section 36 of the ICRCA 
defines concession as a contractual arrangement in which the contractor undertakes 
construction, financing of infrastructure, facility and operation, maintenance and supply 
of any equipment and machinery for any infrastructure or provision of any service 
(Akinwale & Aremo, 2010).  
 Nigeria’s first concession contract is the Nigerian ports concessions (NPC). 
Though considered one of the largest concessions of all time because it involves a 
contract with 20 concessions, it is now a failure more than a decade later (Nwanosike, 
Tipi & Warnock-Smith, 2016, p. 18). NPCs were necessitated by issues arising from 
insecurity of ports, inefficiencies, corruption, mismanagement, and a debt of $34 million 
USD that threatened the ports (Akinwale & Aremo, 2010). It was also expected that 
NPCs would create more investments and employment, lower tariffs, and increase 
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economic growth (Akinwale & Aremo, 2010). However, the porous regulatory 
environment in Nigeria due to extant endemic corruption in the system and lack of 
appropriate regulatory framework and strategies to protect the masses from abuse of 
monopoly powers of concessionaires as well as also protect investments from 
unwarranted government interruptions hampered positive externalities (Akinwale & 
Aremo, 2010; Nwanosike et al., 2016). 
Researchers have studied P3 concession uncertainties but have not explored how 
concessionaires experience these uncertainties and how these experiences affect their 
attitudes towards P3 concession projects. This study is needed to understand what P3 
concession uncertainties mean to concessionaires in the FCTA of Nigeria, and how these 
experiences affect project outcomes. Decision makers from various sectors can use 
results of this study to structure better concession contracts in the future.  
Problem Statement 
Public-private partnerships are new in Nigeria, and there have been many failures 
and a few successes (U-Dominic et al., 2015; Umar & Okafor, 2015). 75% of P3 
concession contracts in Nigeria fail due to poorly structured agreements that do not 
feature needed flexibilities. These contracts fail to adapt downside risks of P3 projects, 
consequently increasing the project’s level of uncertainty (Babatunde et al., 2015; Kadiri 
et al., 2015). The level of uncertainty in Nigerian P3 contracts and how these 
uncertainties affect concessionaires can contribute to failures of P3 concession contracts 
(Babatunde et al., 2015; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016a).  
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When a P3 contract lacks adaptation mechanisms such as flexibility, which 
enables parties to exercise options as contingent claims, the contract becomes rigid 
(Beuve et al., 2014a; Beuve et al., 2014b; Cruz & Marques, 2013a, 2013b; Da Cruz & 
Marques, 2012; Opawole & Jagboro, 2017). A rigid contract may save transaction costs 
by avoiding renegotiations, but it shuts out contract adaptation mechanisms (Babatunde et 
al., 2015; Beauve et al., 2014b; Mudi et al., 2015; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016b). The lack 
of proper structuring of P3 concession contracts in Nigeria influences concessionaires’ 
behaviors, which impacts project outcomes because private operators are the drivers of 
the projects.  
Scholars have explored P3 concession contract structuring in Nigeria and how it 
affects the success of the projects. However, they have not studied concessionaires’ 
experiences involving concession uncertainties, how they cope with the phenomenon, and 
their experiences in terms of how the phenomenon affect their concession projects.  
Purpose of the Study 
In this qualitative phenomenological study, I explored and interpreted 
concessionaires’ experiences of barriers and opportunities that emerged during their P3 
concessions with the FCTA of Nigeria. The purpose is to identify what P3 concession 
uncertainty meant to private promoters, while collaborating with the FCTA of Nigeria to 
deliver public infrastructure. For the purpose of this study, P3 concession uncertainty is 





This research study was guided by one major question: What is the meaning of P3 
concession uncertainty to concessionaires within the FCTA of Nigeria, and to what extent 
did these choices, options, and experiences affect project values? 
Theoretical Framework 
Risk Flexibility Theory (RFT) 
The RFT was founded by Chiara and Kokkaew. It is used to acquire or arrive at 
the optimal combination of flexibility, using both real option analysis and contractual 
flexibility analysis (Kokkaew & Sampim, 2014, p. 457). Chiara and Kokkaew’s RFT was 
the conceptual framework through which I explore experiences, choices, options, and 
influences involving participants’ perceptions and knowledge. 
Whereas parties to a concession cannot consider all possible eventualities of a P3 
concession that runs for decades, they engage in strategic investments and enforcement. 
Uncertainty leads to risk in terms of goals or objectives, constituting a threat to success or 
a welcome effect when properly managed (Da Cruz & Marques, 2012; Domingues & 
Zlatkovic, 2015; Iossa & Martimort, 2015). Uncertainties can be turned into opportunities 
if risks are identified and flexible options are created with real practical application (Da 
Cruz & Marques, 2012). For a P3 project to be economically efficient, there must be 
proper allocation and handling of risks amongst stakeholders of the project (Chiara & 
Kokkaew, 2009; Cruz & Marques, 2013a; Dong & Chiara, 2010).  
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Logical Connections Among Key Elements 
The phenomenon that grounded my study is P3 concession uncertainty. 
Concession uncertainties generate risks that may affect goals of the concession project in 
unknown ways. Therefore, to avoid risks that are generated by these uncertainties, parties 
to the concession must determine ways of management and mitigation of risks. To induce 
flexibility that is needed to manage and mitigate these downside risks, flexible contracts 
should be designed (Beuve et al., 2014a, 2014b; Cruz & Marques, 2012). Risk flexibility 
analysis projects risk allocation as an adaptation mechanism by which risk is allocated to 
the party within a partnership who is best able to manage it with the least amount of cost 
(Domingues & Zlatkovic, 2015; Domingues et al., 2014).  
The economic theory of incomplete contracts explains that parties get into 
contracts to protect specific investment, made towards ex-ante efficiency for more value 
(Scott & Triantis, 2005). Contracts sometimes commit parties to an exchange that might 
later become wasteful, that is when the cost to the promisor of performance becomes 
higher than the value to the promise (Scott & Triantis, 2005). Therefore, because 
concessions are investments with unknown downside risks, contract agreements are 
incomplete and generate uncertainties (Domingues et al., 2014, p. 6). This means that 
lack of flexibility to cope with uncertainties might affect contracts via resultant inefficient 
investments generated by insufficient contractual protection (Domingues et al., 2014). 
Relationship Between Study Approach and Theoretical Framework 
My study approach involved using a qualitative phenomenological design to 
explore experiences of those who have lived through P3 concession uncertainty in the 
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FCTA of Nigeria. I researched how P3 uncertainty presents itself to the consciousness of 
concessionaires within FCTA  by interpreting their abilities to address uncertainties that 
emerged as barriers, and use emerging opportunities through the lens of the RFT.  
Van Manen’s hermeneutic phenomenology entails interpretations of participants’ 
experiences. Husserl’s concept of epoch (or bracketing) is when researchers are 
encouraged to set aside their presuppositions and previous understanding of the 
phenomenon and attempt a fresh perspective. Hermeneutical phenomenological 
researchers are expected to declare their knowledge of the phenomenon under 
investigation and place their biases aside in order to freshly understand the meaning of 
the phenomenon according to participants (Merriam, 2014, p. 27). 
 A hermeneutic phenomenological approach enabled me situate myself. Again, I 
sequenced my open-ended interview questions and ensured that they were neutral, 
singular, and clear enough. This helped this researcher use the participants  answers to 
interpret meaning of my data as accurately as possible, remaining true to the facts . The 
research question involved  concessionaires’ experiences of P3 concession uncertainty. 
Themes were drawn from responses and behavioral patterns of interviewees during data 
analysis. One major research question was developed to understand what P3 concession 
uncertainty means to concessionaires within the FCTA of Nigeria.  
Nature of the Study 
 Epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge, which guides researchers’ 
study of social phenomena (Creswell, 2013; Holloway, 1997). I used the Heideggerian 
hermeneutic phenomenology to understand how my participants lived through P3 
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uncertainty in relation to my preconceptions of the phenomenon. I focused on cognitive 
meaning of interview data text. Solan and Bowe (2014) argued that a hermeneutic 
phenomenological research does not look for truth but for informants’ perception of truth 
as they perceive them.  
This hermeneutic phenomenological study was used to interpret experiences 
involving P3 concession uncertainty for nine P3 concessionaires in the FCTA of Nigeria. 
A sample size of six to 10 is the norm for qualitative phenomenological studies. Chapter 
3 contains a more detailed explanation of the sample size. Concessionaires who were 
chosen purposefully for this study were those who have experienced P3 concession 
uncertainty while collaborating with the FCTA of Nigeria. The central research question 
served as the basis for crafting interview questions. A comprehensive discussion of the 
study’s methodology is given in Chapter 3.  
Definitions 
Concessionaire: A concessionaire is a promoter and private partner in a P3 
concession who assumes responsibility for the service provision during the concession 
period (Cruz & Marques 2013b). 
Contractual flexibility: Contractual flexibilities are adaptation mechanisms that 
allow for shifting risks of a concession contract from one party to the other in pursuit of 
efficiency and improved contract behavior (Cruz & Marque, 2012, p. 476). Flexibility 
can be classified into four factors: strategic, tactical, operational, and external or 
exogenous flexibility, based on a scale of options (Dong & Chiara, 2010). Strategic or 
system flexibilities are long term and irreversible structural impacts on the system which 
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are costly; tactical or managerial options involve significant costs to reverse or exercise; 
operational flexibility does not require changes in systems infrastructure, but rather ways 
in which infrastructure is used; exogenous flexibilities are those flexibilities that exist 
outside the system (Cruz & Marques, 2012, p. 476; Dong & Chiara, 2010). 
Contractual flexibility analysis: Contractual flexibility analysis is a proactive 
uncertainty management procedure that can improve the economic efficiency of P3s by 
incorporating flexibilities into contract structuring (Dong & Chiara, 2010, p. 87). Because 
infrastructure projects are contract structuring projects, the terms of contract agreements 
determine their viability and economic rewards and also control allocation of risks (Dong 
& Chiara, 2010). Stakeholders must decide how to allocate and address risk through 
appropriate contractual structures. This is achieved via long-term irreversible contracts 
that allow both parties in a P3 to make contingent claims that incorporate interdependent 
flexibilities into the contract structure (Chiara & Kokkaew, 2009; Dong & Chiara, 2010; 
Kokkaew et al., 2012). 
Contractual rigidity: A governance mechanism that reinforces commitment from 
contracting parties to establish a contract agreement that does not permit renegotiations to 
curtail challenges from political contesters, interest groups, and third parties (Beuve et al., 
2014a, 2014b; Domingues & Zlatkovic, 2015). They are formalized, standardized, and 
bureaucratic procedures embedded in contracts, and they are displayed via forms of 
arbitration, certification, evaluation, litigation, penalties, termination, design, and 
contingencies (Beuve et al., 2014b, p. 9; Domingues & Zlatkovic, 2015, p. 207). 
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Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA): The FCTA is the office of the 
Nigerian FCT, which is mandated to provide effective and efficient administrative 
frameworks, critical infrastructure, and other services to FCT residents. The minister is 
the governor of the Nigerian FCT. The FCT has six area councils and sits on 8,000 square 
kilometers of landmass (FCTA, 2013). The FCT has natural resources like coal, 
columbite, tantalite, granite, precious stones, and gemstones. The FCT’s climate involves 
dust haze, cold, and dryness. The weather is rainy, with dry seasons of brief hamartia. 
Geographical features include lush vegetation and rich soil rivers, hills, mountains, and 
forests (FCTA, 2013). 
Public-Private Partnership (P3) Concessions: P3 concessions are complex long-
term agreements between public and private actors that involve nonverifiable investments 
for the delivery of complex services with high uncertainty (Estache & Saussier, 2014; 
Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015). Public infrastructures are delivered by the private partner with 
private funds, or in some cases, an asset may be transferred from the public to a private 
sector partner. The private partner will automatically assume responsibility of providing 
the public service which the public partner is meant to provide and maintain and improve 
on the facility or service for a concession period of usually 20 to 30 years (Mouraviev & 
Kakabadse, 2016; Xiong & Zhang, 2014). Private partners recoup their investments by 
way of user fees charged for infrastructure, which is what differentiates concessions from 
availability-based P3s and process-plant projects where the government pays in advance 
for facilities or services (Yescombe, 2017, p. 7-8). 
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Real Options Approach: The real options approach is a method used in valuing 
projects with flexibilities and uncertainties. It involves taking action (e.g., abandoning, 
expanding, and deferring) at a predetermined price (exercise price) for a predetermined 
period (Chiara & Kokkaew, 2010).  Real options on projects are used in capital budgeting 
decisions during the preplanning stage of an infrastructure life cycle, while real options in 
projects are used to select the most flexible design system during the design stage of this 
cycle. 
Risk and uncertainty: Taylan et al. (2014) defined risk as an extant phenomenon 
that threatens a project’s key performance indicators due to presence of uncertainties and 
unexpected variations in quality of inputs. Da Cruz and Marques (2012) defined risk as 
the effect that uncertainty has on objectives. Risk is related to uncertain consequences of 
events, and it may threaten or lead to success (Da Cruz & Marques, 2012, p. 1435). Risks 
affect projects negatively by exposing them to issues such as cost overrun, time slippage, 
technical shortfalls in performance, and unrealized benefits (Taylan et al., 2014, p. 107). 
There are three phases to risk management: risk identification, risk allocation, and risk 
mitigation. The risk management process is a life cycle that starts with the preparation 
and design phases involving construction and operation (Da Cruz & Marques, 2012). 
Value for money (VFM): VFM is the extent of cost savings when public 
infrastructure is delivered through a P3 compared to the traditional government 




Assumptions are expectations that researchers believe to be true but have not been 
proven or verified (Silverman, 2013). This study included a few assumptions. I assumed 
that participants demonstrated integrity, sincerity, and truthfulness based on their 
experiences during open-ended online recorded interviews. The second assumption was 
that questions during interviews were clear, understandable, and unbiased questions that 
were relevant to concessionaires’ experience involving concession uncertainty. The last 
assumption was that face-to-face interviews with open-ended questions were the best 
method of data collection.  
Scope and Delimitations 
I used a phenomenological approach to chronicle experiences involving P3 
concession uncertainty for nine private partners who have or have had P3 concessions 
with the FCTA of Nigeria. I studied the essence of P3 concession uncertainty as 
experienced by concessionaires, paying attention to the nature of contracts, how 
concessionaires coped with them, and how the contract designs led to adaptation through 
the concession period.  
I focused on understanding and interpreting the phenomenon by documenting 
what these experiences bring to participants’ consciousness and interpreting them through 
my pre-knowledge of the phenomenon, and considering its effect on their P3 concessions 
with the FCTA.  
P3 usually have rigid contractual structures to reflect real commitment from 
contracting parties (Beuve et al., 2014a, p. 20). Although rigid contractual structures 
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reduce transaction costs, they ignore flexibility by which renegotiation of contracts can 
address downside risks to achieve economic efficiency (Dong & Chiara, 2010, p. 6). This 
study revealed the effects of P3 concession uncertainty as experienced by concessionaires 
in terms of the value of projects within the FCTA. There are levels of flexibility that can 
assist these concessionaires in coping with P3 uncertainties. The three levels of flexibility 
are system, managerial, and contractual flexibilities (Kokkaew & Sampim, 2014). System 
flexibility refers to the ability of a system to make physical adaptations in response to 
various purposes or conditions; managerial flexibility refers to the management style that 
involves changing the way a facility is operated to create efficiency; contractual 
flexibility refers to those exogenous flexibilities found outside the scope of a system and 
operation which involve mitigating market and demand risks (Kokkaew & Sampim, 
2014). A contract is considered rigid when it has fixed terms, or when the agreement 
involves government mechanisms that reinforce commitments from contracting parties 
and avoid renegotiations through embedded formalized, standardized, or bureaucratic 
procedures (Beuve et al., 2014b, p. 9). Therefore, by undertaking this study, I understood 
what concession uncertainty brings to concessionaires’ consciousness. 
Knowing experiences involving P3 concession uncertainty for concessionaires is 
of importance because it shows how the phenomenon has affected both concessions and 
concessionaires. Stakeholders may use results of this study to make recommendations 
that will aid policy makers in future decision-making for economic efficiency. Social 
implications of this study include improving living and social conditions among 
concessionaires, their communities, the FCTA, and Nigeria as a country by designing 
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successful projects. Furthermore, this study supports policy makers better understanding 
of contract designs and their effects on infrastructure concessions. This study includes 
recommendations that may be useful to both concessionaires and government officials 
who make concession decisions, governments at different levels, foreigners who might 
wish to enter into P3 concessions in Nigeria, and the body of knowledge regarding P3. 
Delimitations are boundaries set by researchers for their studies by defining 
parameters of their investigations. I studied only concessionaires’ experiences of P3 
concession uncertainty and contract designs that increase the economic value of P3 
projects. I chose a purposeful sample of nine Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) or 
managing directors of P3-promoting organizations who have experienced concession 
uncertainty with the FCTA of Nigeria. Open-ended online recorded interviews were used 
for data collection technique .  
Limitations 
Limitations are potential weaknesses that are beyond the researcher’s control and 
hinder or restrict a study (Haug, 2015; Silverman, 2013). There are five limitations in this 
study. The first limitation was the lack of adequate funds to finance the study. Working 
from Africa, it is difficult to secure research grants. The second limitation involved 
population size. Qualitative scholars use small populations that could present difficulties 
in terms of generalizability (Maxwell, 2013; Patton, 2002). The third limitation involved 
participants’ unwillingness to appreciate and acknowledge my suppositions linked to 
their experiences in dealing with the FCTA of Nigeria. The fourth limitation comes from 
the inability to transfer qualitative studies to a broad population. The fifth limitation 
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involve the bias I bring to the study, considering my experiences of P3 concession 
uncertainty and rigid contract design with the FCTA of Nigeria. 
Significance of the Study 
This study will show the effect of P3 concession uncertainty on concessionaires 
and how they cope with both risky and opportunistic effects of the phenomenon. It also 
shows what concession uncertainty means to concessionaires who collaborate with the 
FCTA of Nigeria. The United Nations Human Settlement Program (2015) asserts that 
although Nigeria is below average in terms of urbanization level (45%), it has one of the 
world’s highest urbanization growth rates, estimated at 5.3% per year. Nigeria is the most 
populous nation in sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated population of 181 million. It is 
the seventh most populous country in the world (US Census Bureau, 2015; Worldometer, 
2015). Being the fastest growing economy in Africa, Nigeria deserves a functional 
channel of infrastructure delivery to  empower its society in compliance with sustainable 
global development. Because Nigeria has turned to P3s as an alternative way of public 
service delivery, there is a need to structure P3 concession contracts successfully and 
provide efficient gains. Therefore, a well-articulated P3 contract design will lead to better 
relationships between public and private actors and avoid concessionaires exposures to 
wasteful investments. Avoidance of contracts that lead to wasteful investments will 
increase value of projects  overcome downside risks. 
Significance to Practice 
Findings from this study provide information about better P3 concession 
contracting designs that may lead to solutions where everyone benefits, including public 
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and private actors. In addition, the study highlights P3 concession uncertainty according 
to concessionaires and how they cope with, and improved those situations. Policy makers 
and other public actors’ better understanding of how P3 contract designs affect 
concessionaires will lead to improved business relationships between public and private 
partners. Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) suggested that opportunities to enhance 
communication, enrich transparency, and strengthen partnerships could be generated by 
building and nurturing business relationships between public and private management. 
Such collaborative relationships support the exchange of knowledge and resources 
toward successful projects. 
Significance to Theory 
Through this dissertation, I have provided information regarding how 
concessionaires could embed flexibility in their concessions with the FCTA of Nigeria 
and exercise elements of the RFT to manage business risks appropriately. RFT contingent 
claims help concessionaires adapt to changing circumstances involving emerging barriers 
and opportunities (Cruz & Marques, 2012; Wang & Zhao, 2018). RFT is important 
because it is the lens through which I understand and interpret concessionaires’ 
experiences involving P3 concession uncertainty.  
Significance to Social Change 
The findings of this study may provide information regarding collaborations 
between public and private actors involving positive social change. The public partner 
creates an enabling business environment and institutional framework, while the private 
partner brings in expertise and finance that are critical to successful P3 concessions, 
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providing needed infrastructure to improve social conditions of societies (U-Dominic et 
al., 2015, p. 64). In addition, successful P3 projects create jobs for unemployed persons 
(Haug, 2015). With successful P3s, governments create VFM, using private finance and 
expertise to deliver public services that are not ordinarily covered by their fiscal budget 
(U-Dominic et al., 2015; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2016). 
Summary  
Governments engage in rigid P3 contracts to reinforce commitments of 
contracting parties, and they do not envisage uncertainties involved in an incomplete 
contract like a P3 concession. This leads to avoiding renegotiations that would have 
availed parties opportunities to appropriately allocate and address downside risks. This 
study involved employing a phenomenological design and drawing on experiences of P3 
concessionaires who are or were involved in P3 contracts with the FCTA. Nine CEOs or 
managing directors were interviewed to understand P3 concession uncertainties from 
their experiences. Interview questions were created to help me understand 
concessionaires’ experience involving P3 concession uncertainties while collaborating 
with the FCTA of Nigeria.  
In Chapter 2, I outline current literature regarding the relevance of the problem 
and databases searched. The theoretical framework of the study was identified in addition 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The infrastructure delivery has four complex stages. The stages are  planning, 
designs, implementation, and  operation and maintenance. This process is so complex 
that professionalism and effective flexibilities are required for successful delivery of 
infrastructure projects (Shaik, 2016, p. 22). Closing the infrastructure gap of any 
economy in Sub-Saharan Africa creates profound financing needs (Calderon et al., 2018, 
p. 1). Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria generate revenue but have poor 
public investment management systems and procurement methods (Calderon et al, 2018, 
p. 1). Thus, these countries find it difficult to effectively deliver large sunk infrastructural 
projects. 
Some governments have limited financial resources with which to meet their 
public infrastructure delivery needs and consequently turn to the private sector to finance 
some of these public services. To ensure an efficient and cost-effective delivery of public 
infrastructure in Nigeria and other developing countries in Africa, governments turn to 
P3s. P3s are incomplete contracts between the public sector and private firms, involving 
large sunk investments on the part of the private partner over a period of years which 
have uncertainties in terms of delivery of complex public services (Beuve et al., 2014b). 
Types of uncertainties associated with P3s include ambiguity uncertainty (imprecision 
due to ambiguity of communication), epistemic uncertainty (lack of information or data 
to support the project, aleatory uncertainty (variations in variables of the system), and 
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interaction uncertainty (unknown outcomes of agent interactions; Cruz & Marques, 2012, 
p. 474).  
Public contracts are characterized by formalized, standardized, bureaucratic, and 
rigid procedures (Beuve et al., 2014b, p. 9). These rigid contracts are structured to avoid 
renegotiations, but are often renegotiated due to maladaptation and orthogonality (Beuve 
et al., 2014b). Beuve et al. (2014b) said a weak government facing opposition or an 
election tends to sign rigid contracts. Roumboutsos and Saussier (2015) said it is crucial 
to induce flexibility into P3 concession contracts  to enable renegotiation, even if the 
contract is rigid and well-designed. Rigidity does not make a contract more complete, 
only makes it less renegotiated (Ross & Yan, 2015; Trebilcock & Rosenstock, 2015).  
Van Den Hurk and Verhoest (2016) said these partnerships fail or stay incomplete 
because of the rigid or standard nature of traditional public infrastructure contracts. 
Contractual rigidity does not allow needed learning or flexibility to properly allocate and 
address risks. Public partners sometimes relinquish their policy capacity rights to oversee 
concession projects, allowing concessionaires to work in isolation in the face of project-
related complexities and uncertainties. When the project outcome does not satisfy the 
potential users, they may fight to bring these projects to an abrupt stop, or be renegotiated 
or auctioned.  
The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine, explore, and describe P3 
concession uncertainties according to concessionaires in collaboration with the FCTA of 
Nigeria. In this chapter, themes that enabled a general deeper understanding of the 
context of the phenomenon are presented, and the phenomenological design is justified. 
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Additionally, this chapter includes literature search strategies, the theoretical foundation, 
conceptual framework, literature review and gap, phenomenology, and summary and 
conclusion. It includes information regarding what concession uncertainty is, what 
behaviors concession uncertainty activates in concessionaires, how concessionaires cope 
with concession uncertainty, what motivates public and private actors to partner, 
distinction between fixed and flexible concession contracts, relationship between risk and 
uncertainty and their connection to incomplete contracts, and how contractual flexibility 
could be used in the management of concession uncertainty. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Sources were reviewed using Walden University’s library services. I used the 
following databases to find sources for the literature review: ProQuest, EBSCOHost, 
ERIC, BIG Thoreau, Google Scholar,, PsycARTICLES, PsycBooks, and PsycINFO. 
Theories and concepts relating to P3 concession uncertainty were analyzed in terms of 
contract designs and their effects on concession projects. Information was gathered from 
a peer-reviewed journals, scholarly texts, and required readings from public 
administration and psychology courses. I used the following keywords and phrases: 
government concessions, public-private partnerships, government collaborations, 
concessions in Nigeria, uncertainty, contract designs, fixed and flexible contracts, P3 
contract configurations, contract structures, risk management, and renegotiation. Table 1 





Synopsis of Current Sources 
 
  






     
Research-based peer-
reviewed journals 
146 131 15 0 
Dissertations 6 5 1 0 
Conference Proceedings 13 10 3 0 
Seminal and 
Contemporary Books 
29 12 17 0 
Others (Business online) 2 0 2 0 





The theory I used in my research is Chiara and Kokkaew’s RFT, using real option 
analysis (ROA) and contractual flexibility analysis (CFA) to evaluate and analyze risks of 
infrastructure development projects to make them more economically efficient. The RFT 
includes ROA and CFA to guarantee optimal combination of flexibility to secure 
economically efficient contracts and increase value of infrastructure investments.  
The discount cash flow (DCF) technique is the tool for valuation of infrastructure 
investment involving capturing the inherent value of flexibility (Martins et al., 2014, p. 
73). The DCF is used to calculate costs of additional flexibility to infrastructure via 
economic valuation without including benefits of its use in terms of adaptable timing. 
ROA includes a holistic valuation that includes both costs and benefits (Martins et al., 
2014, p. 73). The CFA was derived from the financial option theory and was proposed by 
Chiara and Kokkaew to be used in the evaluation of endogenous interdependent 
flexibility within an infrastructure contract that involves multiple shareholders. 
Infrastructure projects are traditionally structured as long-term rigid contracts with a high 
level of uncertainty, which is why they are called incomplete contracts (Dong & Chiara, 
2010). Such rigid long-term contracts usually are not successful when they lack 
flexibilities (Dong & Chiara, 2010). To create economically efficient contracts, rigid 
contracts should have flexibilities innovatively embedded in them to provide shareholders 
with contingent claims that enable proper risk allocation all through the project’s 
lifecycle (Dong & Chiara, 2010). 
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Flexibility can be classified into three categories: system flexibility, which 
involves infrastructural capability to adapt to various conditions and purposes, 
managerial flexibility, which refers to a project manager’s ability to manage a system in 
an adaptive and responsive way, and contractual flexibility, which refers to types of 
flexibility that could be acquired through contract agreements (Kokkaew & Sampim, 
2014, p. 456). 
In a relationship-specific investment like P3, transaction costs are generated when 
parties bargain sharply or display opportunistic behaviors (Beuve et al., 2014a; Dong & 
Chiara, 2010). To avoid transaction costs caused by opportunistic behaviors, 
governments tend to write rigid infrastructure contracts (Dong & Chiara, 2010). 
However, because infrastructure contracts are naturally high uncertainty projects due to 
parties’ inability to foresee situations and environments in the future, downside risks 
cannot be allocated or addressed appropriately by using rigid contracts (Dong & Chiara, 
2010). 
Rigid contracts keep some shareholders unsatisfied due to irreversible results and 
downside risks, while other shareholders enjoy surpluses and are satisfied as upside 
potentials present opportunities. However, an economically efficient and successful 
project should deliver success to all shareholders. P3 concession projects can be 
ameliorated via implementation of RFT to avoid transaction costs and obtain the best 
value for projects (Dong & Chiara, 2010, p. 90). The RFT involves a two-step procedure: 
(a) discovering and incorporating individual exogenous and endogenous flexibilities and 
(b) adding proper endogenous interdependent flexibilities between parties (Dong & 
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Chiara, 2010, p. 91). The RFT was used to analyze and explain participants’ experiences 
involving P3 concession uncertainty. 
Elements of Risk Flexibility Theory 
The two elements of RFT are: the ROA and CFA. 
RO Framework 
The RO framework involves mitigating underinvestment or strategic investment 
in P3 concessions and restoration of competitiveness through adaptive capabilities of 
acquisition and management of corporate RO (Cruz & Marques, 2013a; Dong & Chiara, 
2010; Kokkaew et al., 2012). The RO framework enhances project value by managing 
uncertainty through investment structuring and design (Martins et al., 2014). A manager’s 
ability to respond proactively during decision-making using RO techniques renders 
demand forecasting obsolete and removes uncertainty, creating opportunity for future 
decisions against downside risks.  
The main purpose of a RO approach is to create the project managers’ ability to profile 
both uncertainties and decisions over time; it helps in value creation and risk 
management of infrastructure projects.  
The characteristics to the RO framework include: 
 RO affects both present and future decisions in a project by creating uncertainty 
management procedures. RO makes it possible for project managers to proactively 
respond to future decisions. RO keeps corporate managers attention on the value of 
flexibility. RO maintains the effectiveness of planning, investment, and operating 
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strategies. Finally, with RO, management becomes more reactive (responding effectively 
as uncertainty evolves) and more proactive (embedding flexibility in project designs). 
Types of RO 
Martins et al. (2014) said availability of subsequent options enhances the value of the 
effective underlying asset compared to earlier options of a project lifecycle. . Martins et 
al. defined seven categories of RO: 
Option to Differ  
This type of option exists when management feels that possible future conditions 
to a business agreement might emerge, and they are able to leave an open door to 
investment opportunities, thereby deferring the investment and waiting for a better 
opportunity (Martins et al., 2014). This type of option provides upside potential 
flexibility and could be applied to development, farming, natural resources industries, and 
real estate. 
Option for Staged Investment 
This is an option to divide investment into stages. Staged investment creates the 
growth and abandonment options, allowing the investors opportunities to assess the value 
of every stage and decide on an action to grow or abandon (Martins et al., 2014). This 
type of option provides both upside potential and downside protection flexibility, and it 
could be applied in research and development intensive industries, capital-intensive 
projects, and start-up ventures. 
Option to Alter Operating Scale 
This option creates an opportunity for the management to make the choice of 
either an increase or decrease in the operating scale of business according to market 
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conditions to achieve optimal investment (Martins et al., 2014). Under a favorable market 
condition, the company might decide to scale up its production by increased investment 
to increase output level. When market conditions are unfavorable, the company would 
have the ability to shut production down. This type of option guarantees upside potential 
and downside protection flexibilities and could be applied to natural resources industries, 
commercial real estate, and other cyclical industries.  
Option to Abandon  
 This option enables the management of a company to abandon a project 
permanently while maintaining the ability to recover salvage value of the asset (Martins 
et al., 2014, p.6). It is like the U. S. put option. This option creates upside potential 
flexibility and could be applied to capital-intensive industries (e.g., airline industries, 
railroads, shipping lines and financial services).  
Option to Switch 
 With the switch option in place, the management of a company can switch 
between operating modes by the combination of the call and put options, creating a 
process and product flexibility by a downside protection. The switch option could be 
applied to facilities that are dependent on one input (e.g., oil). 
Growth Option  
 This option gives investing managers the ability to open doors to future 
opportunities and revenues (Martins et al., 2014). A growth option is a compound 
option, and its value depends on a preexisting option. It is like both European and 
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U. S. call. It has both upside potential and downside protection as flexibility and 
could be applied in a research and development industry. 
Interacting Option 
This is the combination of various options that have been highlighted above. 
When combined according to needs, these options create various upside potentials and 
downside protections and could be applied to certain industries (Martins et al., 2014). 
 
Contractual Flexibility Analysis Framework 
Chiara and Kokkaew developed the concept of CFA based on the concept of real 
options in systems. The CFA includes endogenous interdependent flexibility by igniting 
mechanisms that improve contract behaviors by allowing risk shifts from one partner to 
the other (Cruz & Marques, 2013a, p. 476). In addition, P3s are characterized by complex 
contractual arrangements between multiple actors, coordinated in a network of social 
connections, mutual agreements, and contract clauses, to achieve public infrastructure 
delivery (Demirel et al., 2016, p.2). Because contractual agreements set stakeholders’ 
responsibility, risk allocation, and the project profitability, Chiara and Kokkaew 
presented infrastructure project as contract structuring project. 
 Chiara and Kokkaew (2009) evaluated endogenous flexibility from the project-
level perspective because, just as real option in projects consider individual flexibility as 
a potential maintained by one project shareholder. The CFA treats the endogenous 
interdependent flexibility within a contract structure that binds multiple shareholders 
(Dong & Chiara, 2010, p. 91). In a P3 concession partnership between a public and a 
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private sector, RO provides the private or public sector the right to abandon the project 
when the risk or challenge that confronts them becomes overwhelming. However, CFA 
provides the right to shift this risk or challenge from one partner to the other with the aim 
of enabling the partners to shift the risk to the partner who is best equipped to handle it. 
 Infrastructure development projects are long-term, relation-specific investments 
that carry high-level uncertainty. When such contracts are drawn without flexibilities, 
parties to the contract risk negative outcomes to themselves or to the entire contract 
(Dong & Chiara, 2010, p. 91). To fortify these contracts against such negative outcomes 
and make the projects more economically efficient, flexibilities should be embedded in 
the contracts, giving shareholders contingent claims with which to adjust risk allocation 
all through the lifecycle of the project (Dong & Chiara, 2010, p. 91). Through CFA, the 
traditional rigid terms of P3 infrastructure agreements are replaced by a well-articulated 
flexible term, while keeping the transaction costs down as a merit of the rigid contract (p. 
91). Dong and Chiara (2010) shared an example of CFA in a take-or-pay contract, where 
a P3 concessionaire exercised his claim to receive various volumes of construction 
materials under predetermined delivery constraints, transferring the price and volume risk 
of construction materials to the supplier when such need arises (p. 91). Figure 2 shows 
the evolution of RO analysis and CFA to improve economic efficiency of public-private 





Evolution of RO analysis and CFA. 
 
Note. Adapted from “Improving Economic Efficiency of Public-Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Development by Contractual Flexibility Analysis in a Highly Uncertain 
Context,” by F. Dong and N. Chiara, 2010, Journal of Structured Finance, 16, p. 90.  
 
Flexibility Analysis Procedure 
The flexibility analysis procedure of P3 infrastructure development is a two-step 
procedure: 
Firstly, identifying and incorporating individual endogenous and exogenous flexibilities 
by ROA. And secondly, adding relevant endogenous interdependent flexibilities between 
parties to a contract by CFA (Barton, 2015; Cruz & Marques, 2013a; Doug & Chiara, 
2010; Kokkaew et al., 2012).  
Figure 2 shows a procedure for flexibility analysis in P3s by applying both ROs for 





Procedure for Flexibility Analysis in P3 
 
Note. Adapted from “Improving Economic Efficiency of Public-Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Development by Contractual Flexibility Analysis in a Highly Uncertain 
Context,” by F. Dong and N. Chiara, 2010, Journal of Structured Finance, 16, p. 91.  
 
Step 1 depicts a stakeholder trying to exercise a RO on project while considering 
RO in projects to ensure flexibility and to mitigate future downside risks. In Step 2, a 
shareholder ensures that suitable interdependent flexibilities are incorporated into the 
contract agreement he or she has with his or her partner in form of contingent claim, 
making the infrastructure development project more economically efficient. If Party A is 
befallen by a downside risk that he or she cannot handle during the lifecycle of the 
project, Party A reserves the right to exercise some of the claims incorporated into the 
contractual agreement between both parties by transferring the risk to Party B who should 
be less vulnerable to the transferred risk (Bock & Linner, 2015; Cruz & Marques, 2013a; 
Doug & Chiara, 2010; Kokkaew et al., 2012). 
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Types of Flexibility 
Flexibility is the incorporation of physical mechanisms into infrastructure to cope 
with new opportunities and barriers (Cruz & Marques, 2012). Flexibility comes either as 
an option or imbedded into the infrastructural system to cope with future demands (Cruz 
& Marques, 2012). 
System or Strategic Flexibility 
These types of infrastructure contract flexibilities have a long-term structural 
impact on the system. The flexibility is usually an extant in an infrastructure, keeping it 
open for physical adaptation to various purposes and conditions. They are structurally 
irreversible. When this option is exercised, it will become difficult and costly to reverse 
or stop it (Cruz & Marques, 2013a, c; Kokkaew et al., 2012). In P3 infrastructures, 
system or strategic flexibility entails change in the infrastructure (Cruz & Marques, 
2013a, 2013c; Kokkaew et al., 2012). 
Tactical Flexibility 
Tactical flexibilities are those options taken in the middle of the business term due 
to business conditions. They are reversible but costly to exercise or reverse (Cruz & 
Marques, 2013a). An example of tactical flexibility is the expansion of the scale of 
business operations when conditions turn out to be favorable and reduction of the 
business scale of operations if business becomes unfavorable (Kokkaew et al., 2012). 
Operational or Managerial Flexibility 
Operational or managerial flexibilities are short-term flexibilities that neither 
changes the system nor are costly to exercise; they do not change the infrastructure itself 
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but the way it is used (Cruz & Marques, 2013a; Kokkaew et al., 2012). The manager 
exercises this type of flexibility by operating the facility in a way that becomes adaptive 
or responsive to uncertainty (Kokkaew et al., 2012). This is an exercise of flexibility by 
operations management, which includes work organization, planning and scheduling 
material management, information technology, and reengineering of business processes 
(Kokkaew et al., 2012). 
Exogenous Flexibility 
Exogenous flexibilities are those that exist outside the system and operations; they 
are designed to mitigate residual risks beyond a manager’s control (e.g., market 
conditions or demand risk; Kokkaew et al., 2012). This flexibility comes in the form of 
contingent claims, which could either be exercised or not, depending on future events. 
Kokkaew et al. (2012) claimed that this type of flexibility is minimum revenue or 
demand guarantee, which provides the guaranteed opportunity or flexibility to overcome 
future revenue shortfalls (p. 5). Aside from the exogenous flexibility, the rest of the 
flexibility types discussed above are endogenous flexibilities, and Kokkaew et al. found 
that continuous use of endogenous flexibilities, or their combination to mitigate risk, 
eventually loses its economic efficiency effect, while the combination of both 
endogenous and exogenous flexibilities yields total flexibility (p. 5).  
Flexibility for Renegotiation 
Rigid contracts are not more complete contracts; they are just probably less 
negotiated (Beuve et al., 2014a). The higher the uncertainty, the more likely it is for 
contracting parties to sign flexible contracts (Beuve et al., 2014a). Cruz and Marques 
34 
 
(2013) argued that due to unpredictability in estimations for periods of 10 years or longer, 
long concession periods imply risks resulting from uncertainty (p. 47). Contractual 
flexibility may increase P3 projects’ net present value (Cruz & Marques, 2013; Chiara & 
Kokkaew, 2009; Dong & Chiara, 2013). Econometric models have undergone 
improvements over the years, but they do not have the ability to estimate economic 
performances of regions and what their respective impacts will be on infrastructure 
projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 12); key variables of infrastructure projects cannot be 
estimated accurately.  
 Emphasis placed on these estimations and inaccuracy has been the base for 
renegotiations, partly because of the incomplete nature of contracts and partly due to the 
opportunistic behaviors of both parties to the contract (Cruz & Marques, 2013a; Engel et 
al., 2014a). The failure of these P3 projects, and the incapability of the parties to cope 
with the new situation, is what brings about renegotiation. To overcome uncertainty, 
flawless rigid contracts are designed as impossible contracts (Estache & Saussier, 2014). 
In addition, P3 concessions designed with contractual rigidity are supported by the idea 
of foreseeing the future and aiming at covering extant contingencies that may arise ex 
post and adapting and aligning contracts to future estimates (Estache & Saussier, 2014). 
This rigidity is not beneficial for efficient management as it limits the concessionaires’ 
ability to adopt a more proactive and aggressive approach in adapting the infrastructure 
or service to needed standards (Cruz & Marques, 2013a, p. 54). 
The economic efficiency of P3s depends on the possibility of proper risk 
allocation, management, and mitigation (Dong & Chiara, 2010, p. 87). Concession 
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grantors and concessionaires face the decision of how to allocate and address risk through 
contractual structure. Decision makers use flexibility in design to accommodate and 
shape the risk-value profile, embedding RO in projects (Dong & Chiara, 2010). Risk 
allocation and management are at the heart of P3 contracting decisions and justifies the 
P3 model to be chosen (Carbonara, 2015, p. 157).  
Aside risk allocation, the potential to mitigate and manage risks is equally 
important. Carbonara (2015) focused on proposing strategies for mitigating types of risks. 
On the upside, some of these risks turn out to become opportunities instead of challenges 
for both the concessionaire and grantor (Carbonara, 2015, p. 158). Some uncertainties 
could be resolved over time to increase the project’s value when a risk management 
process is activated by managerial flexibility (Carbonara, 2015). In addition, P3 
renegotiations are almost unavoidable due to residual ownership rights, asymmetry 
information and strategic behaviors of parties (Domingues & Zlatovic, 2015). Finally, 
P3s are large-sunk, long-term (incomplete) contracts. Identification of appropriate 
mechanisms that increases the flexibility of its contracts and allows for on-going 
renegotiations reduces their level of uncertainty and leads to the success of the projects. 
Major Uncertainty: Generating Barriers of P3 Concession Projects in Nigeria  
Although P3 is globally regarded as a means of filling infrastructural gaps and 
delivering on public services, it has not gained total acceptance in Nigeria. Pursuant to P3 
initiative for infrastructure delivery, the federal government of Nigeria enacted the 
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) Act 2005 to regulate and 
oversee P3 contracts in Nigeria (Opawole & Jagboro 2016, p.31). The act determines the 
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scope of P3 projects in Nigeria, and the first P3 concession project in 2006 as well. 
Babatunde, Perera, Zhou and Udeaja (2015) highlighted three big Nigerian concessions 
that were auctioned or revoked within the last decade to show that P3 concessions have 
been mainly unsuccessful in Nigeria, unlike in other developed countries (p. 670). 
Babatunde et al. explained how controversies surrounding P3 concessions in Nigeria have 
led to concessionaires’ inability to fulfil their obligations to their financers (p. 670). This 
means that P3s in Nigeria are hindered by lots of uncertainty generating barriers to 
implementation. Foreign private investors may shy away from these barriers and 
uncertainties, and even go as far as divesting to stay safe. However, identifying and 
understanding the effects of these uncertainties and barriers to P3 project implementation 
will help P3 project stakeholders negotiate and structure better agreements in future. 
Furthermore, Nigeria’s huge infrastructural deficit, which affects the citizens’ 
quality of life in almost every sector of the economy, has been attributed to long years of 
underinvestment and abject lack of maintenance (Akintoye, Beck, & Kumaraswamy, 
2016, p. 248). Major infrastructure in Nigeria was built in the 1970s without any 
significant upgrade or maintenance till date (Akintoye et al., 2016, p. 248). Nigerian 
leaders or public actors of over 6 decades, have poor maintenance culture, which has left 
most of the public infrastructure in decadence. This gap in public infrastructure delivery 
is one of the main causes of Nigeria’s economic deterioration. The federal government of 
Nigeria must take advantage of the efficiency of the private sector by delivering and 
managing public infrastructure through P3.  
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Barriers to Nigerian P3 Projects  
As awareness of P3 grows, many developing countries, especially in Africa are 
keying into the private financing of public infrastructure delivery (Babatunde et al., 2015, 
p. 669). FCTA of Nigeria accepted and started funding public projects with it, but with 
many barriers that sometimes bring the projects to abrupt failure (Ameyaw & Chan, 
2015; Babatunde et al., 2015). There are a few factors that affect the implementation of 
P3 concession projects in Nigeria, bringing many projects to inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness (Babatunde et al., 2015, p. 670). Some of the barriers are 
financial/commercial, legal and socio-political, technical, and environmental barriers 
(Babatunde et al., 2015, p. 673).   
Financial/Commercial Barriers 
Financial barriers hinder P3 projects a lot because, when there is no money to 
finance the projects, they will not get off the ground, less being successful. Currency 
exchange rate fluctuation is a big issue mitigating against wonderful concessions (Xiong, 
Zhang & Chen, 2015, p. 432). Nonpayment of user fees makes it very hard for the 
concessionaires to recoup their investment and manage the facilities as needed (Ameyaw 
& Chan, 2015, p.444). Another barrier to consider is the credit laws in Nigeria. Nigerian 
banks have pushed a lot of P3 projects into failure by making it technically impossible for 




Fluctuation in Currency Exchange Rate 
Currency exchange rate is one of the socio-economic variables that pose as high-
level uncertainty to P3 projects because, it partially determines the financial backing of a 
large sunk investment (Xiong, Zhang & Chen, 2015). Ameyaw and Chan (2015) agreed 
with Xiong et al. (2015) by espousing that currency exchange rate moderately affects P3 
projects in their operational stages (p. 432). Currency exchange rate, which is rarely 
stable in Nigeria, influences P3 projects in major ways (e.g., the value of borrowed funds 
decreases as currency exchange rates increases; the value of user fees decreases as 
exchange rates increase). The level of planned revenues and profit will be affected by 
fluctuation of currency exchange rate. A P3 project with revenues in Nigeria might have 
some costs in other countries with different currencies and exchange rate. The prices of 
imported parts are affected by the exchange rate fluctuations. These elements show how 
fluctuation in exchange rate could be unseen barriers to P3 project implementation. 
Nonpayment of User Fees  
Nonpayment of user fees is one of the major challenges of a P3 concession in 
developing countries. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) pointed out that nonpayment of bills is a 
challenge in the water industry, and it has been the main reason for the privatization of 
public water services (p. 444). Ameyaw and Chan explained that, although people may 
have deep rooted habit of nonpayment of user-fees or bills which directly affects the 
concessionaires’ cash flow and concession period, governments good enforcement 
strategies will mitigate such uncertainties (pp. 444-445). Nonpayment of user fees 
reduces the ability of the concessionaire to run the facility smoothly by employing 
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enough hands for the operation and management of the infrastructure. Nonpayment of 
user fees forces the concessionaires into avoidable renegotiations that might generate 
opportunistic behaviors from either of the parties just to secure longer concession period 
to recoup their invested funds (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015). However, to avoid unnecessary 
controversies and to achieve a smooth and successful P3 project implementation, 
government needs to rely more on user fees and devise better ways of enforcing the 
payment of these fees to maintain the partnership agreements and successful P3 projects. 
Difficulty in Securing Credit from Local Banks  
Local banks in Nigeria have low capacity to fund huge investments like 
concession project, which are large sunk investments, and the overwhelming conditions 
attached to foreign finance of local projects in Nigeria does not help concessionaires 
(Opawole & Jagboro, 2017, p. 53). Yescombe (2017) found that securing credit facility in 
developing countries, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa for long-term finance of 
concession projects, is difficult, and concessionaires tend to borrow in foreign currencies 
from investors and lenders who fear depreciation of the local currency (p. 5). The cost of 
capital will automatically become high, and the lenders will require some sort of 
guarantee from the local banks to secure their funds from depreciation. If the government 
could guarantee concessionaires’ loans from local banks against concession contract 
sums, it would give the banks the needed comfort to go into concession projects’ finance. 
Loans in Nigeria are repaid at high interest rates, making it difficult for concessionaires 
to recoup their investments on schedule (Ibem, Aduwo, & Onyemaechi, 2017, p. 9). It is 
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difficult for Nigerian concessionaires to secure local credit facilities with which to 
execute concession projects.  
Legal and Sociopolitical Barriers 
The legal and sociopolitical barriers to P3 concessions in Nigeria start from poor 
political willingness to drive the concessions to successes, and runs through to total 
absence of, or poor enabling policies or legal frameworks to back contractual agreements 
(Ameyaw & Chan, 2015; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016). Without the political willingness of 
public actors, implementation of projects is impossible (Panavides, Parola, & Lam, 2015, 
p. 1110. Corrupt and insincere public officers will, always behave opportunistically, 
putting their personal interest above public needs (p. 111). 
Lack of Political Willingness  
In Nigeria, a change of government translates to a change in government policies, 
and this affects policy related to concession projects (Opawole & Jagboro, 2016, p. 41), 
compelling the concessionaires to take up an insurance cover for envisaged associated 
risks. Public actors in a new government are reluctant to continue P3 concession projects 
when they take over the offices, ignoring or violating contract provisions (Ameyaw & 
Chan, 2015, p. 442). Panayides, Parola, and Lam (2015) posited that political 
unwillingness may alter or even blot out the possibility of P3 implementation and success 
(p. 111). Although a country has an institutional framework with which to regulate its P3 
contracts, without strong political willingness, the project will be in jeopardy. 
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Corruption and Insincerity of Public Actors  
Public actors interfere in the activities of private operators and regulators, 
violating contract provisions. Public actors who indulge in corrupt practices do not 
promote the purpose of a P3 concession (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, p. 442). Some 
governments take advantage of inadequate and inconsistent laws to arbitrary and 
unilaterally change laws governing P3 concessions to their interest without consulting the 
concessionaires who have invested money in the project or thinking of the private 
operators’ consequences Ameyaw & Chan, 2015. Pp .442-444). To amass personal gains, 
public actors in Nigeria will change policies to their interests, not minding whatever the 
effects of such changes would be to the private party who has invested funds into such 
projects. Insincerity of public actors in Nigeria has contributed to the high level of P3 
concessions uncertainty in Nigeria.  
Lack of Enabling Policies or Legal Frameworks  
Poor enabling policy or legal frameworks destroy the foundation of a concession 
contract. The enabling policy or legal framework defines the obligations of the parties 
and protects their interests at all stages of the contract (Opawole & Jagboro, 2016, p. 28). 
Such frameworks or policies include contractual terms that define the pre and post 
contractual obligations and liabilities enforcement clauses relating to contract 
cancellation and determination, nonperformance, or delayed performance progress 
(Opawole & Jagboro, 2016, p. 26). Legal frameworks help to keep parties in line to 
achieve successful projects and mitigate opportunistic behaviors from the parties. 
However, when these frameworks or policies are ill-defined or have poor mechanics for 
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enforcement, the aim of setting them up is defeated, giving room for controversies and 
litigations. Concessions in Nigeria are laden with poor enabling policies and legal 
frameworks, which has contributed to the failure of most P3 projects (Babatunde et al., 
2015, p. 673).  
Technical Barriers 
Technical barriers to P3 concessions in Nigeria stem from lack of adequate 
experience on the concessionaires’ part, which frequently translates to poor designs. A 
worse scenario is when a not so experienced promoter cannot put together a good 
consortium of experienced professionals in the field. When a private promoter of a P3 
concession lacks the “technical know-how” and ability to drive the project, the purpose of 
the partnership would have been defeated from the beginning (Babatunde et al., 2015, p. 
675). 
Design and Construction Deficiencies  
A P3 concession project is largely dependent on its initial design. The blueprint of 
a project stipulates how the construction will be done to serve the purpose for which the 
facility is constructed, and it is critical to the successful implementation of the projects 
(Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, p. 442). When the construction design of a P3 project is not 
clear and comprehensive enough to encompass developmental needs, conflicts tend to 
occur from the facility’s inability to serve the masses as needed (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, 
p. 442). When project designs contain irregularities, ambiguities, or deficiencies, the 
infrastructure becomes substandard. Opawole and Jagboro (2016) posited that lack of a 
strong construction design that spells out public needs has led to negative results in P3 
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concessions in Nigeria (p. 28). Nigeria needs a public body or committee that will work 
with the private investors in every P3 concession to draw sound construction designs that 
will envisage futuristic needs and encourage cooperation and cooperation between the 
parties to a P3 concession.   
Lack of P3 Experience/Competence of Promoters  
In a country where P3 is relatively new and yet to be accepted, it may be a 
daunting task to secure local expertise to execute P3 projects. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) 
asserted that issues of incomplete designs and inexperienced public partners make 
tendering difficult (p. 445). Opawole and Jagboro (2017) disagreed with Ameyaw and 
Chan, linking the lack of expertise to the menace of brain drain (the West taking the best 
brains from the developing countries and creating new and conducive lives for them, to 
live and work in the West), which the concessionaire must deal with by importing foreign 
experts (p. 52). Many concession projects have been cancelled during the construction 
phase due to poor execution of projects by engineers who lack the needed expertise and 
experience (e.g., domestic terminal at Murtala Muhammed Airport Nigeria, Lekki toll 
road concession project Nigeria, etc.). P3 projects should be executed by professionals in 
a consortium of experts. These experts could be employed or imported from foreign 
countries to professionally execute these projects.   
Weak or Poor Enforcement Due to Ineffective Institutional Framework  
Ineffective institutional framework for enforcement is one of the barriers to the 
implementation of P3 concession projects in Nigeria (Babatunde et al., 2015, p. 248). 
Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015) explained that development banks encouraged 
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government to establish legislative, regulatory, or policy frameworks for P3s to reduce 
the high incidence of controversies, litigations, and failures experienced in P3s around 
Sub-Saharan Africa (p. 349). Although these frameworks vary from country to country 
and various states, they guide the P3 process from bidding to dispute resolutions 
(Trebilcock & Rosenstock, 2015, p. 349). The regulatory framework is the base for 
enforcement, without which the government will not have the administrative capacity to 
enforce contract agreements. Trebilcock and Rosenstock asserted that foreign investors 
shy away from countries where they think regulatory framework for contract enforcement 
is weak (p. 350). Strong regulatory framework and enforcement is an added advantage 
that encourages both local and foreign investments in developing countries like Nigeria. 
Ineffective institutional frameworks weaken the enforcement capabilities of the public 
party to P3 concessions in Nigeria. 
Environmental Barriers 
There are many environmental barriers to P3 concessions in Nigeria (e.g., land 
acquisition issues, conflict between partners, public resistance due to inadequate 
consultation, etc.). In Nigeria, the land instruments are vested on the public actors, but 
corruption in public offices has tied the functionaries’ hands and kept them from 
enforcing policies that would otherwise, helped the projects succeed (Lamond, Awuah, 
Lewis, Bloch & Falade, 2015; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016). The absence of institutional 
frameworks creates conflicts between parties to P3 concessions and creates room for 
public resistance of P3 projects (Opawole & Jagboro, 2016, p. 39). 
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Land Acquisition Issues  
Land acquisition is one of the biggest barriers faced by concessionaires in P3 
concession business. The Nigerian Land Use act of 1978 vested the instruments of land 
usage on the public sector to recover any land it deems fit for public use after 
compensating the present occupiers and relocating any public facilities (e.g., oil 
distribution pipelines; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016, p. 39). However, a lack of good 
governance and management of these land properties has empowered opportunistic and 
fraudulent land owners to exploit both private investors and other innocent purchasers 
(Lamond, Awuah, Lewis, Bloch, & Falade, 2015, p. 7). Lamond et al. (2015) explained 
that a lack of good land administration makes it difficult for the extant land 
administration system to deliver adequate lands for development in Nigeria (p. 15). 
Government finds it difficult to compensate current occupiers of needed lands for 
development; consequently, they cannot relocate them to avail the lands for development 
(Lamond et al., 2015, p. 15). When government tries to rely on the Land Use act to 
revoke lands for development, there are mass protests to enforce claims that affects the 
concessionaires’ costs by transferring the compensation beat to the private promoter to 
handle. These issues in land acquisition in Nigeria are barriers that generate a high level 
of uncertainty in P3 concession projects in Nigeria. 
Conflict Between Partners  
Conflicts between P3 partners create a hostile atmosphere, which affects the 
performance of both parties, wastes construction time and resources, and jeopardizes the 
success of projects (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, p. 446). Ameyaw and Chan (2015) 
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explained that conflicts between parties to a P3 contract emanate from intolerance for 
performance failures on the public actor’s part per the private consortium not working 
with the consortium on their short coming before handing out sanctions (p. 446). The 
public actors are not flexible enough to encourage a good working relationship that 
should project a common interest and vision towards mutually successful projects. A 
good working relationship amongst the public and private partners will improve 
communication and professionalism and generate proactive relationship managements 
where public executives come together with the consortium of suppliers to ensure clearly 
defined project objectives, well-defined risk allocation and contract design, and 
integration of different facets of the entire project (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, p. 447). 
Public Resistance Due to Inadequate Consultation 
Adequate consultation with the masses that will use any planned public 
infrastructure is needed to avoid public resistance of the infrastructure in future. Opawole 
and Jagboro (2016) indicated that it is the job of the public sector to sensitize the citizens 
to forestall future resistance against the toll payment by the citizens after the 
concessionaire has completed the project and commenced collection of user fees (p. 39). 
If the citizens are not well sensitized, most of them will not know the essence of the 
infrastructure, let alone understand reasons for which they need to pay fees to use them. It 
is of importance to the parties to a P3 concession that the public sector engages in 
sensitization of the masses towards the planning or construction of the infrastructure 
before the completion of the project. 
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General Uncertainties of P3 Concessions 
P3 concessions are vulnerable to uncertainty (Cruz & Marques, 2013; House, 
2016). Although P3s can overcome efficiency, financial, and quality issues that occur in 
public service provision in developing countries (House, 2016, p. 179), complex 
administrative and regulatory strategies and sound institutional oversight are required in 
the management of P3s to avoid opportunism and to ensure that partners commit to 
contract agreements over long time frames (House, 2016, p. 179). P3s come with many 
uncertainties tied to their long-term nature, which may lead to unforeseen circumstances 
that could change the outcome of projects at any time. Parties to a P3 concession must 
use adaptive tools to manage or mitigate these uncertainties. P3 uncertainties are 
associated with factors that affect the supply of raw materials (e.g., extreme weather 
conditions or environmental disaster); political shifts that influence policies; cost of 
supply (e.g., economic crises or change in cost of input); and demand shift (e.g., 
consumer demand shift or temporary or permanent interruption of flow of payment; 
House, 2016). The opportunistic behaviors of both parties to the P3 concession and 
changes arising from the social, economic, and political spheres make P3 concessions 
high uncertainty projects (Cruz & Marques, 2013c; Domingues & Sarmento, 2016). As 
much as P3s are better ways of delivering public infrastructure with private funds to 
cushion the effect of budget deficits on public provisions and create VFM, there are some 
factors (demand shifts, political shift, and lack of raw materials) that prevent the success 
of these projects. 
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 Sarmento and Renneboog (2016) reported that concessions are incomplete 
contracts that involve a lot of parties; therefore, the incomplete nature of P3 contracts 
create high uncertainty, mainly because of their long-termed features. There are four 
categories of uncertainty: ambiguity uncertainty (e.g., imprecision due to communication 
ambiguities), aleatory uncertainty (e.g., when there are variations in the variables of the 
system), epistemic uncertainty (e.g., when the model lacks data or information to support 
it), and interaction uncertainty (e.g., these are uncertainty of the outcome of public and 
private interactions; Cruz & Marques, 2013c). Scholars have asserted that there are 
intrinsic characteristics of P3 concessions that make them vulnerable to uncertainty (Cruz 
& Marques, 2013a; House, 2016; Igboka, 2015; Roumboutsos & Saussier, 2014). The 
characteristics are as follows:  
 These levels of uncertainty that are present in P3 arrangements are the primary 
reasons why P3 concessions require renegotiations to adapt ex post concerns (Cruz & 
Marques, 2012, p. 1, 435). Cruz and Marques (2013a) specified that P3 projects with 
large sunk investments face three types of uncertainty: cost overruns, demand 
forecasting, and capital cost (p. 475). 
Cost Overruns 
Cost overruns are the difference between the contract winning the bid of a P3 and 
the final cost of completing a large sunk, long-termed construction, maintenance, or 
rehabilitation projects (Anastasopoulos, Haddock, & Peeta, 2014; Cruz & Marques, 
2013a). Having accurate estimates at the bidding stage aids the selection and 
implementation of appropriate projects to sustain project preservative strategies 
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(Anastasopoulos et al., 2014, p. 2). Although cost overruns are minimal in bundled P3 
contracts, increasing user expectations and scarce government funding increases 
construction costs (Anastasopoulos et al., 2014). Another issue is the time lapse between 
planning and execution, which, when long, make unitary prices of building materials 
increase more than expected (Anastasopoulos et al., 2014; Iossa & Martimont, 2015; 
Kodwo & Allotey, 2014). The risk of cost overrun comes from the inability of the 
concessionaires to estimate what the cost of project completion will be. The long-term 
nature of the concession contracts may mean that prices may change in an unexpected 
way. Therefore, It is better if the concessionaires add ample contingencies to their 
bidding cost and work to complete the projects within the estimated time.  
 Love, Edwards, and Irani (2012) argued that infrastructure projects experience 
cost and schedule overruns due to misinterpretations and optimism bias (p. 1). Love et al. 
stated that the two rudimentary causes of cost overrun as deceptive misinterpretation by 
politicians and project planners to ensure that projects are off the ground and going and 
optimism biases that cover the overoptimistic tendency of decision makers about 
outcomes of projects. Furthermore, opportunistic behaviors on the part of public actors 
may lead to cost overruns. These public actors misinterpret both the value of projects and 
return on investment, thereby misguiding the concessionaires into cost overruns. 
 Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014) stated that cost performances remain the major 
performance indicator of the success of a construction project (p. 38). Ahiaga-Dagbui and 
Smith stressed that reliable estimates are important for organizational budget purposes 
and loan application when projects are funded through credit facilities, loan finance 
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(interest payment), and estimation of commercial feasibility and viability of the planned 
project (p. 38). However, estimation of the final cost of a construction project is difficult 
due to the numerous factors that need consideration. To appropriately estimate the final 
cost of these projects, the designers need to consider project type, material costs, ground 
conditions, duration, tendering methods, type of client, and size of the project (Ahiaga–
Dagbui & Smith, 2014). Working out the influence of these variables at the inception or 
decision stage can be a daunting task, but ignoring them creates an avenue for cost 
overruns, disputes, and law suits that sometimes lead to project termination (Ahiaga–
Dagbui & Smith, 2014, p. 39). 
 Cost overrun in a construction projects is attributed to numerous factors that 
include managerial incompetency, technical error in design and estimation, risk and 
uncertainty, deception and delusion, suspicions of foul play, and corruption (Ahiaga–
Dagbui & Smith, 2014; Anastapoulous et al., 2014; Love et al., 2012). Nine out of 10 
infrastructure projects overrun their budget, and 86% exceed their budgets (Love et al., 
2012).  
Demand Forecasting  
Traffic demand is based on human behavior and economic conditions. Accurately 
estimating traffic demand for several years is difficult (Cruz & Marques, 2013a, p. 475). 
Many researchers have concurred that failure of demand forecasting is not just a forecast 
issue, but an issue of optimism bias that raises the demand estimate to justify the financial 
viability of the projects (Cruz & Marques, 2013a; Oliveira, Ribeiro, & Macario, 2016). 
The concessionaires often raise the demand estimate of the infrastructure to make them 
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more bankable and attractive to financiers. There are variations between forecasted and 
actual demand. 
 However, Estache and Saussier (2014) revealed that most P3 projects fail because 
there was no need for the project and because they provide no positive externalities to the 
potential users (p. 9). In line with Cruz and Marques’s (2013a) and Oliveira et al.’s 
(2016) assertions, Flyvbjerg (2014) claimed that overestimation of demand is 
commonplace in P3s, and it is perpetuated by both parties to keep the project values 
attractive (p. 5). Like Estache and Saussier’s assertions, Bel, Estache, and Fourcart (2014) 
showed how a collusion between the public and private actors to a large-scale 
overestimation of demand in infrastructure in Spain led to oversized and unwanted 
transport networks without demand that the government was forced to shut down (p. 8).  
The introduction of more expertise from the private sector will improve demand 
forecasting in the infrastructure concession. Corruptions on the part of decision makers 
who gain from large investments lead to demand-forecasting errors. This corruption is 
more evident amongst public actors who advocate schemes of inflated concessions to get 
back a percentage of the contract sum from the operators while getting promotions in 
civil service for technical support albeit overestimating benefits of the project (Button & 
Chen, 2014). A possible way of reducing such manipulations is by engaging private 
sector expertise in public sector decision making (Button & Chen, 2014). 
 The possibility of erroneous demand forecasting is a risk to concessions that 
generates a high level of uncertainty (Burke & Demirag, 2015). As risk is best transferred 
to the concession party that can control it best, or to the party who will deal with it better, 
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allocation of P3 risk and its assessment determines whether the project is VFM (Burke & 
Demirag, 2015). More P3 risk could be taken by the private sector to create VFM if the 
public sector provides the necessary guarantee to reduce the level of uncertainty (Burke 
& Demirag, 2015). Most of the achievements of P3 are due to the risk sharing and trust 
between partners (Chung & Hensher, 2016; Oliveira et al., 2016). P3s stand on two basic 
principles: private finance provision and long-term repayment method that defines the 
equilibrium market between public investment objectives and the interest of the private 
sector (Burke & Demirag, 2015). 
 While focusing on financial aspects of the investment decision process, Oliveira 
et al. (2016) studied a causality hypothesis between the clauses of financial guarantees 
and opportunistic behaviors after tendering. Oliveira et al. found that when there is a 
government guarantee, the private partner is incentivized to bid towards riskier 
investments as uncertainty arises out of the optimism of decision makers from the 
barriers between actual information and estimation (para 4 & 5). Oliveira et al. pointed 
out that as much as P3 may look like a simple investment structure, its problems start 
even before designs, as all components must be defined under uncertainty and probability 
due to limited information (para 6 & 7). The risk of the expected cost and returns on 
investment is represented by uncertainty. P3s have succeeded and failed due to 




Cost of Capital 
The financing of P3 infrastructure concessions is the responsibility of the 
concessionaire or private sector (Cruz & Marques, 2013a). The concessionaire works 
with investment bank loans, private equity funds, governmental funds, and user charges 
to finance these infrastructure projects. The recent global economic meltdown and limited 
credit facilities have kept the cost of capital high and made it one of the greatest 
challenges of P3 infrastructure concessions (Cruz & Marques, 2013a). Ameyaw and 
Chan (2015) saw financing risks of P3 concessions as an issue to consider because of no 
availability of sufficient funding, both in debt and equity (p. 445). Ameyaw and Chan 
recalled Beijing’s #10 water project, which failed due to the concessionaires’ inability to 
secure debt financing because of China’s finance policies and regulatory structures. 
Concessions are capital-intensive projects, requiring financing and refinancing, which 
cannot be obtained at moderate interest rates to suit the lengthy payback periods 
(Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, p. 445). Furthermore, P3 concession capital is expensive to 
secure, due to its long pay back periods, which makes it hard for financiers to give 
reasonable interest rates. A lack of advantageous financing policies and regulatory 
structures are other factors that create difficulties in project financing. 
 The concessionaire is only able to mobilize the needed capital for expensive 
infrastructure and services given the right environment and incentives. Good governance 
provides the right incentives and enabling environment for P3s to thrive, and good 





 This is the  degree to  which all stakeholders to a project are involved in the 
Planning and decision making via good communication processes. 
Decency 
 This involves the carefulness with which the formation and stewardship of rules 
should be undertaken to avoid harming people. 
Transparency 
 This is the level of openness in all decisions and welcome of suggestion from all 
stakeholders, no matter inappropriate they may sound initially.  
Accountability 
 This is the extent to which public actors are held responsible for their actions. If 
public actors know that they will be held responsible for things that go wrong on their 
watch, they will obviously try to always do things right. 
Fairness 
 Fairness involves the degree to which rules apply equally to all in the society. 
Inequality portrays marginalization, and sometime s affect people psychologically, 
making them feel unwanted and inferior, breeding bad blood that creates disunity. 
Efficiency 
 This involves the proportion at which limited human and financial resources are 
applied to avoid waste, delay, or corruption without damaging future generations (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2016). 
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 There is a relationship between concession investment and its financing because 
the concessionaire might need to employ outside financiers for risk evaluation, and this 
becomes a new contract between the consortium and the financiers that could affect 
incentives (Iossa & Martimort, 2015, p. 26). Concession contracts involve information or 
knowledge asymmetries, which is a complex condition that levels decisions to human 
conditions (Chung & Hensher, 2016). Cognition costs that arise from strategic behaviors 
in response to uncertainty and incorrect information are informed by contract designs or 
framework (Chung & Hensher, 2016). Long duration of concession projects (coupled 
with information asymmetry, asset specificity, and ex post opportunism) hinder the 
economization of transaction cost and efficiency (Chung & Hensher, 2016). Opportunism 
falls under strategic uncertainty, and it compounds transactional difficulties through 
nondisclosure, disguise, or distortion of information, while the primary uncertainties arise 
from the state of nature or external environmental changes (Chung & Hensher, 2016, p. 
263). Another contractual dimension that increases the cost of capital is asset specificity 
or the unique nature of the asset that takes away the possibility of the asset being 
redeployed to alternative uses and users without sacrificing its productive value (Chung 
& Hesher, 2016). Asset specificity creates contractual gaps and welcomes renegotiation. 
 Moszoro (2014) argued that the public actor is in a better position to source 
outside finances for the concession (p. 104). The public actor has a lower cost of capital, 
while the private concessionaire has better managerial skills and industry-specific know-
how, especially with complex goods (Moszoro, 2014, p. 104). Moszoro suggested that 
mixed public-private capital structures provide a more efficient governance structure than 
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an entirely private or solely public structure (p. 104). Moszoro believed that the public 
actor becoming part of the special purpose vehicle could achieve this, instead of standing 
aside as an enforcer with an oversight function and leaving the running of the concession 
to the private partner (p. 110). Moszoro posited that the shareholding structure of the 
concession should secure the interest of public financing and private managerial 
discretion. 
Relationship Between Uncertainty and Flexibility 
Flexibility has attracted attention over the last decade in areas like economics, 
regional science, operations research, and management, although it has been present in 
topics like biology, medical science, and genetics for decades. Flexibility is the ability of 
living organisms to adapt themselves to changing conditions (Cruz & Marques, 2013a). 
Scholars have suggested the importance of a certain degree of freedom to enable 
adaptability within systems to cope with changes (Cruz & Marques, 2013a; Martins et al., 
2014; Martimort & Straub, 2016). 
 Physical flexibility is one of the adaptation mechanisms used to deal with 
uncertainty in infrastructural projects. An example of physical flexibility is having space 
on a highway, as future increases in traffic might necessitate adding extra lanes to ease 
traffic or to strengthen the foundation of buildings as the need to add extra floors might 
arise in the future (Cruz & Marques, 2013; Martins et al., 2014). Large sunk and long-
term contracts like P3 concession construction contracts are filled with uncertainties that 
could be mitigated by an adaptation mechanism like flexibility (Cruz & Marques, 2013a; 
Martin et al., 2014). 
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Flexibility as an Uncertainty Adaptation Mechanism 
Public-private partnership concessions are large sunk contracts signed to run for 
several years (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2014a, 2014b). Over the long concession 
period, the uncertainty attached to this type of contract keeps it incomplete (Martins et 
al., 2014). Pursuant to coping with P3 uncertainty, Rakic and Radenovic (2014) explained 
that public partners to a concession, who are expected to understand the barriers to public 
infrastructure delivery via concessions (uncertainties), should provide adequate risk 
mitigation and management mechanisms and strategies to help private promoters/partners 
adapt their investments to changes (p. 109). Traditionally, contracting parties to 
concession sign rigid contracts to avoid renegotiations, although renegotiations adapt 
contractual framework to unforeseen contingencies and enforces cooperative behaviors 
(Demirel, Leendertse, Volker, & Hertogh, 2016). 
 Martins et al. (2014) argued that unlike the discounted cash flow analysis (DCF) 
that evaluate project values without capturing the inherent value of flexibility, the real 
option (RO) technique incorporates flexibility in infrastructure projects, adapting them to 
future changes (p. 6). Incorporating flexibility is simpler than the empirical application of 
DCF, which is complex (Domingues, Zlatkovic, & Roumboutsos, 2014; Martins et al., 
2014). According to RO, it is important to incorporate flexible options that will allow the 
infrastructure or service to be adapted to a certain future change, right from the design 
stage (Chiara & Kokkaew, 2013; House, 2016; Martins et al., 2014). An example is the 
Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe international airport road in Nigeria, which is being expanded 
from double lanes to five lanes on each side. This is only possible because someone saw 
58 
 
that such expansion might be needed in the future and incorporated the flexibility at the 
design stage of the road project.  
 The economic value of flexibility (RO) is calculated by putting together its 
benefits according to an adaptable timing (Gothwal & Raj, 2016; Van Den Hurk & 
Verhoest, 2016). Bachelier (as cited in Chiara et al, 2007) laid the foundation for finance 
options theory–the theory of speculation (p. 3). However, there was still a need to value 
the uncertainty payoff until recent developments in RO theory (Dong & Chiara, 2010; 
Martins et al., 2014). The RO originated from financial stock options pricing, which are 
contracts sold against some premium that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, 
to purchase stocks against predetermined prices (Dong & Chiara, 2010; Martins et al., 
2014; Xion & Zang, 2016). Managers can use RO to change an investment decision by 
responding to new information and implementing optional strategies (Eber & 
Zimmermann, 2014; Xiong & Zang, 2016). 
 The uncertain nature of P3 concessions make them incomplete, which is 
traditionally understood as negative. However, the RO can be used to increase the value 
of the assets where managers use their options well (Gothuwal & Raj, 2016; Mansor, 








Title of Figure 3 
 
Note. Adapted from “Maximizing the Value of Money of PPP and Arrangements 
Through Flexibility: An Application to Airports,” by J. Martins, R. C. Marques, and C. 
O. Cruz, 2014, Journal of Air Transport Management, 39, p. 72-80. 
  
Summary 
 In Chapter 2, I examined peer-reviewed journals, books, expert reports, 
government websites, psychological handbooks, conference papers, dissertations, and 
other scholarly sources to enable me to investigate and draw common themes. I used 
Chiara and Kokkaew’s RFT to explore what coping with concession uncertainty means to 
the P3 concessionaires with FCTA of Nigeria. The foundation of the literature review 
was laid with the incomplete nature of P3 concessions and the uncertainty that comes 
with it. I looked at the risks of a concession contract that emit the uncertainties (e.g., cost 
60 
 
overruns, demand forecasting, cost of capital, etc.). Finally, I looked at other 
accountability challenges that generate uncertainty in a P3 concession.  
In Chapter 3, I outline the research plan by providing the role of the researcher 
and participant population, after which I describe the research method and design. Other 
parts of Chapter 3 include data collection instruments and techniques, data analysis 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
Wherever uncertainty exists, there is the risk of unknown eventualities. P3 
concessions are prone to uncertainties  that sometimes put the projects at risk. These risks 
require proper allocation for the achievement of successful projects. 
 The purpose of this study was to understand how concessionaires within the 
FCTA of Nigeria cope with concession uncertainties by drawing on their experiences 
involving P3 concession uncertainties. While looking for an explorative research design, 
I chose phenomenology. Chiara and Kokkaew’s RFT was used to understand 
concessionaires’ experiences involving P3 concession uncertainty.  
This chapter begins with the research design and rationale. I restated the research 
questions, defined the phenomenon under study, and identified research traditions and 
rationale. The role of the researcher in this study and the methodology was described by 
outlining participant selection logic, instrumentation, procedures for participant 
recruitment, data collection, and data analysis plan. I also addressed issues of 
trustworthiness, validity, transferability, dependability, confirmability, reliability, and 
ethical procedures.  
Research Questions 
Patton (2002) said that qualitative interviewing involves asking thoughtful, clear, 
singular, focused, and distinct questions. This research was guided by one major research 
question: What is the meaning of P3 concession uncertainty to concessionaires with 
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FCTA of Nigeria, and to what extent did these choices, options, and experiences affect 
project values? 
Research Design and Rationale 
Qualitative research involves the collection, organization, and interpretation of 
textual information in a systematic manner (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research is not a 
predetermined process, but rather an inductive one that involves iterative procedures. The 
design is informed by my experiences and worldview assumptions and the nature of the 
research problem.  
Epistemological Reflexivity 
A well-organized qualitative study is crafted with philosophical and 
epistemological positions to guide it. Ontological opinions involve an individual’s 
resolve about and considerations of nature of being or reality, while epistemological 
opinions are what a person considers knowledge (Patton, 2002). A researcher’s 
epistemology is his or her theory of knowledge that shapes his or her process involving 
studying the phenomenon (Creswell, 2009; Patton, 2002). 
 I used an essentialist/realist paradigm to engage the study participants via in-depth 
and intensive interviews, to collect data for my study. The essentialist/realist approach 
assumes that motivations, experience, and meanings can be theorized in a straightforward 
way because, a fine and greatly unidirectional relationship  exists between experience, 
language, and meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 85). As an essentialist/realist, I studied 
the various realities participants shaped and the essence of those constructions in their 
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lives. Results of the study include rich descriptions and narratives involving the 
phenomenon according to participants. 
  
Phenomenology  
 Phenomenological researchers aim at understanding the essence of an experience 
involving a phenomenon by analyzing participants’ experiences (Van Manen, 1990, p. 9). 
Phenomenologists try to find the meaning, structure, and essence of lived experiences of 
a person or group of people (Patton, 2002, p. 104). Phenomenologists capture the nature 
of a phenomenon. Creswell (2013) defined phenomenology as a study involving common 
meanings of experiences of a concept or a phenomenon. 
 Other qualitative approaches are different from phenomenology, which involves 
meanings, structure, and the essence of lived experiences. Other qualitative approaches 
were not accepted because, it would have been impossible to understand and carefully 
interpret the meaning, structure, and essence of concessionaires’ experiences without 
directly interviewing them and specifically striking a rapport that avails me the 
opportunity to ask questions that draw insightful experiential data using other qualitative 
approaches. The purpose of this study is to produce a comprehensive description of 
concessionaires’ experiences involving P3 concession uncertainty.  
Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Hermeneutics is a qualitative research approach that involves the interpretation of 
social phenomena (McNabb, 2013, p. 310). It is used in studying social phenomena such 
as behaviors and statements from public administration groups and agencies . 
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Phenomenology is rooted in existentialism and the study of the meaning of language and 
other symbolic behaviors (McNabb, 2013, p. 309). Hermeneutic phenomenology is 
primarily linked with Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur. A 
hermeneutical phenomenology involves using an interpretive method rather than a 
descriptive method as done in transcendental phenomenology (Given, 2008). For this 
study, I used Van Manen’s  hermeneutic phenomenology to address lived experiences of 
concessionaires within the FCTA of Nigeria. 
 Van Manen’s hermeneutic phenomenology involves interpretations of 
participants’ experiences. Husserl’s concept of epoch (or bracketing) is when researchers 
are encouraged to set aside their presuppositions and previous understanding of the 
phenomenon and attempt a fresh perspective. Hermeneutical phenomenological 
researchers are expected to declare their knowledge of the phenomenon under 
investigation and place their biases aside in order to freshly understand the meaning of 
the phenomenon according to participants (Merriam, 2014, p. 27). 
 Merriam (2014) said the phenomenological approach captures common meanings 
of lived experiences of a phenomenon. Understanding concessionaires’ experiences is 
important because it will inform policy makers in terms of how to make policies that will 
enhance the value of P3 and enrich knowledge in the field of study 
 Phenomenological research is done often in public policy and social science 
studies because it involves proffering solutions to previous struggles involving 
understanding experiences in diverse social circumstances.  The phenomenological 
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approach has been used to study and explain the experiences of 10 or fewer subjects to 
accurately capture lived experiences of participants. 
 In my study, I explored the experiences of nine concessionaires involving P3 
concession uncertainty. Moustakas (1994) said studies that concern individual and 
collective human experiences are not quantitatively approachable because they require 
richer, more explanatory, and in-depth treatments (p. 21). Quantitative scholars cannot 
draw individual meaning and personal descriptions via phenomenology and other 
qualitative methodologies access and in-depth open-ended interviews. Interviews were 
used to understand what P3 uncertainty brings to concessionaires’ consciousness, and 
their open-ended nature encouraged participants to give more insights regarding their 
perceptions. 
Role of the Researcher 
I drove the phenomenological research but worked with participants as 
coconstructors of meaning. The phenomenological researcher engages participants in 
continuous interviews until the end of the study (Moustakas, 1994). Participants were 
made to understand their status and roles in the study. This was achieved by explaining to 
participants how they fit into the purpose of the research. I made study participants as 
comfortable as possible, encouraging them to stay open and share rich data about their 
experience involving the phenomenon, which facilitated flow of communication. 
 As a former CEO of a company that had a failed P3 concession project with the 
FCTA of Nigeria, I have experienced the uncertainty that comes with P3 concession 
projects. Therefore, my preconceptions and understanding of the study phenomenon is 
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hereby acknowledged, which makes me part of the study participants’ historical, social, 
and political milieu. Heidegger (1962?) said a researcher cannot be removed from the 
process of essence identification. This research was constantly reviewed through member 
checking, field notes, and transcriptions. I used reflexivity to stay aware of participants’ 
preconceptions as an aid for data analysis and interpretation of meanings. Reflexivity is 
the process by which researchers stay conscious and thoughtful about the way their 
questions, methods, and subject positions might skew meanings (Solan & Bowe, 2014, p. 
1297). Researchers’ reflexivity is important because it allows for descriptions of the 
nature of phenomenon. Participants were engaged as coconstructors, which means that 
individual interview transcripts, field notes, and other data instruments and themes were 
shared and verified with them. 
Methodology 
Methodology involves how research is conducted systematically . It clarifies, 
identifies, and justifies the study population, sampling strategy, participant eligibility 
criteria, number of cases, rationale, procedures for participant identification, and 
recruitment strategies. 
Participant Selection Logic 
 The population of my study were P3 concessionaires with the FCTA of Nigeria 
who have experienced P3 concession uncertainties. The sample size of a population is a 
subset of that population (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 163). Qualitative 
studies usually have small samples that are selected purposively for participants with 
specific characteristics and from whom rich information about the phenomenon under 
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study can be addressed. Neuman (2014) said qualitative scholars draw their strength from 
purposive sampling, which allows for the selection of information-rich cases for in-depth 
studies. Neuman clarified that information-rich cases are those from which the researcher 
can learn about issues of central importance, and that is why this type of selection is 
called purposeful sampling. 
 There are no estimates or rules for sample sizes in qualitative inquiries. Sample 
size depends on what the researcher wants to know, why he or she wants to know that, 
how findings will be used, and what amount of time and other resources the researcher 
has for the study (Palinkas et al., 2015, p. 534). The sample size of a qualitative 
phenomenological study depends on the scope of the study, quality of data, nature of the 
topic, study design, and use of shadowed data (Smith, 2015). Because a small sample of 
information-rich can generate the needed data for a qualitative study, large samples are 
not needed to generate rich data sets (Smith, 2015). 
 The purposive sample size of my study was nine research participants, due to the 
achievement of theme saturation, instead of an earlier prescribed population of 8 to 12 
concessionaires with the FCTA of Nigeria. Creswell (2013) concluded that a 
phenomenological study could have samples ranging from one up to 325, but 
recommended sample sizes of 3 to 10 subjects for a phenomenology (p. 157). Some 
phenomenological scholars, with studies like mine, used sample sizes of 10 (Bennett, 
2015; Bole, 2014). However, while considering the time and other resources that were 
committed into this study, and pursuant to working with an information-rich sample, nine 
concessionaires gave me the needed data saturation with which to complete the study. 
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 Saturation of data is achieved when additional interview data will not add any 
unknown relevant information to the data (Patton, 2014; Smith, 2015). The method I used 
in achieving data saturation in my data analysis is Comparative Method for Theme 
Saturation (CoMeTS; Constantinou, Georgiou, and Perdikogianni, 2017, p. 571). 
CoMeTS is comparative in two ways. Firstly, all themes from all interview data were 
compared with each other. Secondly, the interview sequence was reordered severally to 
recheck saturation (Constantinou et al, 2017, p. 571). Qualitative data is saturated when 
topic, theme, or new information can no longer be gotten from the dataset (p. 575). 
Saturation is therefore, evidence that data collected is sufficient for detailed 
understanding and interpretation of meanings (p. 575). Again, saturation is criterion for 
dependability because, researchers are expected to give details of their coding and 
analysis approach (p. 575). Constantinou et al. (2017) asserted that interview data cannot 
be saturated, but categories and themes which are identified within the dataset can be 
saturated (p. 576).  
 Therefore, in attempting to achieve categories or theme saturation, the researcher 
conducted 18 synchronous online interviews to address their research questions. The 
study  relied on purposive sampling to select sample set. The researcher invited eligible 
and potential participants via email and those who are interested in participating in the 
study made appointments. All the eligible participants wrote “I Consent” on their 
informed consent forms and return them, and an approval was obtained from the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) ethics committee before the study commenced. 
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 The researcher engaged and interviewed 9 participants, using 6 interview 
questions to draw in-dept responses from the participants. The six questions were 
grouped under three main areas, namely, Understanding living with emerging barriers; 
Utilization of emerging opportunities; effects on project values (Constantinou et al, 2017, 
p. 579). Within these three areas of inquiry, Thematic coding approach was used to 
generate themes directly from the raw data (Given, 2008; Saldana, 2016). Thematic 
coding is the segmentation and categorization of data, reducing them to themes that form 
meanings (Given, 2008; Saldana, 2016). Given (2008) described thematic coding to begin 
with a list of known or anticipated themes from the data (p. 867). As data were collected 
from participants in semi-structured interviews, some themes were seen or anticipated 
concurrently (Given, 2008, p. 867). However, some other themes were found in the 
chosen framework and literature review. Further description of thematic coding were 
given at the data analysis section. 
 Following Constantinou et al. (2017) the researcher compared themes at two 
levels to determine whether saturation of themes have been achieved (p. 580). Firstly, all 
interviews were compared with each other in search of new themes. And secondly, the 
sequence of all interviews were reordered severally, rechecking for saturation of themes 
to avoid order-induced error, and safely achieve saturation (Constantinou et al, 2017, p. 
580). My sample size of 9 participants after saturation is achieved is consistent with the 
recommendations of other proponents (Boyd, 2001;Creswell, 1998;2013;2017; Duke, 
1984; Patton, 2014; Riemen, 1986). The participants in my study were concessionaires 
with the FCTA of Nigeria who have experienced P3 concession uncertainty. 
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 The first step to data management was to have additional or back-up copies of all 
data, both raw and transcribed ones. Individual files were made for all participants of the 
study, both soft and hard copies of such files that will include the field notes, interview 
protocol documents and transcripts, and raw digital files. Additionally, the digital files 
were stored both on my computer and on a separate external hard drive, arranged by 
individual participants. 
 The researcher maintained sole access to interview data and to the participants’ 
identification, which was kept discreet by assigning a pseudonym for respondent 
reference and ensuring that no names were attached to the participants’ responses. For 
example, Study Informant 1 was referred to as Participant 001. The data stored in my 
computer is password-protected. My printed data and electronic data storage devices like 
the tape recorders are stored in a fireproof safe in my home library. The researcher keeps 
a master list of all the types of information gathered. All data to my study have been 
safely kept away, and will stay like that for 5 years after the conclusion of my study in a 
place that only I can have access to. At the end of 5 years, the study data will be deleted, 
destroyed, erased, or shredded as the case may be. 
Instrumentation 
In a phenomenological study, primary, in-depth interviews are the main data 
gathering method (Yüksel & Yildirim, 2015). Phenomenological interviews are used to 
describe the meaning of a phenomenon to several individuals (Merriam, 2014; Smith, 
2015). At the beginning of each interview, the researcher explained the significance of P3 
concessions to the development of Nigeria and how it has helped the Nigerian 
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government continue to deliver public infrastructure with private funds in times of budget 
deficits. Additionally, the researcher stated how the P3 policy has imparted the FCTA of 
Nigeria. Likewise, they mentioned that no researcher has given meaning to the 
experiences of concessionaires of P3 uncertainty; neither has any researcher given voice 
to the concessionaires with the FCTA of Nigeria who experience P3 uncertainty. The 
researcher explained that the information generated from this study, may improve current 
and future public-private collaborations. Each of the participants to this study was asked 
the questions listed under Appendix D in the exact order, about their lived experiences 
with P3 concession uncertainty at the FCTA of Nigeria.  
On concluding the interview, I thanked each participant and ask if there is 
anything outside the interview questions that they may wish to talk about, or any 
questions they may have for them to answer. 
 The research questions were shaped by the literature review to point out possible 
themes from which the researcher developed their interview questions. Answers to these 
interview questions provided answers to the study research question. Interview questions 
1 to 3 were about the  role the concessionaires played in the P3 concession, and the 
options and choices they made. Question 4 is about possible emerging barriers and how 
they live through them. Question 5 is about how the concessionaires utilized possible 
emerging opportunities, and how they affected the values of the P3 projects. And 
question 6 sought to verify whether there are legal frameworks or government policies 
that backed concession contract agreements. 
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 These interview and research questions are consistent with keywords that were 
generated in the literature review. These keywords were uncertainty, flexibility, upside 
opportunities and downside barriers, renegotiation, behavioral affordances, risk 
allocation, strategic behaviors, flexible contracts, concession, and VFM. Likewise, 
themes that will be generated from my interview data are expected to be like these 
keywords; although, new themes may arise. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Each data collection step has been articulated in recognition of the impending 
COVID-19 Pandemic. I contacted the Dean of the Centre for Strategic Research and 
Studies (CSRS) to help me put together a list of potential participants(PP) to my study. 
A list of potential participants (PP) contact information was collected from the 
coordinator of Abuja Infrastructure Investment Centre (AIIC) and sent to me  by the 
Dean of CSRS via email. 
I sent out an invitation letter to PPs via email, and consent forms were later sent to 
eligible PPs to complete and return via email. The consent forms proposed a synchronous 
online interview as an interview format in compliance with COVID-19 mitigating 
practices. The data collection technique was synchronous online interviews. 
I located potential participants to the study through Centre for Strategic Research 
and Studies, Nigeria (CSRS), and sent an invitation letter to a minimum of 30 potential 
participants, with the hope of getting at least 15 positive responses.  If the researcher 
failed to get a minimum of 15 responses, they would have resorted to snowballing 
technique to recruit more participants. They then moved on after two weeks of the initial 
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letter of invitation, by getting the responding potential participants’ consent. This was 
done by getting them to read, understand, and sign the Informed Consent Forms. A semi 
structured interview protocol with open-ended questions was used, and participants’ 
responses to these questions were digitally recorded and transcribed with the participants’ 
permission (Polkinghorne, 1989; Van Manen, 1990). Phenomenological researchers who 
conduct semi structured interviews do so with interview protocols where questions are 
arranged in an order, allowing researchers to ask follow-up and proactive questions that 
allows them to draw insightful responses from the interviewees (Creswell, 2013, pp. 163-
164). The researcher identified potential participants to the study through purposive 
sampling, using a criteria–concessionaires who have, or are experiencing P3 concessions 
uncertainty while partnering with FCTA of Nigeria to deliver public infrastructure. 
 I explained the purpose of this study to all potential participants, explaining that 
they were at liberty to withdraw from the study at any point at which they were no longer 
interested in being a part of the study. The participants were also informed that they are 
not obligated to answer all the interview questions. That they may decide not to answer 
any or a few of the interview questions without explanations as to why they chose not to 
respond. This information was reflected on the informed consent form, which contains 
background information on the study, study procedure, confidentiality, risks and benefits 
of participating in the study, contact for questions, and a statement of consent to all 
participants to the study. Prior to the interview, informed consent were collected from the 
participants confirming they have been informed on the modalities or entire process of 
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the study, and the researcher provided them with an opportunity to ask any questions that 
they may wish to ask. 
 Participants determined the schedule of the interviews, which ran for 45 minutes 
and only stretched up to 1 hour as the need emerged (Patton, 2015, p.486). Interviews 
were held online. Everything that was used in the process was ready before the interview 
start time. Patton (2002) confirmed that the researcher must be a skilled questioner and an 
attentive listener to understand another’s experience (p. 340), and approach the interview 
with an assumption that the participants’ perspectives are meaningful, knowable, and 
could be made explicit enough to be understood (Patton, 2002, p. 341). While 
questioning the interviewees, the researcher asked clear, singular questions, and maintain 
neutrality to the content of interviewees’ responses (Patton, 2002, p. 365). 
 Participants’ level of comfort with the outlined processes and research procedure 
determines how much they open to the researchers to draw in-depth responses about the 
participants’ experiences with the phenomenon. This could be easier when the researcher 
has developed a good rapport with the interviewees and has presented them with some 
sort of reward (Moustakas, 1994). Gaining the trust of the participants is important so the 
researcher can ask the participants to tell their stories freely, accurately, and genuinely 
(Janesick, 2011). With the establishment of trust with participants, researchers gain 
greater access and deeper insights into participants’ perspectives and thoughts about the 
phenomenon of study (Janesick, 2011). This enables a smooth and rich interview 
experience. I maintained good rapport with the participants even after the interview, to 
enable follow-up interviews and confirmation of intentionality. 
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 To ensure a smooth data collection process, I researcher conducted a pre-
interview with the participants to ensure that their recording devices are working well, 
considering volume control and recorder position. They made sure to bring more than one 
recording device and extra batteries for all devices, and ensured that they are at the 
interview venue on time, maintaining scheduled start and end of interview time. The 
researcher worked hard to ensure a smooth interview and made sure to ask clear and 
singular questions all through. The researcher’s role is to organize the interview in a way 
that keeps the participants relaxed and at ease to share their experiences. Questions like 
“can you give an example of what you mean by that” or “please say more about that” are 
what the researcher used to bring participants back to topic when they wonder off or if 
the responses need clarification. 
The organizations, positions of potential interviewees, and project details are as 
follows: 
Organization A: potential interviewee’s position: managing director/chief 
executive officer (CEO); project name: Project cost: $23 million U. S. dollars (USD); 
PPP model: Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015, p. 1336); 
project status: on-going concession. 
Organization B: potential interviewee’s position: managing director/CEO; Project 
cost: $4 Million USD; PPP model: Design Build Operate Maintain (DBOM;  Osei-Kyei 
& Chan, 2015, p. 1336); project status: on-going concession. 
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Organization C: potential interviewee’s position: managing director/CEO; Project 
cost: $18 Million USD; PPP model: Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO; Osei-Kyei & 
Chan, 2015, p. 1336); project status: on-going concession. 
Organization D: potential interviewee’s position: managing director/CEO; Project 
cost: $32.5 million USD; PPP model: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 
2015, p. 1336); project status: on-going concession. 
Organization E: potential interviewee’s position: managing director/CEO; Project 
cost: $400 million USD; PPP model: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 
2015, p. 1336) ; revenue model:; project status: on-going concession. 
Organization F. Potential interviewee’s position: Managing Director/CEO. Project 
cost: $1.75Billion US. PPP Model: Design Build Finance Operate Transfer (DBFOT; 
Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015, p. 1336); Status: on-going. 
Organization G. Potential interviewee’s position: Managing Director/CEO. 
Project cost: $18Billion US. PPP Model: Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO; . Osei-
Kyei & Chan, 2015, p. 1336); Status: on-going. 
 Organization H. Potential interviewee’s position: CEO. Project cost: $68million 
US. PPP Model: Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015, p. 
1336);. Status: on-going. 
 Organization I. Potential interviewee’s position: Managing Director. Project 
cost:$320million US. PPP model: Design Build Finance Operate            
(DBFO; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015, p. 1336); Status: on-going. 
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 Organization J. Potential interviewee’s position: Chairman/CEO. Project cost: 
$48million US. PPP model: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015, p. 
1336); Status: recently completed.    
Data Analysis Plan 
Coding is the first step of analysis where the interview data are classified in a 
manageable way from the field notes and transcripts (Patton, 2002, p. 463). The coding 
procedure I used for my study is theming or thematic coding. Thematic coding is the 
reduction of interview data to themes that inform meaning through segmentation and 
categorization (Given, 2008, p. 867). Thematic coding starts from a list of anticipated or 
known themes being drawn concurrently as data is being collected, while other themes 
are located in the chosen framework and, or, literature review (p. 867). 
Themes are repeated patterns across the dataset (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82). A 
theme captures important details in the data by relating to the research question, and 
shows some level of patterned responses or meanings within the data set (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Therefore, the frequent reoccurrences of particular phrases in few 
participants’ responses become theme (Given, 2008), code aid the development of 
themes, while themes elucidate codes. At the early stage, coding categories are not 
analytic, but discovery in nature; indicating promising ideas or major elements of every 
participant’s story (Given, 2008). Saldana (2016) defines theming as the formulation of 
meanings during data collection and initial analysis, and the constant examination of such 
meanings as  Thematic coding procedure entails moving parts of the data form the 
context of the interview and distributed into themes, then coding categories are 
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rearranged and reconceptualized while the analysis progress to alternative interpretations 
(given, 2008).  
A theme identifies the meaning of reoccurring experiences, capturing or unifying 
them (Saldana, 2016, p. 199). Saldana asserts that ultimately clarifies the meanings of 
participants’ experiences in the data (P. 199). It is a phrase or sentence that explains the 
meaning of a unit of data, describing what the participants’ experiences and behaviors are 
within certain cultures, morals, and iconic statements (Saldana, 2016, p. 199). An 
identified theme categorizes a set of data into implied topics, organizing reoccurring 
ideas into manifestation of a theoretical construct, through which life worlds are studied ( 
Saldana, 2016; Van Manen, 1990). These theoretical constructs serve phenomenology, to 
gain deeper understanding of the meaning or nature of everyday experiences (Van 
Manen, 1990, p. 9). 
The data analysis technique that was employed  in this study is Thematic Analysis 
(TA). This process, other than analyze data, could be used to confirm theme saturation in 
data collection (Given, 2008, p. 868).  Again, TA is recognized as the fundamental 
method of qualitative analysis because it provides tools with which other forms of 
qualitative analysis could be conducted (e.g., thematization of  meanings; Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 78). Thematic Analysis is very flexible due to its independence of theory 
and epistemology, and it provides rich and detailed account of data through its theoretical 
freedom (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 78). Thematic Analysis is a method for identifying, 
analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) that emerge from our thoughts about data, 
which create links to meanings (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 80).  
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 The process of TA starts during data collection, when the researcher begins to 
notice and look for patterns of meanings and issues of potential interest in the data, and 
the end point is the reporting of the content and meaning of patterns (themes) in the data 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). There are no right ways of proceeding with the 
reading of literature for your TA because, in an inductive approach, the researcher needs 
not engage  literature in the early stage of analysis, but in a theoretical or deductive 
approach, the researcher engages literature prior to analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 
86). Qualitative analysis has guidelines but not rules, its basic precepts need to be applied 
flexibly to suit research questions and data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Patton, 2014). The six 
steps to doing a thematic analysis as posited by Braun and Clarke (2006) are: 
Familiarizing yourself with your Data:  
 This involves spending ample time with data. I read the data severally and 
listened to my audio recording, noting down initial ideas. Read in a curious and 
questioning way to activate reflexivity (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). 
Generating initial codes:  
Coding enables deep engagement with the data and the production of an analysis 
that surpasses expectations. At this stage, interesting features of the data are coded in an 
organized way, across the entire dataset, collating relevant data to each code. These codes 
identifies and labels interesting parts of the data, in relation to the research questions  
(Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). 
Searching for themes:  
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This is the collating of codes to form potential themes, and gathering data that are 
relevant to each potential theme. Theme development involved the promotion of complex 
codes into themes. A major way of confirming whether a potential theme is actually a 
theme is by checking whether it identifies a coherent part of the data and tells something 
about that part that is relevant to your research question  (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 
2015).   
Reviewing themes:  
Here, I  reviewed my themes, and this is done in two ways: first, in relation with 
the collated, coded extracts (level 1), second, in relation to the entire dataset (level 2), 
generating a thematic “map” of the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015).  The 
first stage of the review evaluates individual themes to  ensure they work with the coded 
data by rereading the data associated with the codes for each theme and checking whether 
the candidate theme fits the meaning of the coded data before proceeding to the next 
stage of review. Once the candidate themes have passed review against coded data, I 
reviewed them against the entire dataset for a final check for fit (Braun & Clarke, 2006; 
Smith, 2015). This review ensures that individual themes and entire analysis capture core 
meanings and patterns in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015).   
Defining and naming themes:  
This is where I elaborates my themes and move towards the write-up of their 
results (Smith, 2015, p. 240). It came after I have crafted a robust thematic mapping of 
my data, considering the scope of each theme and how they all relate together (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). Theme definition is very useful in data analysis, they are 
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short description that explain the essence, scope, coverage, and boundaries of every 
theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). This step will help me develop my analytic 
narrative and interpretive commentary on the data, and sharpen my focus on  the 
organization and flow of analysis within each theme, which will provide leads for my 
eventual write-up (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). 
Write-up or Analytical reporting:  
Data analysis and its report complement each other, and cannot stand separately, 
but run concurrently (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). Writing up starts from the 
commencement of data analysis and has no hard rules, but relies on general guidance for 
writing up a qualitative study (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). My write up 
included my reasons for choosing TA, and how appropriate TA is for my study as a data 
analysis technique (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). I presented themes that 
contextualize others first in their order of the presentation, and presented data examples 
for my key observations (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Smith, 2015). I strived to make my write 
up very comprehensive, and information rich as the base of my study (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Smith, 2015). 
NVivo has different types of visualizations that could aid thematic analysis (Cain, 
2017, p.3): 
Mind maps:  
This is the brainstorming tool that helps researchers visualize their thoughts and 
ideas, from the central topic or main idea to other idea that relate to the central topic, with 
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sense making connectors. This tool helps researchers reflect on their thoughts of the topic 
as other ideas are flowing  (Cain, 2017, p. 3) 
Project maps:  
This  is where you produce a thematic map that helps you reflect on                         
how your themes are related (Cain, 2017, p. 3). 
Comparison diagrams:  
This tool is used to compare sources to see if they share                     
similar themes (Cain, 2017, p. 3). 
Word clouds:  
      This tool help the researcher to quickly see the most frequently                      
occurring phrases or words (Cain, 2017, p. 3). 
                                 
 NVivo was used in the support, organization, and management of data that were 
gathered through synchronous online interviews. Furthermore, NVivo enables the 
auditing of analytical processes and interpretations by peers, construction of lineal 
narratives, and grouping of codes into categories to represent broader and more abstract 
themes (OSR International, 2014).  
 Although NVivo helps in management, exploration, and determination of patterns 
in collected data, it should not be allowed to replace a researcher’s analytical expertise 
(OSR International, 2014, p. 6). Researchers should endeavor to keep professional 
alertness while using a computer software in analyzing data. I transcribed my recorded 
data manually into a Microsoft Word document and performed thematic analysis with 
83 
 
Microsoft word before importing my transcript afresh into NVivo to ensure a clean, clear 
transcription that includes a holistic submission of the collected data. Then, the 
organization and management of data, and visualization of themes will be done by NVivo 
for confirmation of results before writing-up.  
 One of the major issues of a phenomenological study is making haste to describe 
a phenomenon, even if it is not properly identified (Finlay, 2014a, p. 121). A research 
method must be reactive to a phenomenon to understand its real nature (Finlay, 2014a, p. 
121). Finlay (2014a) introduced a phenomenological attitude that I used in my study, and 
the attitude involves a process of seeking afresh, dwelling, explicating, and language (p. 
122). 
 In seeking afresh, the researcher breaks away from their preconceptions or 
established knowledge of the phenomenon and try to stay open to new knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon through the data. Their previous knowledge of the 
phenomenon, which would have constituted a bias to the study, will be bracketed through 
reduction or epoché. They will focus on the participants’ presentations of their 
experiences to draw meanings of the nature of the phenomenon and avoid giving implicit 
meanings. 
 In dwelling (immersion), They spend time with the data to understand their 
meanings. Finlay (2014a) defined dwelling as a way through which the 
phenomenological approach creates room for the phenomenon to demystify itself by 
telling its story (p. 124). This entails dwelling with the minutiae of data for its details to 
be revealed with time. In the process of dwelling, new understanding emerges to 
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transform data to meanings. At that point, the researcher will engage the participants as 
co-constructors of meanings as they discern meanings together (Finlay, 2014a). 
 In explicating, the researcher synthesizes and integrates emergent themes into 
narratives. They should not to be caught up in the story of the participants’ lives, and 
miss the phenomenon (Finlay, 2014a, p. 129). The researcher will focus on the 
participants’ lived experiences of the phenomenon, instead of the participants’ life 
experience, to gather essential meanings. 
 Language is an important element of a phenomenological study because it 
requires the researcher to write extensively to describe their understanding (Finlay, 
2014a, p. 133). It  helps the researcher express their findings and describe the 
phenomenon they are studying. Being the last stage of data analysis, language expresses 
the systematic rigor of an analytic exercise by crafting the entire process. As the final part 
of the phenomenological attitude, I used a constructive language to establish some degree 
of scientific credibility, as well as describe the participants’ experiences of the 
phenomenon using phenomenological concepts (Finlay, 2014a, p. 133). 
 I embodied my research, as taught by Finlay (2014b), who suggested that an 
embodied intersubjective relationship, like the ones clients and therapists share, should 
exist between the researcher and the study participant (p. 4). Finlay described this 
relationship as a vehicle that would carry the researcher into the participant’s experience 
and world (p. 5). This is a way of bringing the bodily experiences of both the researcher 
and the study participant into the work. Finlay expressed the process as a focus on the 
meanings that lie between and beneath verbal interactions, where the body senses and 
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detects meanings, spurring the researcher to “empathize with, interpret, and understand 
participants’ experiences” (p. 6). I stayed alert to my physical sensations and senses with 
empathy to achieve this.  
 On the emergence of discrepant cases, the researcher will reinvestigate by 
commencing further interviews for more data concerning the discrepant cases. They will 
recode the new data to see where, how, and why the data negated each other.   
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness refers to issues of validity and reliability of a research procedure 
as a significant element of the methodology (Maxwell, 2013, p. 121). Trustworthiness or 
rigor is the integrity with which a study is conducted to ensure credibility of the study 
(Noble & Smith, 2015, p. 34). Cope (2014) asserted that trustworthiness of a qualitative 
research and the transparency with which it is conducted are very important to the 
usefulness and integrity of its findings (p. 90). Trustworthiness or rigor of a study is the 
degree of confidence in data, the interpretation, and the methods used to maintain the 
quality of the study (Connelly, 2016; Polit &Beck, 2014). The criteria for establishing 
trustworthiness or rigor as outlined by Lincoln and Guba (1985) are accepted by many 
qualitative researchers, and include Credibility; Dependability; Confirmability; and 
transferability (Conelly, 2016, p. 435).  
Credibility 
 Trustworthiness in a qualitative inquiry is proved by the elements of the inquiry 
that show that its findings are worth giving attention (Elo et al., 2014, p. 2). 
Trustworthiness is the reporter’s credibility; trustworthiness is the consideration of how 
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the qualitative inquirer affects the reception of the findings (Elo et al., 2014, p. 2). Every 
qualitative scholar should report information about him or herself because the researcher 
is the instrument of data collection, as well as information about the participants because 
they are the informers (Elo et al., 2014, p. 2). To enhance trustworthiness, the 
researcher’s experiences with the phenomenon, training and preparations for fieldwork, 
and general perspective will be announced, as well as the people who will fund the study 
and what arrangements the researcher has with them. The researcher will declare how 
they gained access to the study site and what prior knowledge they bring to the study 
topic and site (Patton, 2002). The researcher will report their relationship with the 
phenomenon and study participants. Their experiences with a P3 concession with the 
FCTA of Nigeria can either enhance or reduce their credibility or trustworthiness, 
depending on how it has affected data gathering and analysis. Patton (2002) asserted that 
the researcher must report any personal or professional information that may imparted, 
influenced, or affected data collection, analysis, and interpretation (p. 566).  
Transferability 
 Elo et al. (2014) defined transferability of data as its potential for extrapolation 
with the understanding that some findings can be generalized or transferred to various 
settings or groups (p. 2). Creswell (2009) defined qualitative validity as a researcher’s 
continuous checks for the accuracy of his or her findings by putting certain procedures in 
place (p. 190). Creswell defined qualitative reliability as some confirmation that the 
researcher’s approach is aligned across different researchers and projects (p. 190). 
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 As validity is considered to strengthen a qualitative research (Creswell, 2009, 
p.191), the researcher intends to strengthen their study by employing multiple validity 
strategies. They justified themes from their collected data by examining evidence from 
the sources. Different participants’ perspectives were pulled together to see whether they 
support the themes. I used follow-up interviews with my study participants to confirm 
meanings or comments on my findings. I wrote-up my findings with rich descriptions to 
paint a clear image of the setting for my readers and to provide many perspectives about 
my theme. Additionally, I clarified my biases, stating how my interpretations would have 
been past knowledge of the phenomenon or background. I did not only present evidence 
that supports my themes, but also presented evidence that contradicts them.  
Dependability 
 Dependability in qualitative analysis refers to the stability of data under different 
conditions and over time (Elo et al., 2014, p. 2). To achieve reliability in a qualitative 
study, Creswell (2009) suggested that a qualitative researcher needs to document their 
study procedures step-by-step in order not to miss anything (p. 190). I checked all my 
interview transcripts for transcripts errors. I compared my interview data with codes by 
keeping a menu on my codes and their definitions to ensure that there is no shift in code 
meaning or drift in code definitions during the coding process. Additionally, I made both 
audio and video recordings of my interviews with two digital devices to ensure that I 
have my digitally recorded data backed up somewhere. I instituted what Creswell called 
an intercoder agreement (p. 191) by finding another qualitative researcher to crosscheck 




 Conformability is the objectivity and the potential congruence between two or 
more independent people about the accuracy of data, relevance, and meaning (Elo et al., 
2014, p. 2). Maxwell (2013) suggested that reactivity is another factor that affects a 
qualitative researcher’s credibility or trustworthiness (p. 124). Maxwell defined reactivity 
as the influence of the researcher on both the participants and the setting that is 
impossible to eliminate (p. 124). Reactivity or reflexivity does not threaten observational 
studies as much as it does interviews because, in an interview, the researcher becomes a 
part of the world the researcher studies. The interviewer influences the participants’ 
responses (data) through interpretations and descriptions, while the interview situation is 
an influence of its own. Maxwell stated that it is important for the interviewer to 
understand and share how they influence the data and how that influence affects the 
validity of drawn inferences made from the interview data (p. 125). I made all my 
bracketing and reflexivity clear in Chapter 4. 
Ethical Procedures 
The civil rights movement of late 1950s and 1960s, the attempts to control 
federally funded research after world war II, some particular studies with questionable 
ethics that created concerns over human subjects rights and welfare, all generated the 
need to protect human subjects in research studies (Berg, 2004, p. 44). The horrible 
torture and dismemberment unleashed by Nazi physicians and scientists during world war 
II, the Tuskegee syphilis studies and the unethical exposure of subjects to freezing 
temperatures, live viruses, poisons, malaria, and a host of untested drugs, all necessitated 
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the emergence of the Nuremberg code, the declaration of Helsinki, and the “Ethical 
Guidelines for clinical investigation” (Berg, 2004; Given, 2008). Following the US 
Department of health and human services regulations (1991) governing the protection of 
human subjects in biomedical and behavioral research and its policy that followed (Berg, 
2004; Given, 2008). 
I ensured that no participant to the study will be compromised or harmed in any 
way during the study and that care is taken to achieve the safety and well-being of the 
research participants. The researcher made sure that approval is received from Walden 
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) before they commenced the study. On 
commencing the participant selection, the researcher ensured that all their selected 
participants signed an active informed consent form (Berg, 2004, p. 58). This shows that 
they have voluntarily accepted to participate in the proposed study. Again, the informed 
consent form emphasizes the participant’s rights to decline answering any question or 
discontinuing the interview at any time they feel like doing so (Berg, 2004). Furthermore, 
the researcher ensured that their interviewees are comfortable to work with them at all 
times, and not feel coerced or threatened in any way, or in fear of any consequences 
(Berg, 2004, p. 58). The researcher also ensured that the participants go through the entire 
interview process at no cost (p. 63). The researcher kept the audio records and transcripts 
of the interview data very confidential, giving the participants pseudonyms as names, and 
ensuring that no records nor locations can give out their identities (Berg, 2004, p. 65). 
Furthermore, the researcher took intentional precaution to ensure that the study or 
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interview data does not accidentally fall into wrong hands, become public or carelessly 
discussed (Berg, 2004, p. 67).  
 I had no issues with the ethics and principles of beneficence because they ensured 
that no harm comes to the research participants by reducing the risks the participants will 
be exposed to, to the barest minimum, to be out-weighed by the benefits of the study. The 
researcher achieve this by conducting a synchronous online interview  which was very 
safe and conducive for the participants in the present COVID-19 Pandemic period. The 
results of this study will benefit future concessionaires at the FCTA and the entire 
ministries, departments, and agencies in Nigeria. All the research participants will be 
treated equitably, fairly, and without bias to satisfy the ethics principle of justice. A copy 
of the study’s executive summary will be given to all study informants or respondents as 
respected co-researchers and colleagues of the explorative endeavor (Moustakas, 1994). 
 The data was managed in a proper manner by backing up all data (both raw and 
transcribed ones). Individual files were created for every participant in soft and hard 
copies where all data that are related to the study will be backed up. All digital data were  
stored on an external hard drive and be kept protected with password-protected folders. I 
maintain sole access to both data and participant information. All printed,  recorded, and 
digital data will be stored in a fireproof safe. After five years, the researcher will make 
proper arrangements to ensure that all transcripts and data are properly and safely 




I used a phenomenological approach to allow me to embed myself as an 
instrument of data collection and be able to draw in-depth information from interviewees 
through semi-structured interviews. Components of the study included measures to 
enhance validity, reliability, and trustworthiness of data collection and analysis 








Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction   
This qualitative hermeneutic phenomenological study involved exploring and 
interpreting concessionaires’ experiences of barriers and opportunities that emerged 
during their public-private partnership concessions with the FCTA of Nigeria. The 
purpose was to identify what P3 concession uncertainty meant to concessionaires while 
they collaborate with the FCTA to deliver public infrastructure. 
P3 are new in Nigeria and have witnessed a lot of failures and a few successes. 
75% of P3 concession contracts in Nigeria fail due to poorly structured agreements that 
do not feature needed flexibilities. These contracts do not adapt downside risks of P3 
projects, thereby increasing projects’ level of uncertainty (Babatunde et al., 2015; Kadiri 
et al., 2015). The level of uncertainty involving Nigerian P3 concessions and how 
concessionaires experience these uncertainties contribute to the failures of P3 concessions 
(Babatunde et al., 2015; Opawole & Jagboro, 2016a). Concession contract structuring is a 
primary factor that affects project outcomes (Babatunde et al., 2015; Kadir et al., 2015; 
Opawole & Jagboro, 2016). A flexible contract structure permits renegotiation as needed, 
while fixed or rigid contracts save transaction costs but preclude renegotiations (Hurk & 
Verhoest, 2016; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2016; Umar & Okafor, 2015). However, because P3 
concession contracts are generally large in scope and involve long-lasting relationship-
specific investments, it is impossible to write P3 concession contracts completely while 
specifying all contingencies (Xiong & Zhang, 2016). To understand these complexities, I 
studied concessionaires’ experiences of P3 concession uncertainties and how these 
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barriers and opportunities shape project outcomes. To capture the reality of P3 
concession uncertainty as expressed by participants, I posed the research question: What 
is the meaning of P3 concession uncertainty to concessionaires in the FCTA of Nigeria, 
and to what extent did these choices, options, and experiences affect project values? In 
this chapter, I give an overview of the research setting, participant demographics, data 
collection details, data analysis process, evidence of trustworthiness, and results before 
concluding with a chapter summary.  
In this chapter, my research investigation regarding experiences involving P3 
concession uncertainty according to concessionaires who collaborate with the FCTA of 
Nigeria was described. Details involving  the criterion-based purposeful sampling 
strategy and qualitative in-depth interviewing techniques were given. Strategies included 
peer debriefing, member checks, criterion-based sampling, audit trails, post-interview 
notes, structural corroboration, reflexive journaling, and auditing. All data relating to this 
study were collected, organized, managed, and stored using Microsoft Word 16 and 
NVivo 12. Details regarding these procedures were outlined in Chapter 3. Nine 
concessionaires participated in research voluntarily after signing written consent forms 
and willingly shared information about their choices, decisions, encounters, and options, 
which served as study data. All concessionaires were thanked for their participation and 
will be offered a copy of results of the study upon publication. 
My research investigation generated 18 open-ended question-based interview 
transcripts, a total of over 14 hours of audio narrative. After being member-checked and 
approved, study data were organized electronically to identify 502 general units of 
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experience. However, further revisions reduced data to five clusters, and eventually three 
anchor themes with 15 subthemes. 
 The first anchor theme, emerging barriers to P3 concessions, involved the issues 
that emerge to the hindrance of structured P3 concessions. This yielded 10 subthemes: 
inexperienced concessionaires, corruption and insincerity of public actors, poor 
institutional framework for enforcement, poor political willingness, difficulty in securing 
business capital, poor concession adaptation mechanisms, insufficient contract protection, 
conflict between partners, implication of change in government, and inefficient 
investment. Insights regarding barriers that frustrated P3 concessions with the FCTA of 
Nigeria were detailed using concessionaires’ experiences. Concessionaires expressed 
difficulties due to lack of absolute support from the government and rigid contract 
structures that do not embed contractual risk flexibilities or at least support 
renegotiations. 
 The second anchor theme, emerging opportunities to P3 concessions, was divided 
into three subthemes: alternative business opportunities, improvement of project values, 
and business networks. Participants expressed joy in having some unexpected 
opportunities that helped them cope with hardships rendered by the P3 concession 
barriers they experienced. Some participants got and executed alternative business 
contracts while waiting for concessions to begin. Some met with influential government 
officials and politicians who were willing to give them other government contracts. A 
few concessionaires had the opportunity to improve their project values by engaging in 
flexible construction, adding some major recreational and medical facilities that were 
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missing, and investing some funds from other businesses to help finance their 
concessions. 
 The third anchor theme, effects of uncertainties on value of projects, involved two 
subthemes: Struggling projects and failed projects. Concession projects can struggle and 
fail when overwhelmed. Participants expressed their unending struggles with unexpected 
barriers like Insincerity and corruption from public actors. They said if some of these 
barriers could be mitigated, a few upside opportunities that come with them would help 
the concessions projects be executed successfully. Participants confirmed that their 
projects failed because they lacked the mix of a flexible contract structures and legal 
frameworks for contract adaptation. 
Setting 
I collected data for this study through effective synchronous online interviews. 
Each participant was engaged twice for a total of not more than 45 minutes per period for 
both interviews and member-checking after transcription and data analysis. All 
interviews took place without background noise or distractions. Participants spoke 
slowly, loudly, and freely. I returned results back participants after data analysis to 
confirm accuracy in terms of participants’ experiences. This was done to ensure that 
participants’ own meaning and perspectives were represented. Member-checking 
commenced by email after analysis. 
Demographics  
There were nine participants to my study: four women and five men with ages 
ranging from 37 years to 57 years. Five of the participants had no previous concession 
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experience before collaborating with FCTA, but four of them have been in other 
concessions before dealing with FCTA. 
Table 2 
 
Participants’ Demographic Variables 
Participant  Age  Gender  Type of P3 Concession  Sum of P3 Concession  Years of  
   ID                                                                                      In USD                   Experience 
 
P1                 42      Female      Build own operate               $68million                          0 
                                                       And transfer 
P2                 45      Female      Design build finance           $12million                          2 
                                                          operate 
P3                 53      Male          Design build finance           $1.75million                       5 
                                                       Operate transfer 
P4                 47      Male          Build operate transfer         $320million                        8 
 
P5                 37      Female      Design build finance           $18million                          0 
                                                       & operate 
P6                 54      Male          Build operate transfer         $48million                          0 
 
P7                 44      Female       Design build operate          $40million                          0 
                                                         manage 
P8                 57      Male           Build operate transfer        $400million                        11 
 
P9                 48      Male           Design build finance          $23million                          0 




Participant recruitment began in August and concluded in late December 2020. I 
identified concessionaires in this study using a criterion-based purposeful sampling 
strategy. I acquired a list of potential participants for my study from the Abuja 
Infrastructure Investment Centre. I sent out a mass email expressing my intentions to 
recruit potential participants who had or still have concessions with the FCT of Nigeria. I 
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asked potential participants to confirm their ability to volunteer for my study by 
reviewing and completing the participant eligibility form. Once eligibility was confirmed, 
I sent out informed consent and participant information forms (see Appendix C) for 
review and completion before each interview commenced. Each concessionaire who 
participated in the study received a copy of the informed consent form and participant 
information sheet. Completed and signed informed consent forms and participation 
information sheets were printed, collated, and sealed in an envelope and kept safely away 
from third party access.  
I conducted two video conference interviews with each participant using a 
standardized and semi-structured open-ended approach. The initial interview was guided 
by a semi-structured protocol, and the followup interview was guided by data collected 
from the first interview. Each interview was conducted with open-ended questions, and 
both initial and followup interviews were recorded both online with Zoom recorder and 
another recording device (Sony stereo recorder) with an Intelligent Noise Cut for clear 
speech playback. I tracked all initial and follow-up interviews using both recording 
devices before transcription as detailed in Chapter 3. Initial interviews lasted an average 
of 45 minutes and followup interviews were an average of 30 minutes each. A total of 18 
interviews were conducted before saturation was established. At the end of initial 
interviews, I scheduled the followup interviews keeping in mind that I would need to 
transcribe and send out interview transcripts to participants to review before followup 
interviews. I wrote memos immediately after each interview and offered to send 
transcripts of collected data to participants 4 days after the interview via email. 
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Participants all agreed to receive and approve followup interviews via email in 
consideration of COVID-19 pandemic issues. After approval of each transcript, I 
informed each participant that I would be emailing a thank you letter and copy of official 
study results to them after the completion of my study. All corrected and generated forms 
used in data collection were scanned and uploaded to a password-protected desktop 
computer in my home. All original paper and handwritten and audio documents were 
destroyed after transcriptions were uploaded to a protected computer, and all data relating 
to the study were managed, stored, and  maintained.  
My initial plan was to interview a sample of eight to -12 concessionaires who 
collaborated with the FCTA of Nigeria. During the recruitment period, 42 individuals 
expressed interest in voluntarily participating in this study. Of the 42 individuals who 
expressed interest, 26 were found ineligible. I interviewed eligible participants knowing 
anything could happen during data collection to further disqualify more participants. 
Three eligible participants withdrew from the study before data collection commenced, 
and saturation of data was achieved after the ninth interview. Data collection was 
concluded after nine eligible participants completed both initial and followup interviews.  
 
Data Analysis  
In-depth semi structured interviews were used in this study. Interviews contained 
a range of questions concerning P3 concession uncertainty. Interviews were all digitally 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Theme emergence was detectable by reading each 




Reflexivity is the process in which researchers are conscious of and reflective 
about the ways in which their questions, methods, and subject positions might impact 
data or knowledge  (Sloan & Bowe, 2014; p.1297).  
Hermeneutics is a qualitative research approach that involves interpretation of 
social phenomena such as behavior and statements, human actions in social 
environments, texts, art works, and statements in public administration groups, and 
agency settings (McNabb, 2013). Data analysis in hermeneutic phenomenology involves 
construction of meanings between the researcher and participants. I stayed aware of how 
my preconceptions could affect my understanding and interpretation of the true nature of 
the phenomenon.  
Phenomenological Reduction     
Phenomenological methodologies involve assessment of human experiences and 
occurs through the following processes: 
Verbatim transcriptions:  
Transcribing the details of digitally recorded interviews into Word documents in 
participants’ exact words.  
Imaginative variation application:  
Opening data to express meaning, to a clearly, easily understandable level.  
Gathering emergent themes:  
Using research protocols to organize categories and data topics into study sources. 




Culling of data for examination of meanings expressed in terms of experiences 
shared by participants that address the phenomenon. 
Descriptive synthesis:  
Narratives of summarized data in consideration of the researcher’s preconceptions 
of the phenomenon of study. 
Key findings and recommendations: 
  Final interpretation of information presented via summaries of the study.   
Interview transcripts, journals, memos, and unstructured notes are useful tools for 
phenomenon exploration. 
Memoing 
The Memoing technique enhances qualitative inquiry by helping the researcher to 
achieve triangulation during the data collection stage. Memoing is also NVivo software 
compatible, capturing material or events that the researcher sometimes forget. reflective 
notes taking during a study saves observational details occurring at a fast rate. Memos 
have freedom to create detailed observations capturing outflowing ideas and insights.  
Journaling    
Journal reflections and thoughts are part of everyday activity during data 
collection. The researcher used Journal file system to ensure changes are efficient. 
Journal accounts help in the provision of methodological clarity and rigor to the analysis 
phase. journals also capture detailed descriptions that help the study. Reflections were 
done with the help of the journal during data analysis to limit omissions, and 
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inconsistencies in this study. By the use of a reflective journal the researcher was 
reminded daily to encourage the participant to freely express themselves towards the 
achievement of study goals. 
Member Checking   
Member checking is the most useful measure adopted in a qualitative inquiry 
because it sends the transcripts back to the expert informant for confirmation. Member 
checking is also an avenue for the participants to provide more information and insights 
while correcting the wrong ones. doing the member checks, the participants checks 
whether the researcher has accurately captured their experiences for achievement of 
validity and whether the meaning of their experience has been translated correctly. 
The researcher applied the first part of the data analysis using Microsoft Word by 
going through the following processes: 
Familiarizing with the data:  
In this phase, the researcher transcribed the data, sent the transcript to the 
participant for confirmation, made necessary corrections, got approval of transcripts, and 
read and reread the transcripts, while writing down ideas (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Generating initial codes:  
This phase includes the coding of interesting features of the data in a systematic 
way across the entire data set, collating data that are relevant to each code (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). 
Searching for themes:  
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This is where the researcher collated codes in two potential themes and gathered 
all data relevant to every potential theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Reviewing themes:  
On this phase, the researcher checks if the potential themes work in relation to 
coded extracts (level 1), and the entire data set (level 2), while generating a thematic map 
of the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Defining and naming themes:  
Here, the researcher continued analyzing the data by defining the specifics of each 
theme and the overall story of the analysis to generate clear definitions and names for 
every theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Report writing:  
This is the final phase of data analysis. The selection of vivid, compelling 
excerpts examples, the analysis of selected excerpts, relating back to the analysis to the 
research question and literature, and the production of a scholarly report of analysis 
(Braun &amp; Clarke, 2006). 
Pursuant to achievement of theme triangulation and rigor in qualitative research as 
advised in residency 4 of October 2020, the researcher also embarked on a software data 
analysis using NVivo 12 for comparison and confirmation of emergent themes. NVivo 
has different types of visualizations that could aid thematic analysis. 
Confirmatory Data Analysis with NVivo 12 
The qualitative data analysis with NVivo 12 was carried out after the completion 
of the Thematic Analysis with Microsoft Word. NVivo12 software was used to sort the 
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data of the transcribed files. NVivo12 software assisted in managing raw data into 
meaningful themes through the use of the index and search features. The transcriptions 
were coded for word frequency using the NVivo12 software. NVivo12 assisted with 
capturing word frequency and semantic phrases which were evaluated by interview 
questions to extract themes and underlying meanings. 
Word clouds comprising of phrases or text as a unit of analysis to understand the 
data further. For this qualitative research study, the option of 50 words was used from 
transcribed text to emphasize the frequency of words. Figure 3 below details the  
frequency of words. The word cloud is a visualization of themes and words identified. 
The frequently mentioned words were: government, concession, project, Nigeria, FTCA, 







On the theme of the barriers affecting P3 projects, corruption and insincerity in the public 
sector was the most mentioned barrier. This shows that corruption was the main barrier 
affecting P3 projects. On the other hand, public resistance was the least mentioned barrier  
meaning that it was not a key barrier.  
Discrepant Cases 
When code transcription was complete, the study disclosed no evidence of 
discrepant cases in the research data. If there were any discrepant cases I would have 
welcomed and investigated more on them. Contradictions in data sometimes lead to 
unexpected findings, which ultimately strengthen theory (Paton, 2002). 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness refers to issues of validity and reliability of a research procedure 
as a significant element of the methodology (Maxwell, 2013, p.121). it is the rigor with 
which a study is conducted to ensure its credibility (Noble & Smith, 2015, p.34). I used 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) as criteria for establishing trustworthiness or rigor, which 
includes credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability (Conelly, 2016, 
p.435). These standards of measure were defined and explained in chapter 3.  
Credibility 
Credibility concerns are centered on a belief held by naturalistic enquirers, stating 
that multiple realities exist in contacts with participants (Merriam, 2002; Guba, 1981). 
For this study I introduced specific strategies to help minimize the effects of emerging 
realities. The first strategy, peer briefing was an on-going standard protocol to a doctoral 
study like this one. All methods and insights relating to this study were reviewed by my 
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dissertation committee members at every stage and I received feedbacks that improved 
the quality of my research to achieve high quality results (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). 
The second strategy, member checking was satisfied by ensuring that every participant 
got an opportunity to review transcripts of their interviews. Each one of the 
concessionaires corresponded with me by both emails and audio phone calls to discuss 
the information recorded in their transcripts and make necessary changes. Each 
concessionaire was asked to provide approval after rechecking the transcript for 
requested changes. The concessionaires communicated their approval via emails and 
phone calls, which permitted me to go ahead with the data analysis process. All the 
participants were actively engaged in the member-checking process. The third strategy, 
structural corroboration, came up after all the data was gathered. I diligently and 
thoroughly searched the entire data for discrepancies, and there were none.  
Transferability 
The goal of transferability is to describe the meaning of P3 concession uncertainty 
to concessionaire with FCTA of Nigeria who have experienced P3 concession uncertainty 
(Guba, 1981; Miles, Huberman, Saldana, 2013). I achieved transferability by applying 
appropriate and important strategies all through the study. The first strategy was criterion 
based purposeful sampling. I used the criterion-based purposeful sampling to ensure that 
information gathered was specific to the targeted experience and context. The criteria for 
participation were made known through email to potential participants and they affirmed 
their eligibility for participation prior to acceptance. 
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The second approach to transferability was qualitative interviewing. I saw the 
accepted concessionaires as capable of providing information-rich responses that could 
inform my study. I engaged the participants in in-depth interviewing, asking them series 
of open-ended questions, to help me interpret the details of their experiences of P3 
concession uncertainty while collaborating with FCTA of Nigeria. I recorded every 
concessionaire’s response using an audio recording device, and digitally tracked them. I 
subsequently transcribed, reviewed and analyzed all the recorded data. The third strategy 
to transferability, data accounting sheet was completed after every interview to track 
responses and device plans for the follow-up encounter (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 
2013). Shared experience of the participants, memos and member checks, all helped me 
achieve data richness till saturation.  
Lastly, I created thick descriptors from study data, considering time, context, and 
cultural factors of experience reported during each interview encounter (Guba, 1981; 
Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013). My goal is to interpret from the study data, the 
meaning of P3 concession uncertainty to concessionaires who collaborate with FCTA of 
Nigeria. The description of lived experiences of P3 concession uncertainty given by 
concessionaires who have or are collaborating with FCTA of Nigeria in this study is 
specifically applicable to concessionaires experiencing the same phenomenon. 
Dependability 
Fieldwork files are available for this study both electronically and in hard copy. 
These documents exist for peer review purposes should one be required in support of the 
study results. Audit created folders also store the factual evidence and details provided by 
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the participants. Electronic files and hard copied documents are available containing 
voice recording of interviews, interview transcripts, letter of consent, letters of 
cooperation, and created using both Microsoft word and NVivo 12. This audit trail was 
developed using raw data, categorized data, and analyzed data as phases of progression 
while working with data. Information-rich materials gathered from the study participants 
were consistently organized, managed, and stored according to the procedures outlined in 
chapter 3. The audit trail process was very helpful in the management of data flow and 
easy identification of errors requiring correction. The faculty member appointed as 
chairperson for my dissertation committee performed a dependability audit and found my 
audit trail acceptable according to current qualitative research practices.  
Confirmability   
Trustworthiness and quality were established by showing evidence aligned with 
investigative integrity. Investigative integrity findings being consistent with the gathered 
data, was the goal of establishing conformability. The first strategy towards achieving 
conformability was aimed at preventing distortions of findings, and was completed before 
data collection. The interview protocol which is the research instrument was evaluated 
and confirmed fit to the research population. And research question (Havens & Vasey, 
2015; Kici & Wessthoff, 2004). A voluntary testing of the interview protocol with two 
members of the targeted population who are not participants was conducted as a final 
effort to produce an easy to understand and relevant instrument (Boyce & Neale, 2006; 
Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Seidman, 2013).  
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The second strategy to achieving confirmability is building a positive rapport with 
the participants. The researcher identified himself as the first contact with the participants 
and revealed that he had been part of a concession with FCTA of Nigeria. This was done 
to gain positive rapport and access to raw, reliable, and applicable data (Dwyer & Buckle, 
2009; Maxwell, 2013). Being perceived as an insider created a safe atmosphere for open 
and honest disclosure during all the interviews. The researcher stayed inquisitive, seeking 
to learn from the expert informants, concessionaires with FCTA of Nigeria (Patton, 
2015). 
The third strategy is reflexivity. Reflexivity and conformity enable a rigorous 
sense of self-awareness during data collection and compilation of results. Reflexivity is 
the process in which researchers are conscious of reflecting about the way in which their 
questions, methods and subject positions might impact on the data or the psychological 
knowledge produced in the study (Sloan & Bowe, 2014; p.1297). The collection of data 
occurred independently, reducing the potential for different judgements, and avoid inter 
and intra code reliability studies. The interview questions were open-ended and focused 
on the phenomenon to ensure there was a limited amount of inconsistency in data 
analysis due to external and extraneous reactions during interview sessions. 
Results 
Nine participants were engaged in a series of interviews to capture their 
experiences of P3 concession uncertainty. The result of the study provides a thorough 
review of well detailed transcription gathered during the data collection stage. The 
examination and clustering together of emerging themes according to conceptual 
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similarities worked out as a useful approach. The thick and rich descriptions told the 
participants’ stories, addressed research questions, and backed-up emergent themes from 
research questions. These patterns generated themes that produce a structure for 
converging ideas (Moustakas,1994). The research question explored in this study is: 
What is the meaning of P3 concession uncertainty to concessionaires with Federal Capital 
Territory Administration of Nigeria, and to what extent did these choices, options, and 
experiences affect project values? Three anchor and 15 subthemes emerged from both 
analysis done with Microsoft word and NVivo 12 from significant statements provided 
by nine participants during the interview process. Each theme captured the essence of P3 
concession uncertainty to concessionaires with FCTA of Nigeria, and its effect on the 
value of their projects. 
Table 3 
Anchor Themes and Subthemes 
Emergent Barriers to        Emergent Opportunities to    Effects of Uncertainties on 
    Concessions                                Concessions                        on Value of Projects    
Inexperienced                          Alternative business                Struggling projects. 
Concessionaires.                       Opportunities. 
Corruption and insincerity       Business networks.                   Failed projects. 
Of government actors. 
Poor institutional framework    Improvement of projects.         
For enforcement. 
Poor political willingness. 
Difficulty in securing credit 
Facilities. 
Poor concession adaptation 
Mechanisms. 
Insufficient contract protection. 
Conflict between partners. 






Theme 1: Emergent Barriers to Concessions 
Subtheme 1: Inexperienced concessionaires 
Five out of nine participants confirmed that their concession with FCTA was their 
very first ones, just as limiting as it is  for the other four whose concessions were their 
first with FCTA despite being in a few other collaborations before this. Zaigham, Zhu, 
and Shahid (2018) expressed that inexperience is a technical barrier that hinders a 
concession project from inception through unclear work scope, inability to perform on 
the required technical grounds, impractical tender estimations etc.(p.5). Five responses 
from participants summarized the essence of this subtheme in relevant significance to the 
phenomenon, stating the following:  
P1 said, “Yes it is my very first concession with Nigerian government.” P5 said, “No, I 
hadn’t been in any concession before this one. So, this is my very first one and the 
attraction is the legal framework which protects the investor to a large extent.”P6 said, 
“That was my very first one.” P7 said “Yes, it was my first concession ever.” P9 also 
explained, 
Yes it was my first concession– I served as a youth Corp member  at FCTA and 
having been there for one year, I saw the problem the administration was having 
with continuing peoples land papers for the Area Council where the chairman 
presided.  
 In exploring this subtheme through the lens of the RFT, inexperience yields a lot 
of mistakes on the part of the concessionaires. These mistakes could  usually be corrected 
by renegotiations during the concession period. The higher the uncertainty, the more 
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important it is for collaborating parties top sign flexible contracts that encourage 
renegotiations (Chiara & Kokkaew, 2009). Though these concessionaires with FCTA 
lacked experience, well-structured flexible contracts that support renegotiations might 
have led to the success of projects (Cruz & Marques, 2013b; Dong & Chiara, 2010). 
Participants reported that public actors in Nigeria are so corrupt that they hinder 
the developmental process of the country. They stated that P3 in Nigerian has corruption 
embedded in it, and that has set most P3 concession projects struggling to an eventual 
failure. Concessionaires asserted that the Nigerian government officials do not care about 
the progress of the nation, but what they can gain from every project for themselves. 32 
comments from the respondents summarized the essence of this subtheme in terms of its 
importance and relevance to the phenomenon, stating the following: P1explained, 
while in Nigeria, the whole projects look like they were conceived, initiated and 
planned for the public officers’ self-aggrandizement. I found out that P3 or 
infrastructure provision in Nigeria has insincerity embedded in it, coupled with 
lack of political will induced by self-centeredness, greed, foolishness and even 
ignorance. I brought my Foreign investors to speak with the Permanent  Secretary 
before we signed our agreement and the Permanent Secretary started making 
demands as conditions for signing the concession agreement. My foreign investor 
pulled me aside and asked if these guys are serious or not. 
P2 also said, 
Sure, there were and will always be barriers in P3 projects, especially in 
Nigeria….When government officials don’t get bribes from projects, they try to 
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stall them. People in government do not let your project succeed without you 
paying backhands to their satisfaction. The culture of continuity is not there 
because every new public officer looks out for what could be theirs in every 
concession, and when there is no personal gain in it for them, they kill the 
concession. 
P3 explained by saying that 
I know! About 15 Senators wanted a plot of land each. Two major negative 
influences on our concession were my Chairman’s and government’s insincerity, 
and Shelter Affric’s refusal to fund us. It even got as bad as Senators and 
honorable Representatives demanding for houses from our project. The chairman 
of my company paid the government to get the concession. It affected it because 
there was no sincerity for implementation. Its corruption, corruption induced by 
failure in government. You know, when a bad system runs for a long time, it 
eventually becomes norm or right. Public officers use their offices to enrich 
themselves in Nigeria, so much that it is norm today. I left when it became clear 
that the only option open for us to access funds was through FMBN, where I 
would have taken a loan in my name and agree to pay 20% of the loan amount 
back to the public officer before even having access to the funds. What’s even 
more unfair is that it’s only the Directors and their Deputies that have access to 
these funds that every Civil Servant contributes to. 
113 
 
P4 said, “They held our project down for two years, making us lose our financiers and 
accumulate a huge bill on overhead and other expenses. We were also maltreated and 
harassed with arbitrary powers.” P5 said, 
There were so many political prosecution targets, and ironically  the new 
government didn’t like the former FCT minister, so they were also looking for 
ways to indict him, or tie him to these projects, but they failed. And that was very 
wicked thoughts, in the end the economy suffered, other concessionaires who 
weren’t prepared suffered. 
P6 explained, 
We signed an M.O.U, but were supposed to sign the main concession contract 
after the due diligence trip. But after the trip, they gave the contract to their own 
company. Sure there were some opportunities that cane up, like I told you, when 
the FCTA cunningly gave our contract to their own company, we were offered a 
building construction business, but my investors rejected it because that was not 
the reason why they came to Nigeria. If the Public officers had held down their 
greed and personal interest initially, putting Nigeria first, That project would have 
been finished and standing now. So the barrier was just Corruption. I will call it 
Corruption!! We travelled to London, USA, Dubai and Iran for the due diligence. 
But they came back and allocated the job to themselves. But now they are mostly 
retired from civil service and could not continue holding unto the government job 
that they could not deliver on. Some civil servants came together and floated a 
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company, used the company to win the contract, It was an invisible bid with the 
company name everywhere. 
P7 also explained that 
The thing is that people in government in Nigeria are not looking out for the poor 
masses or the country at least. All they care about is their pockets, to see that they 
gain from every project that passes their tables, otherwise, they would hold back 
the proposals, keeping them in-view forever. I would tag it greed and Insincerity 
in government. They never showed sincerity of purpose. They went back on their 
words after we had committed a lot into the concession. While we were looking 
for funds to take the business off the ground we got information from a very 
reliable source that the FCTA was talking with one of their retired directors about 
taking over our concession and doing it as a contract instead of a concession. Yes, 
we struggled with lots of barriers. Firstly, we had to spend a lot of money to push 
our concession approval to the signing stage. After signing the concession 
agreement, the FCTA would not come out to start the advertisement of the 
product with us as agreed. 
P9 explained, 
They always see P3 as someone carting away their turf. They might have felt I 
was encroaching on their area of influence, and that was the main problem-
Corruption. Yes, they added something to our recertification process, where they 
check what we have done and okay it, before we can issue the certificate of 
occupancy, and that’s what they used to kill our project. I wouldn’t recommend a 
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P3 with Nigerian government to anybody because, they do not keep to the terms 
of the collaboration, neither do they perform on their obligations. After three 
years of our shutdown, they recalled the retired Director of AGIS that I worked 
with to put the whole concession together. And they are now trying to use him to 
run my intellectual property inwardly by themselves. I think another issue for 
him, aside securing his illegal financial channel, was that he thought out project 
belonged to the retired Director of AGIS whom I worked with in the past, and he 
did not like very much. We needed some information from government (the 
existing layout in the area council) but government couldn’t give us that, probably 
because a whole lot of them felt that our project would block the ways through 
which they syphoned money from government. The problem was that our project 
somehow cuts them off from their scam of creating fake layouts and collecting 
monies from the masses. They were making money from the disorganization, so 
they threatened me in so many ways to abandon the project and save my life.  
In assessing the RFT, an infrastructure project is a contract structuring project because, 
the contract agreement made at the beginning shapes the fate of the project (Dong & Chiara, 
2010). Opportunistic behaviors like corruption and insincerity of P3 partners generate transaction 
cost (Dong & Chiara, 2010). Inability to foresee such downside risks from the beginning makes 
it difficult to address them. 
Participants inferred that change in government in Nigeria came with lots of 
negative effects to their on-going projects. The new administration, especially when from 
the opposing party, goes all out to frustrate projects that they cannot remold for their 
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personal aggrandizement. 14 responses from the study participants summarized the 
crucial import of the subtheme to their lived experiences of the phenomenon, stating the 
following:  
P2 said, 
The initial government officials agreed to pay us in time, even in advance because 
they expected some continuity and good partnerships in training their staff to 
maintain the lights. Nigeria is a difficult place to do business, very unhealthy climate. 
I’m sure a lot of people would have told you that. 
P5 explained, 
There were so many political prosecution targets, and ironically the new government 
didn’t like the former FCT minister, so they were also looking for ways to indict him, 
or tie him to these projects, but they failed. Well, initially, there were no barriers but a 
lot of cooperation from our public partners, but from the time there was a change of 
government, a lot of political interests came up, which has stopped our project. Yes, 
you know our issues started when the new government came in with new interests, 
perceptions and ideas. There were so many political prosecution targets, and 
ironically the new government didn’t like the former FCT minister. 
P6 said, 
Well, like I said earlier, many of the civil servants who perpetrated this dastardly act 
have retied and left the establishment. The then minister has also left the ministry. 
The barrier really affected my business because I lost a lot of money. 
P8 also explained, 
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This is because when this happens, the new operators will come in and show just 
disregard for the on-going concession just because they were not part of their 
initiation. They would rather initiate their own concessions. Because if you take the 
western world for example, there, the public servants have political affiliations 
without actually being partisan, but in Nigeria, civil service has be very politized. So 
as a result of that, a change in government also affects the civil servant’s jobs. When 
a new government comes in with a new agenda, they will just ignore such 
agreements, or formally cancel it. The entire clique of government functionaries that 
were involved in the planning of this concession were removed and new people came 
into offices and it was it was a big shock for us. Everything changed completely. We 
expected a slow down during the elections but did not expect it to continue after the 
elections. And the reason it was sustained was because There was a total change in 
government, that was when Buhari won elections. So I think everything slowed down 
After the new administration came in. Yes ,all the barriers were related to political 
risk, although they were not unanticipated, We did not expect it to bring about 
complete stop of government partnership or concession. 
P9 explained, 
It wasn’t a good experience, and it taught me that P3 in Nigeria is a very dicey 
business. Things could be rosy for a while, but if the public office holder or 
government changes, you could be facing unimaginable issues. So, when we went to 
the new minister to renew the contract, the Director of lands told the Minister that our 
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project is the former Minister’s scheme to continue enriching himself even after 
leaving office. 
Assessing this subtheme through the lens of RFT’s contractual flexibility analysis 
provides both partners to a P3 collaboration the right to shift risks or challenges from one 
partner to another who is best equipped to handle them. In the light of concessionaire’s 
experience of the hardships brought about by change in government administration in 
Nigeria, an ability to shift risks or make contingent claims would have been ideal. 
Participants revealed that FCTA had a poor institutional framework to back-up 
their P3 projects by enforcement. They stated that through these, P3 enforcements were 
agreed upon at the commencement of the projects, government failed to fulfill these 
obligations, making it difficult for the promoters to succeed. Nine recorded responses 
from participants summarized the essence of this subtheme to the phenomenon, stating 
the following: 
P1 explained, 
We do not have the right collateral to stake, and government will not give us the 
title document of the land we are to build on, so we can use it to get loan from the 
bank. They could have even done the road and bring in all other infrastructure to 
support our collaboration, and then put a toll gate to recover their expenses and 
people would still have felt better to deal with us by just seeing the government 
presence in what we do. The government does not lift a finger to assist the 
concessionaires in any way, even with something as small as talking to the central 
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bank to lend to the concessionaires at a moderate rate. They just watch these 
beautiful projects die when there is no funding for them. 
P2 also explained, 
I don’t think so. The initial government was excited, wanted to identify with it. 
They also like working and learning with us and wouldn’t have killed it, though 
they didn’t go off their way to protect it. It took a lot money and time to keep our 
proposal in view, and even more money and time to push it to FEC to be 
approved. 
P3 said, “Well, the whole contract and land is still there, but the honesty needed for 
implementation is lacking.” 
P9 explained saying that 
They are non-receptive to P3, no matter how hard you try to carry them along. 
And they don’t care what the state loses, all they want is an avenue to fill their 
pockets. Without the certificate, govt continues to lose money at these locations. 
But government did not do their part to enforce the process to bring in 
subscribers. I barely used the little we got to pay back the  bank loan. They also 
do not enforce or provide anything as government to help the concessionaires 
succeed.  
 Looking at the RFT, poor enforcement falls under managerial flexibility, which 
refers to the project manager’s ability to manage a system in ways that are both adaptive 
and responsive (Kokkaew & Sampim,2014, p.456). 
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Participants reported that there were series of conflicts between partners to 
concession projects which hindered communication in lots of ways. Conflicts between 
collaborating partners hurt concessions by tampering the most important concession 
success factor-communication, and trust. Seven comments from study participants 
summarized the essence of this subtheme in understanding their experience with the 
phenomenon, stating the following: 
P1 said, “It affected my foreign investor in very negative ways, but myself, being a 
Nigerian makes it easy to adapt to their corrupt ways. But I am optimistic about Nigeria 
surviving all these theft and  maltreatment.” 
P2 explained, 
There was no room for that, we had gone to court for our money to be paid, were 
no longer friends. We also didn’t want another concession agreement with them, 
where they will be making sure to include a clause that will not allow us go to 
court in eventualities of  intimidations. 
P4 also explained, 
Well, the major barrier we encountered was that FCTA stopped our project when 
we were awarded a free trade zone. The issue was that the free trade zone 
increased the value of our project, and was going to give us more profit, which 




P7 said, “Our partnership in the  collaboration with FCTA was greatly damaged and the 
value of our project was reduced to nothing without the government’s backing. It was as 
if the sparkles left the diamond.” 
P9 explained by saying that 
But they secretly rented and furnished an office for the project. What they do not 
know is that the business name and project have been patented. So once I’m sure 
that they have commenced business, I will pounce on them with everything I 
have. Despite all that I continued because I wanted to help FCTA and also help 
people with the area council landed properties have certified titles to those 
properties. We saw both old and young people who needed our help so we wanted 
to help but the director of lands frustrated it all and even threatened other directors 
that were helping us. When we submit out report to them, he ignored it for long. 
They were making money from the disorganization, so they threatened me in so 
many ways to abandon the project and save my life.  
The RFT has elements of real options and contractual flexibility analysis. In looking at 
the subtheme (conflict between partners), the researcher sees that the conflicts could have 
been avoided by the exercise of an interacting option as an element of the theory. Options 
to make intelligent claims would also have resolved most of the stated conflicts.  
Local banks in Nigeria find it difficult to finance big concession projects, and 
when they do, they demand a worthy collateral to secure the loan. Therefore, Nigerian 
concessionaires have always sought project finance from foreign countries. These foreign 
financiers are most time disappointed by Nigerian government officials asking for 
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backhands or attaching impossible conditions to agreements (Opawole & Jagboro, 2017, 
p.53). Seven responses from participants summarized the significance of this Subtheme 
to the meaning of lived experiences of the phenomenon, stating the following: 
P1 explained, 
The ripple effect of FCTA not advertising with us hindered our ability to secure a 
bank loan for the importation of the goods. Well, we do not have the right 
collateral to stake, and government will not give us the title document of the land 
we are to build on, so we can use it to get loan from the bank. The government 
does not lift a finger to assist the concessionaires in any way, even with 
something as small as talking to the central bank to lend to the concessionaires at 
a moderate rate. They just watch these beautiful projects die when there is no 
funding for them. 
P3 said, “Two major negative influences on our concession were my Chairman’s and 
government’s insincerity, and Shelter Affric’s refusal to fund us.” 
P8 also explained, 
We needed more money to continue the work, but government insincerity 
destroyed it all. Shelter Affric did not fund us because they probably understand 
that investment in Nigeria comes with a lot of Unavoidable risks that could kill 
even a project like our own. Then came the episode with the FMBN, where 
corruption was the order of the day. They would issue a loan of #200Million naira 
with a cutback of #50Millionnaira. I said the time we initiated our concession 
there was a lot of interest external interest to invest in Nigeria but with this new 
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government coming in things have changed but it's more like no one wants to 
invest in Nigeria.  
Tactical flexibilities are options taken in the middle of project life due to business 
conditions (Cruz & Marques, 2013a). Connecting this subtheme to the theory, the 
researcher saw that if tactical flexibility were embedded in the contracts, FCTA would 
have done a lot to assist the concessionaires in securing the needed business capital. 
Political willingness to support on-going concessions is lacking in Nigerian 
government. Public actors are unwilling to continue the works of their predecessors, 
especially when the projects do not yield anything to them (Opawole & Jagboro, 2016). 
The functionaries of new government administrations ignore and violate contract 
provisions with reckless abandon (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, p.442). Six responses from 
the participants summarized the essence of this subtheme in terms of importance and 
relevance to the phenomenon, stating the following: 
P1 explained that 
I found out that P3 or infrastructure provision in Nigeria has insincerity embedded 
in it, coupled with lack of political will induced by self-centeredness, greed, 
foolishness and even ignorance. So the political will of government would have 
helped us a lot. It would have been marvelous. When there is entertainment, crime 
reduces. No, they would have abandoned me because they are not attached to the 
concession, the political will to get things done is lacking so nothing has their 
attention, except things they can gain from. 
P2 also explained, 
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When the mantle of leadership moves from the public officer who set-up the 
concession with concessionaires, the vision dies. Yes, when the new government 
came on, they let us continue our project while they snoop around for ways of 
taking backhands in our project. But when they saw that they could not exploit the 
project, they starved it of funds and killed it. The big picture is to have a master 
traffic light plan for Abuja, and we had this all designed and drawn, but the new 
guys who came into power next felt he project was already going and he wouldn’t 
be gaining from it, so he frustrated it.  
 Infrastructure projects are contract structuring projects, hence the contract made at 
the beginning determines the fate of the project (Doug & Chiara, 2010). If the 
concessions had contractual flexibility, they may have been able to renegotiate their 
contracts. 
Participants reported that their concessions lacked efficient  concession adaptation 
mechanisms. They also confessed that the Nigerian government would not have given 
them the chance to embed flexibilities in their concession contracts. They merely hoped 
that when barriers emerged, the government would be willing to work with them to 
ensure the issues are solved. Six participant responses summarized the significance of 
this subtheme in terms of relevance to the phenomenon, stating the following: 
P2 explained, 
Yes, things would have been a lot different if we had options. We would have 
renegotiated the other phases to come as contracts whereby they mobilize us and 
we move to site and do the work for them because it’s always too hard to get your 
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money from the Nigerian government. No, we knew it was risky to do business in 
Nigeria, but because we had our foreign investors, we thought we could evade all 
risks by staggering the stage in such a way that before the second phase starts, we 
would have gotten paid for both the first and second phase, which kind of evades 
the risk. There were no flexibilities, it is a novel project, to help young Nigerians 
own their  own houses. So because it’s a novel idea for Nigeria, there were no 
flexibilities, and we never thought of that. But that’s not why we are here today. 
P7 said, “No, there were no options or flexibilities embedded in our concession because it 
never crossed our minds to ask for that since it took so much efforts and funds to get our 
concession approved.” 
P8 explained, 
No there was nothing like that, just the hope that because both parties want the 
concession to succeed, when there is a problem, the parties will come together to 
solve the issue. We just felt there was no need to embed such clauses in the 
contract because the chances that the government would agree to that are very low  
P9 also explained that 
In Nigeria, it is tough to have such things in your contract because the 
government here is a bully. They do not give you a lot of room to think because, I 
think they make up their minds not to perform from the beginning not to perform, 
so the avoid liabilities and take whatever they can get out of the concession early.  
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 Considering the RFT in pursuit of economically efficient contracts, infrastructure 
contracts should have flexibilities technically embedded in them, to give shareholders 
contingent claims that enable proper risk allocation all through the projects’ lifecycle. 
Participants revealed that despite going to the Nigerian Federal Executive Council 
to get the highest level of approval, their concession projects were not sufficiently 
protected when the need for protection arose. The government officials’ greed drove their 
projects to failure without some sort of recourse. Six participant’s comments summarized 
the importance of this subtheme in terms of relevance to the phenomenon, Stating the 
following: 
P1 explained, 
Of course, yes we are legally protected and there is the Land-Swap policy of the 
FCT that our project is riding on. Like I said earlier, we did not come to pursue 
legalities but to fight to see that this beautiful recreational facility that has helped 
many in faraway countries is built here in Nigeria to help my people. 
P2 also explained, 
No, we knew it was risky to do business in Nigeria, but because we had our 
foreign investors, we thought we could evade all risks by staggering the stage in 
such a way that before the second phase starts, we would have gotten paid for 
both the first and second phase, which kind of evades the risk. 
P7 revealed that 
Our lawyers were very confident at the time we were signing the agreement, but 
urged us not to go to court when FCTA did not keep to the terms of the 
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collaboration by not fulfilling their obligation to us, saying it will be a futile task 
since no one can and ha ever won the government. 
P8 said, “We just felt there was no need to embed such clauses in the contract because the 
chances that the government would agree to that are very low. You can sign site letter 
agreement much later if issues arise.” 
P9 explained, 
Well this project had all the legal frameworks it needed, and was sufficiently 
backed by the presidency and Nigerian P3 policy, yet it failed out of people’s 
greed, corrupt practices and negligence of duty. I feel terrible about how 
everything went because I thought if the contract went through a steering 
committee and FEC, and also got a presidential approval, it will succeed.  
 Looking at this Subtheme through the lens of Risk Flexibility theory, Flexible 
contracts are viewed as an ingredient for success, especially in long termed infrastructure 
contracts Dong & Chiara, 2010, p.91). Long term projects carry high level uncertainty, 
and when such contracts are drawn without flexibilities, parties to the concession risk 
negative outcomes to both themselves and the entire contract (Dong and Chiara, 2010). 
Participants reported that lots of vices came into play to render their investments 
inefficient. They started with the greed of public officers, asking for a percentage of the 
concessionaires’ business profit in advance before they do anything to move the 
concession forward or help make it a success. Also, was the issue of understanding the 
need for the public infrastructure, some public actors did not understand the importance 
or relevance of the facilities they were charged to oversee. Bureaucracy also makes things 
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slow in Nigeria, hindering the possibility of effective loan utilization and repayment plan 
for such large sunk infrastructure projects in Nigeria. Five comments from the 
participants summarized this Subtheme’s importance and relevance to the phenomenon of 
study, stating the following: 
P1 said, “I brought my Foreign investors to speak with the Permanent  Secretary before 
we signed our agreement and the Permanent Secretary started making demands as 
conditions for signing the concession agreement.” 
P2 explained, 
So you understand the grave mistake in using traffic lights at four intersections 
and road wardens at the remaining two, the flow could be impossible. The 
seamless flow of traffic will be lost. Major issue was being between the west 
where people have transparent and timely mode of business operation and Nigeria 
where things are very slow to the point of frustrations. 
P9 also explained that 
I wouldn’t invest in Nigeria in the near future. I unfortunately borrowed from 
bank to setup the office, bought official vehicles, furnished the office and did a lot 
more to make things work, but my entire effort was ruined by one man in the civil 
service, who did not like my former boss. We went back to the minister severally 
to intervene; he did intervene by sending a representative to oversee our 
relationship with the land directorate. The problem was that our project somehow 
cuts them off from their scam of creating fake layouts and collecting monies from 
the masses.  
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The RO would have played a positive part in alleviating the issues creating inefficiency 
in the investments. The Interacting Option could have given the concessionaires various 
options to call in the face of corruption and ignorance from government officers (Martins 
et al., 2014). And the Option for Staged investment element of the Risk Flexibility 
Theory could have helped ameliorate the impact of Nigerian Bureaucracy on investments 
Martins et al., 2014).  
Anchor Theme 2: Emerging Opportunities to Concession 
Alternative Business Opportunities 
Participants expressed that some of the uncertainties came in the form of 
alternative business opportunities. They disclosed that amidst all the barrier, they were 
offered alternative contracts to execute some other government projects. Some 
concessionaires confessed taking up and executing these projects which they confessed 
helped them out of huge financial issues. Some bureaucratic delays also made some 
concessionaires wait out the tenures of government officials who turned down their 
proposals, welcome new ones who offered them the contracts.  Four responses 
summarized the significance of this subtheme in terms of importance and relevance, 
Stating the following:     
P1 explained, 
Yes, lots of unexpected opportunities. Firstly, I met most of the very influential 
men in Nigeria in the course of my concession, I met governors that want me to 
build Entertainment worlds in their various states, I even met a governor from 
Ghana who would like me to build for his state after building for Nigerian states, 
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a private owner of a recreational park wanted to partner with me, for me to 
maintain and properly manage the park. 
P3 said, “Yes! A company aside the one I came to work for, offered me a job and was 
willing to pay me more than my company offered. I also met so many people important 
dignitaries.” 
P5 explained that 
Sure, we had lots of opportunities which are mostly economic. This concession 
exposed me to so many parties who are very influential in Nigeria. On the 
economic part, I got a lot of good will, made good friends with who I am at the 
moment working on other ongoing projects. 
P6 also explained that 
But when that team left, the next team that came went through the whole bid 
submissions again and nominated our company for the concession contract. I am 
now negotiating with new investors, though I understand that I will finally have to 
work with my initial investors who are already part of my organization and have 
significant equity in the business. 
Analyzing this subtheme with the Risk Flexibility Theory, the researcher found 
that with the Switch Option in place, the Management of a company could switch 
between operating modes by the combination of the call and put options, to create a 
process and product flexibility toward a downside protection (Martins et al, 2014).   
Participants disclosed that their concessions introduced them to other politicians 
and heads of governments. They revealed that these connections are business networks 
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that have given them other jobs, and the once that they are yet to tap into. One of the 
participants recorded getting a business network that could make their concession a 
nationwide project from their concession with FCTA. Five comments from the study 
participants summarized the significance of this subtheme in terms of importance and 
relevance, stating the following: 
P2 said, “And I also met politicians during my concession  period that have been giving 
me other businesses long after the concession.” P3 said, “This concession connected me 
to the Vice President of Nigeria, to whom I explained the workings of mortgage and have 
remained in contact with because, he intends to finally use Mortgage housing to create 
jobs in Nigeria.” 
P7 explained, 
1. The FCT transport secretary also introduced me to his counterpart at Lagos State 
government whom we are at the moment working with to acquire a contract to 
supply fire extinguishers to his ministry. These opportunity helped us come out of 
the concession without a huge debt hanging on our neck, but could not help our 
concession further because, they do not involve enough profits to get the 
concession off the ground. 
P9 also explained that 
I would say I built a network from this concession, I became very popular in FCT 
that I could have gotten any other project that would have been more rewarding. 
Like when they allocated mass housing plots, if I wanted it, the minister would have 
gladly given some to me. But I was so into making what we had work. But I still 
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use my network to help other concessionaires till today. I got the knowledge and 
understanding of the city’s masterplan through this network. This network further 
exposed me to meet other public officers from other government organizations. 
 
In analyzing this subtheme through the RFT, I found some uncertainties turn out 
as opportunities instead of challenges for both parties to a concession. New business 
networks from an on-going concession is an   exogenous flexibility which exists outside 
the system and operations, and created to mitigate residual risks like huge loan debts 
beyond a concessionaire’s control (Kokkaew et al., 2012). 
    
Participants reported opportunities to improve their projects in the midst of all the 
barriers. Strategic management was one way a lot of concessionaires improved their 
projects. Others added some features to their projects that were not there, but made them 
better by increasing the values of their projects. Some other concessionaires poured 
proceeds of other businesses they had into their concessions to improve the project. One 
engaged in flexible construction that considered future projects. Eight comments from the 
study participants summarized the significance of this subtheme in terms of importance 
and relevance, stating the following: 
P1 explained, 
Yes, and it is the flexibility that has helped us overcome the initial stages of this 
concession. We have the flexibility to design the Entertainment World to suit the 
Nigerian weather and for expansion to meet future requirements. But we do not 
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have options to transfer risks. Asking for that as we were proposing  the 
concession would have killed the business even before it started. What I am doing 
presently to help my concession is tarring the 6km road that leads to my 
construction site. I need to do that to take away the feeling that my site is behind 
civilization from every potential client, customer or financier that visits the site.  I 
am doing this because I sometimes loose potential local partners to the fact that 
my site location is far removed from the major road. 
P2 also explained, 
I found myself in that mess and dealt with it in ways I thought would create a 
win-win. So the uncertainties that came with the concession molded me into a 
more pragmatic business man. Well, if you come to do business in Nigeria you 
need the right mind set, you need to understand that things are so slow in Nigeria. 
I had a business going by the side, which was also paying most of my bills. It was 
very frustrating but I hung-in there because I had another means of livelihood. It 
was all difficult trying to get government officials to work with us, see and 
understand what we were doing, But we pulled through all the same. We also had 
a Memorandum of Understanding in place, after which we proceeded with area 
measurements and other things needed for site preparations. We worked with FCT 
staff on site preparations and drawings and other things that required their 
analysis. We were bidding for jobs for years without succeeding  until we decided 




P3 said, “Keeping the FCT Masterplan in mind, we engaged in flexible construction that 
considers future projects.” 
P4 also explained that 
Well we used the shutdown period to also evaluate our entire project and found 
out that some major things were missing in the proposed construction plan. We 
added a Polo Park, 20 tents game reserve, and a host of other infrastructures that 
hugely increased the value of our project to the design. We were also able to 
change the layout of the sewage system, connecting all to the city’s main line, 
reconnected some road networks as value engineering, to save over 200Million 
US Dollars. 
P5 mentioned that 
Yeah, we managed through it. We are lucky that we never took any loan from 
anywhere for the initial setting out on site and the excavation. If we had taken a 
loan, you can imagine what would have happened, like the weight of debt we 
would’ve been carrying by now. Our company might have sunk by now. For our 
many costs, proceeds of other businesses took care of it.  
The RFT is all about improving value of projects. Flexibility is the injection of physical 
mechanisms that come as options and contingent claims, or renegotiation clauses 
embedded  into infrastructure contracts to cope with new barriers and opportunities (Cruz 
& Marques, 2012). As P3 concessions are large-sunk, long term (incomplete) contracts, 
the identification of appropriate mechanisms that increase the flexibility of its contracts 
and allows for on-going renegotiations reduces their level of uncertainty and leads to the 
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success of projects ( Cruz & Marques, 2013; Chiara & Kokkaew, 2009; Dong & Chiara, 
2013). 
Anchor Theme 3: Effects of Uncertainties on Value of Projects 
Participants disclosed that despite huge efforts spent in attempts to create 
successful projects, the projects end up struggling for a long time. Some struggle with 
funds to get their projects of the ground, while others struggle with emerging barriers like 
corruption in government offices. These projects stay struggling for a long time in the 
absence of proper risk allocation, management, and mitigation (Dong & Chiara, 2010, 
p.87). Four comments from the participants summarized this Subtheme’s importance and 
relevance to the phenomenon of study, stating the following: 
P1 revealed that 
I brought my Foreign investors to speak with the Permanent Secretary before we 
signed our agreement and the Permanent Secretary started making demands as 
conditions for signing the concession agreement. My foreign investor pulled me 
aside and asked if these guys are serious or not. The second thing is that as you 
demonstrate what you intend to deliver to the people on behalf of the government 
every government official seated there is watching and thinking about your 
project, to figure out how to make money from it for themselves. Another thing is 
that Nigerians do not know the benefits of all those infrastructures. How can it be 
that a Permanent Secretary does not know how much the provision of necessary 
infrastructure enhances living standards? They know this, but it all doesn’t make 
any sense to them when they are not earning from it. So they will tell you point-
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blank that you are a joker if you think you will sign the concession without first 
settling them. Well I lost the opportunity of getting cheap funds, but I have gone 
to another international funding agent who is funding my project presently. What 
I am doing presently to help my concession is tarring the 6km road that leads to 
my construction site. I need to do that to take away the feeling that my site is 
behind civilization from every potential client, customer or financier that visits the 
site.  I am doing this because I sometimes loose potential local partners to the fact 
that my site location is far removed from the major road. So, though we brought 
the President, Legislative members, FCT Minister, and other dignitaries to our site 
to see what we are doing and they loved it and asked the FCT Minister to build 
the 6km road for us, the Minister did not do it. And that had discouraged a lot of 
potential local partners before we decided to build the road ourselves. That is how 
much the collaboration is worth. 
P5 explained, 
The concessionaires to continue work Well, initially, there were no barriers but a 
lot of cooperation from our public partners, but from the time there was a change 
of government, a lot of political interests came up, which has stopped our project 
and I will honestly tell you that if not for the legal framework that has bound the 
government to this concession, it would have been flushed down the drain, 
because after some hearing about this concession with the house of 
representatives and FCTA, they could not come up with any particular thing to 
say was wrong about the concession or its agreement, so we were asked to go 
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back to work. There  was no way they could continue holding the project 
because the investors were well protected by the framework. It was also in 
avoidance of damages that the Attorney General of the Federations advised FCT 
and their new administration to allow. 
P8 informed that 
Yes, all the barriers were related to political risk, although they were not 
unanticipated, we did not expect it to bring about complete stop of government 
partnership or concession. Because when an administration changes like that, 
especially when it is a total change from one political party to another, which was 
what occurred, the new government starts from the beginning, trying to 
understand what might have transpired.  
Participants reported being exploited by the public partners in every possible way. They 
relate the failure of their concession projects to the self-centeredness of public officers. 
Some participants revealed that concession projects are guided into failures by public 
officers in Nigeria to hinder development that might erase corruption out of Public 
Administration. Some attributed their failure to bureaucratic frustrations that one can only 
buy their way through with fortunes that only a few can afford. Eight comments from the 
participants summarized this Subtheme’s importance and relevance to the phenomenon of 
study, stating the following: 
P2 explained, 
For sure, I did, at the end there was no motivation to continue because of the 
whole political and public officers interest, corruption, and undue interference 
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from all angles. Everybody wanted a piece of our business profit, even the 
legislatures, it was crazy. And when we could pay no more, they frustrated the 
project to failure. 
P3 also explained that 
So I worked with them for three months trying to get the funds we needed to start, 
but after submitting all the documents they demanded, we could not access any 
funds. That was the first barrier. The second one that the prior occupants of the 
land that the government offered us for development became small militia that 
attacked our workers to stop the gentrification of their ancestry lands. Then came 
the episode with the FMBN, where corruption was the order of the day. They 
would issue a loan of #200Million naira with a cutback of #50Millionnaira. It was 
all nonsense. I couldn’t become a part of a corrupt cartel so had to leave. I left 
when it became clear that the only option open for us to access funds was through 
FMBN, where I would have taken a loan in my name and agree to pay 20% of the 
loan amount back to the public officer before even having access to the funds. 
That was a horrible offer. 
P6 informed, 
After the contract agreement was signed, FCTA demanded that we should show 
proof of funds, which we did. They further demanded that we open a joint account 
with them and deposit the sum of #1Billion naira that they could withdraw monies 
from, for the concession documentation and administrative purposes. Yes, 
1Billion naira. And that was the obstacle that stopped the concession because, my 
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financiers were not too comfortable with that demand. In trying to move our 
concession forward, I started looking for other financiers who could share the 
#1Billion naira burden. And that is where the concession stands at this moment. 
P7 also informed that 
Yes, we struggled with lots of barriers. Firstly, we had to spend a lot of money to 
push our concession approval to the signing stage. After signing the concession 
agreement, the FCTA would not come out to start the advertisement of the 
product with us as agreed. We went back and forth with it, and they just wouldn’t 
come out to join us in the advert, to show the people that they are working with us 
on this project. They simply declined, saying that as an arm of government, they 
should not be seen as siding their consultant to force the people into buying any 
product. That didn’t make sense at all, especially when they agreed to do it in the 
first place. Secondly, the ripple effect of FCTA not advertising with us hindered 
our ability to secure a bank loan for the importation of the goods. The bank which 
we had been talking to, understood that we were working directly with 
government, and that was the condition precedent upon which they agreed to 
grant the loan for both the advert and importation of the product. While we were 
looking for funds to take the business off the ground we got information from a 
very reliable source that the FCTA was talking with one of their retired directors 
about taking over our concession and doing it as a contract instead of a 
concession. This means they will fund the contractor to import and sell the 
product, and they will share the profits equally. We confronted the secretary of 
140 
 
transport who did not deny it but accused us of so much delays in starting up our 
project. He also added that they were just looking of alternative ways of executing 
the project. We asked whether they could fund us to start immediately, and they 
declined. Our partnership in the  collaboration with FCTA was greatly damaged 
and the value of our project was reduced to nothing without the government’s 
backing. It was as if the sparkles left the diamond. No other financiers or investors 
would touch our business without the government’s backing. We tried hard for a 
while but could not cope with the blow. 
P9 explained, 
When we started, we started seeing issues of multiple layouts. When we got the 
samples of enough subscribers, the director of lands decided that he no longer 
needs the project. One of the directors called and told me that the Director of 
lands threatened him for helping us. I met the Director of lands and tried to cajole 
him into letting us continue our work, but he outrightly refused. :  And that’s how 
we struggled with the project for five years without any headway until the first 
term of our contract expired in 2015. So, when we went to the new minister to 
renew the contract, the Director of lands told the Minister that our project is the 
former Minister’s scheme to continue enriching himself even after leaving office. 
Being on the opposing side, the new minister bought the story and kept our 
application in view while we ran overhead and other costs like the rent of 
20million naira a year. We were also asked to stop work, pending the renewal of 
our contract for the next five years. After a long while I got information from a 
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very reliable source that they have no intentions of renewing our contract. On that 
information, I shut down the project and laid-off our staff to avoid being driven 
into bankruptcy.  
In Chapter 5, interpretations of findings are provided using a realist approach to 
address experiences, meanings, and motivations in a straightforward way. 
Limitations involving trustworthiness and potential impact of positive change are 
also discussed. Some recommendations for future research are given. I conclude 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In this hermeneutical phenomenological study, I explored lived experiences 
involving concession uncertainties for concessionaires who have or had P3 concessions 
with the FCTA of Nigeria. The purpose of this study was to explore, understand, and 
interpret the meaning of P3 concession uncertainties experiences  for concessionaires 
within FCTA, and how these experiences influence P3 project outcomes. Specifically, I 
sought to support P3 concessions by providing insights regarding how contract structures 
affect both concessionaires and their projects. Enriching both the concessionaires and 
public actors knowledge regarding barriers and opportunities involving P3 concessions in 
connection with contract structures may assist decision makers at all levels of 
government to craft better contracts that will guide successful concession projects. 
 A total of nine concessionaires who were or are involved in P3 concessions with 
the FCTA participated in this study. All concessionaires recounted experiencing both 
barriers and opportunities during their concessions with the FCTA. Each participant 
reported being unable to freely negotiate concession contract terms and structures. While 
participating in this study, each concessionaires participated in two in-depth interviews. 
 Interviews were digitally recorded with an audio recording device for easy 
tracking and transcription. I subsequently transcribed, stored, and managed interview data 
using both Microsoft Word and NVivo 12. I organized and distributed data into five 
clusters and defined them according to three classifications or anchor themes which were 
comprised of 15 subthemes.  
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Interpretation of Findings 
 The results of this hermeneutic phenomenological study clarified my 
understanding of lived experiences involving P3 concession uncertainties for 
concessionaires who were or are collaborating with the FCTA of Nigeria. I acquired 
information needed to understand and interpret lived experiences by conducting 
qualitative in-depth interviews with nine concessionaires. One central research question 
guided this study: What is the meaning of P3 concession uncertainty for concessionaires 
with the FCTA of Nigeria, and to what extent did these choices, options, and experiences 
affect project values? 
I identified a total of three anchor themes and 15 subthemes that represent lived 
experiences of P3 concession uncertainties for concessionaires with the FCTA of Nigeria. 
I explained subthemes using the realist epistemological approach. Interpretation of 
findings will be in form of discussions of lived experiences of P3 concession 
uncertainties divided into three parts based on the three anchor themes. 
Emerging Barriers to P3 Concession 
Inexperienced Concessionaires 
 P3 is a new phenomenon in Nigeria, meaning that many people do not have 
experience undertaking such projects (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015). Participants said that 
they worked with engineers who had no prior experience in the projects they were doing. 
P8 said one of the reasons concessions failed, especially in Nigeria was that 
concessionaires who had no experience tried to illegally execute concession agreements.  
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Corruption and Insincerity of Public Officers 
 Public officers interfere with the operations of P3 projects by demanding 
kickbacks for projects to proceed. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) said public workers who 
indulge in corruption within P3 projects stall such projects’ progress. Participants 
reported that most public officials were not concerned about whether projects would be 
completed; they only thought of how they would benefit from the projects. P2 said that 
everybody wanted business profits, even legislatures. Failure to pay bribes led to 
restructured projects failures. Public actors did not care whether the state lost money; all 
they wanted was to enrich themselves. P1 said, “the project look like it was conceived, 
initiated and planned for the public officers’ self-aggrandizement.”  
Poor Institutional Framework for Enforcement 
Policies or legal frameworks are supposed to define parties’ obligations, and protect their 
interests at all stages of a concession (Opawole & Jagboro, 2016, p. 28). Having good 
policies and legal frameworks helps in adapting contract terms. Participants pointed out 
that concessions lacked strong enabling policies and legal frameworks. P4 said every 
time the government changed in Nigeria, the new government tried to change everything 
the old one had done. Some participants stated they did not sign any agreement with the 
government because there was no government policy to back-up the concession. They 
merely signed a memorandum  of understanding with some public officer and went into 
execution. 
Poor Political Willingness 
 Lack of political goodwill alters implementation and success of P3 projects 
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(Panayides et al., 2015). Participants mentioned that the government did not assist the 
concessionaires, even with something as small as talking to the central bank to lend to the 
concessionaires at a moderate rate. It was difficult to get government officials to work 
with investors, see and understand what they were doing. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) said 
public actors in a new government are reluctant to continue P3 concession projects when 
they take over the offices, ignoring or violating contract provisions. P2 said, “the new 
guys who came into power next felt he project was already going, and he wouldn't be 
gaining from it, so he frustrated.” 
Difficulty in Securing Business Capital 
 It is challenging to secure funding for huge projects in Nigeria from local banks 
(Opawole & Jagboro, 2017). Also, loans from foreign institutions come with conditions 
that are hard to meet. Such loans require collateral, which investors do have. P1 said that 
she did not have the right collateral to secure loans because the government refused to 
give land titles, which could be used as collateral. Participants recalled how they could 
not get funds because financiers understood that investment in Nigeria came with a lot of 
unavoidable risks that could kill projects. Loans in Nigeria are repaid at high interest 
rates, making it difficult for concessionaires to recoup their investments on schedule 
(Ibem et al., 2017). This made it difficult for concessionaires to secure funding. Also, 
participants lost money trying to look for new investors. P3 said they lost money while 
traveling to convince their financiers to come back and work with them after the 
financiers left due to public actors’ corrupt practices and incessant demands for bribe. 
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Poor Concession Adaptation Mechanism 
 Participants reported that their concessions lacked efficient adaptation 
mechanisms. They also confessed that the Nigerian government would not have given 
them the chance to embed flexibilities in their concession contracts. They merely hoped 
that when barriers emerged, the government would be willing to work with them to 
ensure the issues are solved. Some of the main barriers to concession adaptation is 
imprecision from ambiguity of communication, lack of information, system variable 
variations, and unknown outcomes of agent interactions (Cruz & Marques, 2012, p. 474). 
The issue here is that the Nigerian government structures rigid contracts that lacked 
renegotiation abilities, crafting formalized, bureaucratic, rigid, procedures to secure 
politics against third party opportunism (Beuve et al., 2014b, p.9). Participants recorded 
that though they knew that their concession contracts were structured rigidly to avoid 
renegotiations, they had no options nor opinions. The study results confirm that studied 
concession had poor adaptation mechanisms.                                                                                                                 
Insufficient Contract Protection 
 Participants explained that concession contracts with FCTA of Nigerian has 
insufficient contract protection, but thought they could evade all risks by staggering the 
phases to get paid before they go into another phase. Some other participants thought 
they should just accept the contract the way they are and site letter agreements to correct 
any anomalies that arise in the course of the projects. The participants also thought that 
their concession contracts were strongly protected by their legal frameworks and policies 
that backed their concessions, and the presidential approval that most of them had, only 
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to figure that the legal frameworks which had no flexibilities embedded, were just too 
bogus to protect their concessions. Roumboutsos and Saussier (2015) suggested that it is 
crucial to introduce some flexibilities that enables renegotiations at the downsides (p. 2). 
Study results confirm that the concessionaires concession contracts lacked all sorts of 
flexibility, lacking sufficient contract protection. 
Conflict Between Partners 
 Seven participants’ responses showed that there were conflicts between partners 
to some concessions. These conflicts were caused by the level of corruption in public 
offices. Officials were taking bribes to even attend to submissions that could turn-around 
a country’s fate. P1recounted how they spent large sums of money to follow-up on the 
concession Bid, and even travel around the world with government officials in due 
process, but were finally denied the concession, only to be given back the offer when 
they discovered that they had no expertise to execute the project. This created a big 
problem between the concessionaires and the public officers overseeing the project, and 
made their foreign investors back-out of the business. P2 also went to court to get their 
payment for the first phase done, and could not continue working with FCTA after the 
incidence. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) posited that conflict between partners create a 
hostile atmosphere that affects partners performance, waste construction resources and 
time, and jeopardizes the success of projects (p. 446). Study results confirm that public 
officers are not flexible enough to encourage good working relationships that project 
common interests and visions towards mutually successful projects.  
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Implication of Changes in Government    
 A change in government in Nigeria unfortunately translates to change in 
government policies, and affects policy related to concession projects (Opawole & 
Jagboro., 2016, p.41). The participants narrated how change in government became a big 
disadvantage to their concessions. P2 referred to Nigeria as an unhealthy climate, stating 
that their concession was going well until a new government administration emerged. P5 
pointed out that the new government that emerged did not like the old one and indict 
them and cancel the concession contracts the old one signed. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) 
argued that public actors in a new government are reluctant to continue P3 concession 
projects when they take over offices, ignoring and, or violating contract provisions. 
Political unwillingness may alter or blot out the possibility of P3 implementation and 
success (Panayides, Parola, and Lam, 2015). Study results confirm that change in 
government negatively affects both the public and private partners to a concession, and 
also the projects themselves. 
Inefficient Investments    
 Participants expressed that public officers constantly did things to render their 
investments inefficient. P1 claims that a government officer demanded kickbacks as a 
condition for signing their concession agreement, and that upset their foreign investor 
into backing out of the business. Again, participant considered the government officers 
ignorant for wanting to use traffic lights at some intersections, but put traffic wardens to 
work at some intersections between the lights; making the traffic lights inefficient by 
taking away the synchronization. Also, P9 reported working very hard with his team to 
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ensure that they succeed in their task, only to be frustrated out of their concession by just 
one public officer that did not like their project. House (2016) found that complex 
administrative and regulatory strategies and sound institutional oversight are required in 
the management of P3s to avoid opportunism and ensure partners commitment to contract 
agreements over long time frames (p. 179). Study results confirm that public officers at 
FCTA of Nigeria engage in corrupt practices and ignorant behaviors that render 
concession investments inefficient. 
Emerging Opportunities to P3 Concessions 
Alternative Business Opportunities    
 Participants disclosed that they were offered alternative business opportunities 
which most of them took to help them out of debt incurred in the course of their 
concession, but others turned down as a matter of principle. Flexibility is the ability of 
living organisms to adapt themselves to changing conditions (Cruz & Marques, 2013a). 
P1 said, 
Yes, lots of unexpected opportunities. Firstly, I met most of the very influential 
men in Nigeria in the course of my concession, I met governors that want me to 
build Entertainment worlds in their various states, I even met a governor from 
Ghana who would like me to build for his state after building for Nigerian states.  
P3 stated, “Yes! A company aside the one I came to work for, offered me a job and was 
willing to pay me more than my company offered. I also met so many people important 
dignitaries.” P5 said, “Sure, we had lots of opportunities which are mostly economic. 
This concession exposed me to so many parties who are very influential in Nigeria.” 
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Study results show that some participants were flexible enough to take on alternative 
business opportunities that presented themselves during the course of their concession to 
help them cope with the downside barriers. A certain degree of freedom is important to 
enable adaptability within systems, to cope with changes (Cruz & Marques, 
2013a;Martins et al., 2014; Martimort & Straub, 2016). 
Business Networks   
 Participants reported that through the FCTA projects, they met people from other 
departments and countries. Through such interactions, they were able to get other 
businesses. For example, P6 said, “We also met with a lot of government officials who 
were interested in working on other projects with us.” P7 said that through connection 
and interaction with the FCT transport secretary, they were introduced to ministry 
officials who wanted similar services. That opportunity helped them come out of the 
concession without huge debt. 
Improvement of Project Values       
 The theory used in the research is Chiara and Kokkaew (2009) RFT, using ROA 
and CFA to evaluate and analyze the risks of infrastructure development projects to make 
them more economically efficient. Using RO techniques, investors remove uncertainties 
by coming up with strategies of mitigating downside risks (Martins et al., 2014). Also, 
CFA includes endogenous interdependent flexibility by igniting mechanisms that 
improve contract behaviors by allowing risk shifts from one partner to another (Cruz & 
Marques, 2013a, p. 476). Ratkic and Radenovic (2014) explained that there should be 




 Participants identified limiting loan inaccessibility, designing projects with 
allowance for future development, and phasing projects as some of the concessions' 
flexibilities. P5 reported that they cushioned the effect of loan inaccessibility by putting 
the title document in escrow. As soon as they achieved 20% of their obligations, the land 
title documents would be issued to the promoter to use as collateral to borrow funds for 
the project. Also, resetting the aboriginals that lived on the lands to be developed so they 
would not encounter them. P1 and P3 stated that they engaged in a construction plan that 
allowed for future requirements in case of changes. In addition, participants explained 
that investors evaded risks by executing projects in phases. P3 said, “Staggering the stage 
in such a way that before the second phase starts, we would have gotten paid for both the 
first and second phase, which kind of evades the risk.” 
Effects of P3 Concession Uncertainties on Value of Projects 
Struggling Projects       
 Participants disclosed that despite huge efforts spent in attempts to create 
successful projects, the projects end up struggling for a long time. Some struggle with 
funds to get their projects of the ground, while others struggle with emerging barriers like 
corruption in government offices. These projects stay struggling for a long time in the 
absence of proper risk allocation, management, and mitigation (Dong & Chiara, 2010, 
p.87). Participant 001 disclosed that a public officer’s reckless demand made them lose a 
foreign investor that would have given them cheap funds for their project. Again, P5 
pointed out that a change in government stalled their project, bringing everything to an 
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abrupt stop, and thinks that their contract would have been canceled if they did not have a 
good legal framework. Similarly, P8 inferred that albeit knowing Nigeria for what it is, 
they did not think a new government would bring an on-going government collaboration 
to a complete stop, until they have decided how to proceed. Study results confirm that 
33% of participants showed that their projects are still struggling with emerging barriers.  
Failed Projects     
 Participants reported being exploited by the public partners in every 
possible way. They relate the failure of  their concession projects to the self-
centeredness of public officers. Some participants revealed that concession 
projects are guided into failures by public officers in Nigeria to hinder 
development that might erase corruption out of Public Administration. Some 
attributed their failure to bureaucratic frustrations that one can only buy their way 
through with fortunes that only a few can afford. Five participants indicated that 
their concessions failed after much struggles with the emerging barriers.  
P2 stated,  
For sure, I did, at the end there was no motivation to continue because of the 
whole political and public officers interest, corruption, and undue interference 
from all angles. Everybody wanted a piece of our business profit, even the 
legislatures, it was crazy. And when we could pay no more, they frustrated the 
project to failure. 
P3 stated,  
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So I worked with them for three months trying to get the funds we needed to 
start, but after submitting all the documents they demanded, we could not 
access any funds. That was the first barrier. The second one was that the prior 
occupants of the land that the government offered us for development became 
small militia that attacked our workers to stop the gentrification of their 
ancestry lands. Then came the episode with the FMBN, where corruption was 
the order of the day. They would issue a loan of #200Million naira with a 
cutback of #50Millionnaira. It was all nonsense. I couldn’t become a part of a 
corrupt cartel so had to leave. I left when it became clear that the only option 
open for us to access funds was through FMBN, where I would have taken a 
loan in my name and agree to pay 20% of the loan amount back to the public 
officer before even having access to the funds. That was a horrible offer. 
P6 reported that,  
After the contract agreement was signed, FCTA demanded that we should 
show proof of funds, which we did. They further demanded that we open a 
joint account with them and deposit the sum of #1Billion naira that they 
could withdraw monies from, for the concession documentation and 
administrative purposes. Yes, #1Billion naira. And that was the obstacle 
that stopped the concession because, my financiers were not too 
comfortable with that demand. In trying to move our concession forward, I 
started looking for other financiers who could share the #1Billion naira 
burden. And that is where the concession stands at this moment”.  
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Study results show that 55% of Participants reported that their concessions failed 
after much struggles. 
Limitations of the Study   
 Lack of numerical data to support the findings was a limitation I anticipated. 
Quantitative research findings could be concluded with the certainty of numbers to 
express the significance of the outcomes (Husserl, 2013). Specifically, my sample size of 
nine participants was also not enough to assert quantitative significance and 
generalization of findings to the large population of concessionaires who have 
collaborated with FCTA of Nigeria. Also, I initially set-out to have a face to face 
interview that would have enabled me meet the participants in person and observe their 
body languages, eye contacts, and other important reactions to my interview questions, 
but could not have that eventually, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Again, engaging in 
hermeneutic phenomenology requires the inclusion of the researcher’s presuppositions of 
the study phenomenon (Spence, 2017). In hermeneutic phenomenology, the researcher 
stands as a co-constructor of meaning with the participants and their experiences (Sloan 
& Bowe, 2014). Trustworthiness of the study is also jeopardized by both the lack of 
numerical data to support the findings and the inclusion of the collaborative role of the 
hermeneutic phenomenological researcher.  
 Trustworthiness refers to issues of validity and reliability of a research procedure 
as a significant element of the methodology (Maxwell, 2013, p.121). it is the rigor with 
which a study is conducted to ensure its credibility (Noble & Smith, 2015, p.34). I 
ensured that the selected participants met the study criteria to acquire rich data and 
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enhance transferability of the study. Doing so helped me gather data with meaningful 
emergent themes (Morse,2015). Member checking and verbatim accounts of participant 
experiences enhanced the credibility of my study. Also, connecting the participants 
experiences to credible literary sources increased the credibility and trustworthiness of 
the research (Sloan & Bowe, 2014).  
Recommendations   
This study provides an interpretive meaning of the lived experiences of P3 
concession uncertainty for concessionaires with FCTA of Nigeria. The study 
findings add to the dearth of research regarding lived experiences of P3 
concession uncertainties for concessionaires by looking at the emerging barriers 
and opportunities that come with P3 concessions, and interpreting the meaning of 
these experiences for concessionaires. The current study answers the research 
question by interpreting the meaning of these experiences for concessionaires and 
exploring how these options, choices, and experiences of the study phenomenon 
shapes concession projects outcomes. Based on the findings of the current study, a 
follow-up study to learn if the experiences of these participants changed over 
time, to provide insight regarding the crafting of flexible contracts structures for 
adaptation is recommended. This additional understanding will would increase the 
knowledge of the meaning of lived experiences of the phenomenon. Another 
recommendation for future research is to study the impact of  flexible contract 
structures on P3 concession uncertainties. Flexible contract structure permits 
renegotiations to adapt concession agreements (Chung & Hensher, 2016; Oliveira 
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et al., 2016). 
One of the key barriers facing P3 concessions, as identified by the participants, 
was corruption and insincerity in the public offices. Participants stated that public 
officials asked for bribes before they could approve contracts. They did not look for the 
public good; they were only concerned about making money from projects. The 
following are some ways of dealing with willing corruption. The law should be 
effectively enforced to ensure that the corrupt are punished, and impunity is dealt with. 
Also, all stakeholders should be involved in fighting corruption. Citizens should be 
involved and encouraged to report any forms of corruption in the public sector. Investors 
should report public officials who ask for bribes to international organizations to ensure 
that they are sanctioned and not allowed to launder or hide the proceeds of corruption. 
Banks should monitor accounts of people suspected of dealing in corruption and monitor 
for any illicit flow of finances in their accounts. 
Participants also stated that the cost of projects increased due to inflation and 
instability of the Naira against foreign currencies. The cost of building materials, labor, 
and interest rates went up. This barrier can be dealt with by renegotiating the terms of 
contracts or by designing flexible projects that cater to such uncertainties. Contracts 
should be formulated in a way that they allow for inflation and currency fluctuation. 
Costing of projects can also be done in major stable currencies so that any instability in 
the Naira does not affect the initial cost of the project.  
Participants highlighted how poor political goodwill had affected P3 projects. 
Most of the public workers were marred with self-centeredness and did not support 
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projects that did not benefit them. Also, the change of government affected the progress 
of projects. This can be resolved by coming of policies that protect investors such that 
any change of government does not affect projects. In addition, workers who lack 
integrity should be sacked. The citizenry should be educated on electing leaders who 
have integrity. Leaders who have public needs at heart.  
Participants also asserted that no strong policies and legal frameworks were 
governing P3 concessions projects. Since P3 projects are new in Nigeria, and there were 
no policies and legal framework. The legislature, and all concerned bodies should 
formulate laws and policies to ensure that investors and clients are protected.  
Implications   
The results of the study illuminates its potential contributions to positive social 
change. The current research serves as the foundation for social change in the area of P3 
concession contract structuring, in relation to project values and outcomes. Also, 
inexperienced concessionaires and laymen could benefit from understanding the meaning 
of P3 concession Uncertainties for concessionaires with FCTA of Nigeria. Again, 
decision makers in the P3 concession sector will benefit from understanding the emerging 
barriers and opportunities and how they shape project outcomes; to help them craft more 
flexibly successful contract agreements. The insights from this study offers government 
officers an opportunity to revamp P3 policies and procedures by embracing critical 
success factors that will increase the number of successful projects. 
 Naturally, P3 promoters in Nigeria approach concessions like unmerited offers 
because of the corrupt bidding system. They accept this partnership as a favour from 
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people in government, so they work without grounds or the right to negotiate terms. 
Oliveira et al. argued that as much as P3 concessions may appear like a simple 
investment structure, its problems start prior designs, as all components must be defined 
under uncertainty and probability due to information asymmetry (para 4 & 5). Today 
Risk Flexibility Theory offers these promoters and public overseers the options to 
transfer risks, and various types of flexibilities that would create more successful projects 
(Cruz & Marques, 2013: Chiara & Kokkaew, 2009; Dong & Chiara, 2013). The 
implications of this study are twofold regarding the positive impact of social change. 
Firstly, the study results may help public decision makers to improve the cost 
effectiveness and quality of concession agreements, which will in line encourage more 
collaborations and foreign investments. Secondly, the increase in number of successful 
P3 concessions will also increase the rate and speed of development in FCTA of Nigeria. 
 The implementation of Heidegger’s philosophy of hermeneutic phenomenology 
made it possible to “understand the meaning of experience by searching for themes, and 
engaging the data interpretively” (Sloan & Bowe, 2014, p. 1297). Working with the 
tenets of hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry availed me the opportunity to 
incorporate my prior knowledge of the phenomenon by engaging in a collaborative 
research process with the participants to interpret the meaning of their experiences. 
Therefore, the study results credibly add to the body of existing research in the area of P3 
concessions uncertainties, providing an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon from 
the concessionaires lived experiences. This study highlights the value of engaging in a 
hermeneutic framework to deepen the understanding of the study phenomena, and 
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enhance the trustworthiness of qualitative research. 
 Regarding Public Administrative practice, The findings of the study imply the 
need to reform Nigerian Civil Service. Based on this study, the public officers in FCTA 
of Nigeria firstly, are ignorant, and do not understand importance and advantages of P3 
concessions to the development of the state. And secondly, they are too corrupt that they 
use public offices to amass personal wealth or propagate personal interests, increasing the 
cost of transactions (Ameyaw & Chan, 2015, p. 442-444). These deficiencies call for an 
immediate reform of the Civil Service system in Nigeria, weeding out the corrupt officers 
and replacing them with more educated and honest young patriotic ones. It also indicates 
the need to craft flexible concession agreements based on strong and binding legal 
frameworks and other contract adaptation mechanisms.  
     Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to explore and interpret the experiences of public-
private partnership concession uncertainties for concessionaires with Federal Capital 
Territory Administration of Nigeria. The key uncertainties identified from this 
phenomenological study were barriers to P3 projects. These barriers are environmental 
barriers, financial and commercial barriers, legal and socio-political barriers, and 
technical barriers. The financial barriers identified in the study are Inflation and 
Fluctuation in currency exchange rate, and lack of funding and loss of money. Legal and 
socio-political barriers include corruption and insincerity in the public sector, inadequate 
political goodwill, and poor enabling policy or legal frameworks. Lack of knowledge on 
benefits of P3 and lack of P3 experience were the technical barriers while the 
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environmental barrier was public resistance. It has been discovered that these barriers 
stall the execution of P3 projects. Barriers such as inflation and fluctuation of the Naira 
and corruption increases the cost of the project. To successfully complete a project, 
investors inject more money due to the reduction of the value of Naira. Also, money paid 
to corruption makes projects more expensive and must be recovered in running the 
project which eats on the profit. Lack of political goodwill slows projects, leads to failure 
of the project and loss of foreign investors. It discourages foreign investors from 
engaging in projects that involve FCTA, and Nigeria as a nation.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I present research findings. I compare findings to literature 
presented in Chapter 2. Limitations involving trustworthiness that arose during the 
process of investigation are described. Furthermore, I share potential impacts for positive 
change. Finally, my reflections as the researcher are given along with a concluding 
message that captures the key essence of this study.  
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Appendix A: Invitation to Participate 
          Invitation Letter 
You are invited to take part in a research study about “Experiences of Public-private 
partnership Concession Uncertainties in The Federal Capital Territory Administration of 
Nigeria”. The researcher is inviting Concessionaire that have experienced P3 
concession uncertainties while collaborating with Federal Capital Territory 
Administration of Nigeria to deliver public infrastructure, to be in the study.  
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Chigbo  CHIKELU, who is a 
doctoral student at Walden University. Please note, all prospective participants have the 
option to accept or decline this invitation. If interested contact me at the information 
below.  
Respectively 
Name: Chigbo CHIKELU 
Doctoral Candidate of Policy Analysis 
School: Walden University 
Ph.D. Public Policy and Administration-Policy Analysis 




Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
A good interview protocol is essential to obtaining the best information from the  
participants.  Make good connections so the participant feels free to share their story 
which in qualitative research it is important to work with connecting with people.  
Prevent from allow yourself from being distracted.  
Field Procedures: Define major tasks in data collection 
 Develop interview question  
 Develop interview protocol/individual and focus group 
 Issue -Focused Analysis: code what could be learned about specific issues from 
the respondent:  
Prepare for interviews 
Review Interview Guide 
Make list of participants 
Write open ended questions 
Focus on questions that answer the research questions 
Encourage people to talk descriptively 
Setting: Neutral and few distractions 
Review purpose of study, review confidentiality with participants 
Don’t make the interview too long 
Create probes and prompts for each question helps keep on track 
Focus on research question  
Research questions drive the resource process and structure of the study 
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 Remember what data is needed to answer research question and why 
 Keep interview on track 




Appendix C: Interview Questions 
1. Was your concession with Federal Capital Territory Administration of Nigeria the 
first you were in?  
2. Describe your, and your organizations role in the concession you had, or have 
with Federal Capital Territory Administration of Nigeria? 
3. What choices and options attracted you and your organization to a partnership 
with Federal Capital Territory Administration of Nigeria? 
4. Did you struggle with any emerging barriers during your concession with Federal 
Capital Territory Administration of Nigeria, if yes, in what ways did, or do these 
barriers affect your partnership and value of projects, and with what strategies did, 
or do you cope with them? 
5. Were there opportunities that presented themselves to you in the course of your 
concession with Federal Capital Territory Administration of Nigeria, if yes, in 
what ways did, or do these opportunities affect your business plan and value of 
projects? 
6. Were there enabling policies and good legal frameworks that backed your 
contractual agreements, to accommodate and shape the risk-value profile of your 
concession with Federal Capital Territory Administration of Nigeria? 
               





Appendix D: First Level Themes 
Research Topic: Experiences of Public-private Partnership Concession Uncertainties in 
the Federal Capital Territory Administration of Nigeria. 
 
Research Question  
Patton (2002) pointed out that qualitative interviewing could be made deep by asking 
thoughtful, clear, singular, focused, and distinct questions (p. 360). This intended 
research study will be guided by one major research question: What is the meaning of P3 
concession uncertainty to concessionaires with Federal Capital Territory Administration 
of Nigeria, and to what extent did these choices, options, and experiences affect project 
values? 
Introduction. 
The task of discovering themes is at the heart of qualitative data analysis. These themes 
or abstract are constructs which researchers identify before, during and after data 
collection. This Appendix is consisting of a list of the basic themes (ideas, words, topics, 
subjects) that I intend to learn initially from my interview with research participants 
based on my interview questions. 
First Level Themes 
 Barriers to Public-private partnerships 
 Renegotiation 
 Insincerity in government 
 Corruption 
 Opportunism 
 Information Asymmetry 
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 Political bigotry 
 Incomplete contracts 
 Poor risk allocation 
 Inefficient contract agreements 
 Cost overrun 
 Demand forecast 
 Poor institutional frameworks 
 Poor communication 
 Nascent procurement process 
 Opportunities in Public-private partnerships 
 Contingent claims 
 Flexible contracts  
 
 
 
